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**THE
ARROW WAR WITH CHINA**

Cambridge:
PRINTED BY J. AND C. F. CLAY,
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

THE ARROW WAR WITH CHINA

BY

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NANYANG COLLEGE, SHANGHAI

LONDON

SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY

Limited

St. Dunstan's House

1901

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TO VINU
SINGHIAO

FOREWORD.

IT is impossible to read in the official documents or in individual narratives the story of what happened in China from 1856 to 1860, without being impressed with the similarity between the events of those days in the Far East and the occurrences of our own, which have been startling the world. Mr. Henry Norman has called attention to the review in *The Times* of the new edition of Lord Loch's *Personal Narrative of Occurrences in China in 1860*. "Then, as now, a war partly led by an Imperial Prince was in the ascendant; a war was forced on European Powers by a gross breach of a solemn treaty, two Ambassadors on their way to Peking being fired on and obliged to return; the armies of those Powers had to march on the Chinese capital; the Chinese authorities in the provinces were frantic in their eagerness to negotiate so as to stop the advance of the allied army on the capital. Li, then only a provincial Governor, had his little proposals for settling everything to his own satisfaction.

The Emperor had fled from the capital and the lady who is now Empress-Dowager had fled with him, and in many other respects history is just now repeating itself with curious fidelity." *Times*, Sept. 13, 1900.

This fact of similarity is, however, only a manifestation of the larger truth that from history we can draw many lessons which will be of service in getting at the roots of the mysterious problem of the Far East. It is hoped that these lessons may be of some service in awakening sympathy for the great Chinese race which, after passing through what valleys of humiliation we know not, will, some day, throw off the shackles of prejudice, ignorance and isolation and be ready to join the fraternity of the nations as a great, strong, progressive Power.

The study of these past happenings may also help to show how John Bull and Jean Crapeau, while Uncle Sam and the Russian Bear were watching near by, gave the sleeping giant some bluff and hearty raps which made him gape and stretch in a sleep which, it is to be hoped, will some time turn into a bright, joyous awakening.

It has seemed in a work of this kind in regard to a group of affairs, about which there exist so many clashing opinions, which is the focus of so many interests, national, professional, individual, humanitarian, that the best method is to let the actors in the stirring

events speak for themselves. If we have selections from the identical words of those representing invader and invaded, diplomat and fighter, Chinese statesman, foreign soldier, Consul and Ambassador, while the vibrating tones of the orchestra of war beat in the background, we can form our own judgments independently and join our respective camps of opinion.

One word in regard to the orthography of Chinese words. In a book of this sort it has seemed unnecessary to give the sign of the aspirate. For example, Taiping is written instead of T'ai-p'ing, and Taotai instead of Tao-t'ai. The general tendency also is to shorten the names of Chinese cities and places, which have become familiar to foreigners, from separate words joined by hyphens into words of two or more syllables. Thus Hongkong and Tientsin are written for Hong-Kong and Tien-Tsin (except, of course, in quotations).

My heartiest thanks are due to Professor Giles, M.A., LL.D., who has given me his valuable assistance in revising the proof-sheets. I also wish to express my great gratitude to the Rev. T. A. Walker, M.A., LL.D., for many kind suggestions in regard to the book.

C. S. LEAVENWORTH.

PETERHOUSE, CAMBRIDGE,

June 18, 1901.

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CHAPTER I.

THE UNFORTUNATE LORCHA "ARROW."

IN a certain old cathedral there is still preserved and shown to visitors an ancient door, in the midst of which a wide cleft has been cut. The story runs that in former times two great Earls and their retainers had a stormy conference culminating in a conflict of arms in the nave of the church. One Earl, being overpowered, fled to the Chapter House and thought his end had come, but the other came to the door of the same, and pledged his honour that he should receive no hurt. Thereupon the hunted man begged for his lordship's hand as token of his security. Instantly a cleft was pierced in the Chapter House door. Through this the Earls shook hands and were reconciled.

In the long, unending contest between East and West, between China and Europe, there have been moments when it seemed that the middle door of vision between the conflicting ideals of both could at least admit of a cleft being cut, for the hearty hand-grip of peace. Again, the conflict has broken out afresh and the glad day of concord has been postponed. The "Arrow" war with China in its varying phases shows what the men of the last generation

2. The Arrow War with China

[CH]

tried to accomplish in the solution of the old yet never-changing problem.

An event, small in itself, was the spark which ignited in the latter part of 1856 the smouldering ill-feeling between England and China. On October 8th of that year the lorcha "Arrow" was lying in the river of Canton near the fort called the Dutch Folly¹. The "Blue Peter" flag was up signifying that she was about to weigh anchor and sail away. The flag of England was probably also flying at the same time. Suddenly from a great Chinese war-boat a force of officers and soldiers swarmed on the "Arrow's" deck, pinioned and carried away twelve men comprising nearly all her Chinese crew, and, it was said, they advanced and hauled down the British colours. Mr. Harry S. Parkes (afterward Sir Harry Parkes) was then the British Consul at Canton. With characteristic energy he pushed off to the Chinese war-boat which was still lying near the lorcha. On board of her, Consul Parkes demanded back the captive crew and told the officers that possibly they had acted through ignorance. If they had not, what they had done was an insult, a violation of national rights, they had a charge to prefer against their prisoners, bring them to the Consulate and there due examination.

¹ "Lorcha: a vessel of about 100 tons burthen, having a hull of European build, and originally commanded by a European captain but rigged with Chinese masts and sails, and manned by Chinese sailors." *A Glossary of Reference on Subjects connected with the Far East*, 3rd Edit., H. A. Giles, M.A., LL.D.

² *Parliamentary Papers*, Blue Book, 1857, vol. XII. [2163]. Paper relating to the Proceedings of Her Majesty's Naval Forces at Canton with Appendix, p. 1.

nation would be held. The Chinese officers refused to give up the men to Consul Parkes. They said they had reported the occurrence to their superiors and they would have to wait for orders from them. They told Mr. Parkes that they had been authorized to capture a certain old man, the father of a noted Koo-lan pirate wherever they could lay their hands on him. They had heard that he was on board the "Arrow" and accordingly had gone on the boat and seized him. They had not wanted to say anything to Mr. Parkes beforehand, for, if they did, their man might escape them. As for the other eleven men, they had made them captives because they needed them for the evidence they might be able to give about the pirate. Finally, if Consul Parkes tried to take their prisoners away, they intimated that they would use force and stop him¹.

Mr. Parkes, therefore, went back to his Consulate, and wrote to the Chinese Imperial Commissioner, Yeh, the following letter².

¹ Blue Book, 1857, xii. [2163] pp. 1 and 2.

² "Viceroy Yeh, the representative of this party, hated the power, commerce, the civilization of Europe even more than any of his predecessors. He was not aggressive, however, nor did he think it worth while to strengthen his defences or his army. Yet he was determined to maintain the supremacy of China over all barbarians. He blamed Sen for having had too much parleying with Plenipotentiaries and Consuls. He would have no interviews of any sort. He would simply dictate his terms to them. As a matter of fact he never granted an interview to any foreigner, though Sir John plied him with arguments and Sir M. Seymour bombarded his residence to obtain one, and he never met a European face to face until that memorable day (January 5, 1858) when his apartments were unceremoniously burst into by the blue-jackets of H.M.S. *Sanspareil*."

"CANTON, October 8, 1856.

"SIR,

"I hasten to bring to your Excellency's notice an insult of a very grave character, which calls for immediate reparation.

"This morning, shortly after 8 o'clock, a Chinese war-boat boarded an English lorch, the "Arrow," lying at anchor in the river near the Dutch Folly, and regardless of the remonstrances of her master, an Englishman, seized, bound, and carried off twelve of her Chinese crew, and hauled down the English colours which were then flying. Hesitating to rely solely on the master's account of so gross an outrage, I at once dispatched people to make inquiries, and found that the facts were as he stated, and that the war-boat, said to be under the command of Leang-kwo-ting, a Captain (Show-pe) in the Imperial service, after leaving the lorch, had dropped down the river, and was lying off the Yung-tsing Gate, with the crew of the lorch still on board as prisoners.

"On receiving this intelligence, I proceeded in person to the war-boat, accompanied by Her Majesty's Vice-Consul, and explained to the officer whom I found in charge, named Le-yung-shing, the gravity of the error committed by the said war-boat in boarding and carrying off, by force of arms, the crew of an English vessel, and the gross indignity offered to the national flag by hauling down the lorch's ensign. I also re-

and he was, while climbing over a wall, caught in the strong arms of Sir Astley Cooper Key whilst Commodore Elliot's coxswain 'twisted the august tail of the Imperial Commissioner round his fist.' *Europe in China, History of Hongkong*, E. J. Eitel, Ph.D., p. 305.

quired him to bring his prisoners to the British Consulate, there to await examination; but this he refused to do, and upon my claiming them, and insisting upon their being delivered to me, he made a display of force, and threatened me with violence if I attempted to take them with me.

"I have, therefore, to lay the case before your Excellency, confident that your superior judgment will lead you at once to admit that an insult so publicly committed must be equally publicly atoned. I therefore request your Excellency to direct that the men, who have been carried away from the "Arrow," be returned by the Captain, Leang-kwo-ting, to that vessel in my presence; and if accused of any crime, they may then be conveyed to the British Consulate, where, in conjunction with proper officers deputed by your Excellency for the purpose, I shall be prepared to investigate the case.

"At the same time that I address your Excellency on this subject, I am submitting, both to Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary and the Commodore in command of Her Majesty's naval force in this river, a report of what has occurred, and I should add, that the said Lorcha being at present detained here in consequence of the seizure of her crew, has a claim upon your Excellency's Government for the expenses which this delay occasions her.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HARRY S. PARKES¹."

¹ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 2.

At a late hour in the evening, a writer whom Mr. Parkes had left on board the war-boat to keep an eye on affairs, came back and told him that all the prisoners had been taken into the city¹. To any one who has lived in China, the phrase "into the city," i.e. into the native Chinese city, with its visions of judicial tortures, racks and examinations, will mean much more than the words alone.

Now, one might ask, does not justice seem to lie absolutely on the side of the Chinese case in this contention? What shadow of right had Mr. Parkes to advance such claims over Chinese subjects in their own territorial waters? But wait a moment. There is a large-sized body of legal documents and treaty-rights which will tend to explain the seemingly high-handed action of the Consul.

The Blue Books covering the period, the reports of the debates in the House of Lords and House of Commons and the Annual Register for 1856 show the amount of legal threshing-out which the question received. Let us try to follow the thread of the argument.

A. There were former treaties with China.

At the conclusion of the previous war, a treaty had been made by England with that nation in 1842. A supplementary treaty had been concluded on Oct. 8, 1843. By the ninth article of this same supplementary treaty, it was provided that if any natives of China committed crimes or offences against their own government and then fled to Hongkong, or to an English

¹ Blue Book, 1857, xii. [2163] p. 2.

ship of war, or to an English merchant-ship, and if officers of the Chinese Government found out where these offenders had taken refuge, they were to report to the proper English officer and the offenders would be seized and delivered up¹. The same process was to hold good for British subjects escaping to Chinese territory. Note that the process was to be by communicating first with the proper English officer, before the offenders could be delivered over to the Chinese authorities.

By the seventeenth article of this same supplementary treaty² it was provided that every British schooner,

¹ *Annual Register*, 1856, 256]. Also Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 218. Treaty, Art. ix. "If lawless natives of China, having committed crimes or offences against their own Government, shall flee to Hong Kong, or to the English ships of war, or English merchant-ships, for refuge, they shall, if discovered by the English officers, be handed over at once to the Chinese officers for trial and punishment; or if, before such discovery be made by the English officers, it should be ascertained or suspected by the officers of the Government of China, whither such criminals and offenders have fled, a communication shall be made to the proper English officer, in order that the said criminals and offenders may be rigidly searched for, seized, and, on proof of admission of their guilt, delivered up. In like manner, if any soldier or sailor, or any other person, whatever his caste or country, who is a subject of the Crown of England, shall, from any cause or on any pretence, desert, fly, or escape into the Chinese territory, such soldier or sailor, or other person, shall be apprehended and confined by the Chinese authorities, and sent to the nearest British Consular or other Government officer. In neither case shall concealment or refuge be afforded."

² *Annual Register*, 1856, 257]. Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 221. Extract from Art. xvii. of Treaty.

"1st. Every British schooner, cutter, lorch, &c., shall have a sailing letter or register in Chinese and English, under the seal and

cutter, lorchas &c. was to have a sailing-letter in Chinese and English. Every schooner, lorchas &c., on reaching Canton, when carrying cargo, was to deliver up her sailing-letter or register to the British Consul who was to obtain permission from the Hoppo for her to discharge her cargo.

B. What was a "British" vessel?

We find from the following data that the term was of very elastic use in the China waters at that time. By Ordinance No. 4 of 1855 of Hongkong, a system of granting Colonial Registers for ships was provided. Article VI reads, "And be it further enacted and ordained, that it shall be lawful for Chinese residents within this Colony to apply for and obtain Colonial Registers, provided the person or persons applying as owners be registered lessees of Crown lands within this Colony, and that such owner or owners tender as securities for the due performance by them of all the requirements of this Ordinance two other Crown lessees, and that such owners and such lessees be severally re-

signature of the Chief Superintendent of Trade, describing her appearance, burthen, &c., &c.

"2nd. Every schooner, lorchas, and such vessel, shall report herself, as large vessels are required to do, at the Bocca Tigris; and when she carries cargo, she shall also report herself at Whampoa, and shall, on reaching Canton, deliver up her sailing letter or register to the British Consul, who will obtain permission from the Hoppo for her to discharge her cargo, which she is not to do without such permission, under the forfeiture of the penalties laid down in the 3rd clause of the General Regulations of Trade.

"3rd. When the inward cargo is discharged, and an outward one (if intended) taken on board, and the duties on both arranged and paid, the Consul will restore the register or sailing letter, and allow the vessel to depart."

ported by the Registrar-General to the satisfaction of the Colonial Secretary to be each worth two thousand dollars in this Colony, and should such owner or owners be member or members of any shop or partnership that the seal of such shop or partnership be also affixed to the security to be given by such owner¹."

These Colonial Registers for ships were good for only one year from date but were renewable then, for Article X reads, "And be it further enacted and ordained, that any Colonial register granted under this Ordinance shall be in force and effect for one year from the date of such register and no longer, and that such register be renewable by endorsement on the same, under the hand of the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, or officer administering the Government, on the payment of a fee of ten dollars: Provided always, that such register be deposited in the office of the Colonial Secretary one week before the expiration of the year for which the register has been granted, or if the registered ship or vessel be at sea, then on her return to the waters of the Colony²." Note the exception made, if the vessel were at sea.

That this system was of great benefit to the rapidly-growing, infant colony of Hongkong there can be no doubt. It increased the coasting trade in cotton and also it is to be regretted, in opium. It brought in more of the products of China for export. The Colonial Treasurer's Memorandum on Estimates said, "If anything has been, and will be, pre-eminently beneficial to

¹ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2166]. Correspondence respecting the Registration of Colonial Vessels at Hong Kong, p. 3.

² Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2166]. *Ibid.*

this Colony, it is that very system of granting Colonial registers, particularly to respectable Chinese settled here, or, as the Ordinance says, 'Chinese Crown lessees entitled to hold Colonial registers,' since it has already added to, and still tends to increase, the coasting-trade in goods the manufacture of Great Britain, or the produce of India, such as cotton, opium, &c.; and on the other hand, brings to this Colony more of the produce of China for export to Europe and India, or transshipment to other parts of the coast of the Empire.

"I do not know the laws respecting the granting of ships' registers to Chinese in the Straits' Settlements and Java; but I do know that vessels are frequently arriving in this Colony under the British and Dutch flags, which are the property of Chinese in Java, or one of the Straits' Settlements; and only yesterday, two fine lorchas passed through this harbour under the Portuguese flag, the owner of which, as also of a square-rigged vessel, is a Chinese at Macao¹."

It was a question, however, if this granting of registers to Chinese who were not British subjects, for their ships, was not a departure from the Merchant Shipping Act (17 & 18 Vict. cap. 104). By this act it was laid down that British ownership was an essential condition of British registry². But, was the reply, on the other hand, by section 547 of the Imperial Act any British possession, through its legislative authority, could repeal wholly or in part any provisions of the act as to registry of ships in that possession, if it were

¹ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2166] p. 7.

² Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2166] p. 4. Mr. Booth to Mr. Merivale.

empowered to do so by an act or ordinance confirmed by Her Majesty in Council. Such act or ordinance must be proclaimed in the possession¹.

Hence we find the following in the correspondence with the colonial authorities of Hongkong.

"DOWNING STREET, August 27, 1856.

"SIR,

"I have received and laid before the Queen an Ordinance passed by yourself and the Legislative Council of Hong Kong on the 29th of May last, entitled No. 9 of 1856, 'An Ordinance to explain certain Enactments relating to Shipping,' the transcript of which was inclosed in your despatch of the 5th June.

"I have received the Queen's commands to acquaint you that Her Majesty has been pleased to confirm and allow this Ordinance.

"You will cause Her Majesty's decision to be signified to the inhabitants of Hong Kong by a proclamation to be published in the usual and most authentic manner.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. LABOUCHERE²."

This communication was addressed to Sir J. Bowring, the Governor of the colony of Hongkong at this time, and a man of many hobbies and literary tastes.

To sum up. We see that by the treaties with ^{the} ~~the~~ and by the British colonial and imperial measures there had been built up a logical basis for ^{the} ~~the~~ Parkes' action in demanding back the members

¹ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2166] p. 4. Mr. Booth to Mr. Merivale.

² Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2166] p. 12.

of the crew taken by force from a "British" vessel and not delivered first to the proper English authority, i.e. the Consul. The term "British vessel" was applied to the lorcha "Arrow" because, as it was claimed, she had complied with the Hongkong ordinances. These made her a "British" vessel although owned by Chinese residents of Hongkong, not naturalized British subjects.

As to this claim let us suspend judgment and continue the thread of the story of the dispute between Consul Parkes and the Chinese authorities. We have seen that Consul Parkes had already demanded from Yeh, the Chinese Imperial Commissioner at Canton at the time, the return of the captured crew. Yeh replied that there were some among the men who were notorious pirates but that he had given directions to have nine of the crew returned to their vessel¹. Yeh also enclosed the deposition, which had been made before him, of Woo Ajen, one of the crew, as follows.

"I come from the end of Cha-chuen at Macao in the district of Heang-shan. This lorcha, the 'Arrow,' belongs to Soo-a-ching, who began to build it on the 14th day of the 7th month, of the 4th year of Heen-fung (7th August, 1854). On the very day that the lorcha was completed he obtained a register for her through the foreign firm Po-lâ (? F. H. Bloch; of Hong-kong) for which he paid 1000 dollars. He also engaged the foreigner A-loo (? Arrow) to serve in the lorcha at the rate of 30 dollars per month. Hitherto she has made voyages along the coast to Foo-Chow

¹ Blue Book, 1857, xii. [2163] p. 4.

Amoy, and Shanghae, trading in rice, pulse, and general merchandize: I am aware that Le-ming-tae is also known by the name of Leang-ming-tae. On the 23rd day of the 8th month of the present year (21st September) Kaou-laou-jih, the helmsman of our vessel¹, engaged Le-ming-tae and Leang-keen-foo, to assist in the navigation of our vessel. On the evening of the 25th day of the 8th month (23rd September), we were sitting alone in the bow of the vessel, when Le-ming-tae told me that on the 6th day of the 8th month (4th September), he, with Leang-keen-foo, and more than thirty other men, joined themselves to five or six Tsih-pang boats and plundered the junks belonging to Hwang-leen-Kae off San-Chowtang, in the district of Sin-ning, none of the remaining ten men (of our crew), Tang-a-kee and others took part in the piracy, and I certainly had no share in it. What I state is perfectly true²." Yeh said in conclusion that the "Arrow," therefore, was not a foreign lorch.

As a commentary on this testimony we have Mr. Parkes' opinion which he wrote to Governor Bowring, "Your Excellency will doubtless note upon whose information he [Yeh] declares the lorch to be owned by a wholly different party to the person named in the register, viz., one of the crew, who may possibly not be correctly informed on the point of the real ownership, and who was lying bound with thongs before his interested inquisitors at the time he made statement³."

¹ "The 'Arrow,' it is believed, is here meant.—H. S. P."

² Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 5.

³ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 7.

Two months later the "China Mail," a newspaper published at Hongkong, gave the following version of the history of the "Arrow." "We willingly insert the following statement of facts respecting the allusion made to Mr. F. H. Block's name, in connection with the lorcha *Arrow*, in the correspondence between His Excellency Sir John Bowring and Yeh, the Imperial Commissioner, which appeared in the *Gazette Extraordinary* of the 28th November last, and which will entirely deprive His Excellency Yeh of any excuse or pretext founded on the assumed fact of the Register of the lorcha *Arrow* being fraudulently obtained; at the same time vindicating Mr. Block from any imputation which such an assumption might cast upon him. We shall therefore give, as briefly as may be, the history of the lorcha so far as is connected with her becoming a registered British vessel, and, indeed, as far as is known on the subject.

"The lorcha *Arrow* was heretofore employed in trading on the coast, and while so employed was taken by pirates. By them she was fitted out and employed in the Canton river during the disturbances between the Imperialists and Insurgents. While on this service, she was captured by the "braves" of the Soo-tsof-che-tong Company or Guild, one of the loyalist associations organised by the Mandarins for the support of the Imperial Government. By this guild she was publicly sold, and was purchased by a Chin-chew Hong Kong respectable firm at Canton, who also laid out a considerable sum in repairing and otherwise fitting her out. She arrived in this harbour about the month of June, 1855, at which time a treaty (which ended

bargain) was on foot between Fong Aming, Messrs. John Burd & Co.'s Comprador, and Lee-yeong-heen, one of the partners in the Chin-chew Hong, for the purchase of the lorch by the former. Shortly after the arrival of the vessel here, she was claimed by one Quan-tai of Macao, who asserted that she had been his property before she was seized by the pirates. Of course, the then owners disputed his claim; upon which he commenced a suit in the Vice-Admiralty Court. After a short time, by consent of the parties, the question was referred to arbitration, and the arbitrators appointed were Mr. Edward Pereira, on behalf of Quan-tai, and the Hon. Mr. J. F. Edger, on behalf of Lee-yeong-heen, as representing the parties who opposed the claim of Quan-tai. These arbitrators could not agree, and Mr. George Lyall was appointed umpire, who awarded that the possession or ownership of the lorch should continue undisturbed; but as he was not satisfied that Quan-tai had sufficient opportunities afforded him of regaining what he asserted to have been originally his property he also awarded that the sum of \$2100 should be paid to him, being the sum at which the lorch had been sold by the Soo-tsoi-che-tong Guild, and which appeared to be the value of the lorch at the time of such sale. Upon this award, a question arose between Fong Aming, of Messrs. John Burd & Co., and the Chin-chew Hong, as to who was to pay the \$2100, and it was finally arranged between them, that Fong Aming was actually to pay the money to Quan-tai, but that the Chin-chew Hong were to pay him out of the purchase-money for the lorch the sum of \$1000, being their contribution to the amount of the award, and that the balance of \$1100

was to be Fong Aming's contribution. This sum of \$2100 Mr. Block advanced for Fong Aming, and paid it to Messrs. Gaskell and Brown, the proctors for Quan-tai, who acknowledged the receipt thereof from him on account of Lee-yeong-heen, the partner in the Chin-chew Hong, who had been made defendant in the suit. In the accounts between the Hong and Fong Aming, the sum of \$1000 was deducted from the total amount of the purchase-money for the lorcha. The ownership of the vessel was transferred to Fong Aming, and in his name she is registered.

"These are the simple facts connected with the purchase of the lorcha by a resident in this colony and her registry as a British vessel, and it is from these facts that the Imperial Commissioner Yeh has arrived at the erroneous conclusion expressed in this letter of the 12th ultimo, where he says, that a Register was purchased for Soo Aching of the merchant Block for \$1000—the fact being that Mr. Block interested himself in the matter solely for the purpose of extricating his Comprador (Fong Aming) from the difficulty he had with the lorcha at this place.

"As an evidence of the truth of the above statement, the documents bearing reference to it have been placed in our hands, for the inspection of any person who may feel interested in the matter; and we are assured that Mr. Block received no remuneration whatsoever for his assistance, nor did he derive any profits, either directly or indirectly, nor had he any interest or share in the lorcha¹."

¹ The *China Mail*, Dec. 11, 1856. Also in Supplement to the *Overland China Mail*, No. 133, Hongkong, Dec. 15, 1856. Also see Blue Book, 1857, Session 2, vol. XLIII. [2206] p. 12.

The history of the "Arrow's" movements just before the affair of Oct. 8th is thus given by Consul Parkes. "He [the master of the 'Arrow'] states that on the day named he sailed in her for Canton, and proceeded thence to Macao, where he lay a fortnight painting and refitting; then loaded again outside Macao, re-entered that port, discharged a portion of his cargo there, and brought the remainder, consisting of rice, on to Canton; after delivery of which he was to have left, on the day on which his crew were seized, in ballast for Hongkong, prior to proceeding, as he believes, in charter for Ningpo¹."

We have seen that Commissioner Yeh returned some of the men taken from the lorch. Consul Parkes refused to receive them because they were not returned in the manner he had demanded, i.e. to the deck of the "Arrow" in his presence, thus fulfilling the spirit of the treaties². The Consul had discovered that the "Arrow" was sailing under a colonial certificate of registry, renewable annually, with the date Hongkong, 27th September, 1855, and the number 27. This stated that she belonged solely to Fong Aming of Victoria, Hongkong, Chinese trader. Her master's name was Thomas Kennedy, a native of Belfast³. The deposition of the master of the "Arrow" before the Consular officer is well worth giving in full.

"Thomas Kennedy, aged 21 years, a native of Belfast, duly sworn, states:

"Between 8 a.m. and 8½ a.m. yesterday morning,

¹ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 12.

² Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 4.

³ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 4.

8th October, I was on board the lorcha 'Dart,' which was at anchor about 150 yards below the Dutch Folly, my own vessel, the 'Arrow,' was lying about 50 yards ahead of the 'Dart' nearer the Dutch Folly within easy hailing distance, also at anchor. I was sitting on the deck of the 'Dart,' when I saw two Chinese boats, each having Mandarins on board in uniform, and about twenty seamen besides the officers; in all, there might be about sixty men. Some of the officers had official caps, with feather tails to their caps; I did not take any notice at the moment whether they were armed. A little after I saw the boats pass, the Captain of the 'Chusan' lorcha, who was also on board the 'Dart,' remarked to me that these Mandarin boats were lying alongside my lorcha. I answered they are probably sending some passengers to Hong Kong. As we were looking on, I saw one of the Mandarin seamen, who had a badge on his breast and another on his back, and a uniform cap on his head, haul down the English ensign from the mizen gaff. I immediately afterwards saw the Blue Peter, which was flying at the foremast head, hauled down, but could not see the man that did so, because the view was interrupted at the moment. I then got on board a sampan with the Captains of the 'Dart' and 'Chusan,' and pulled alongside the 'Arrow'; it was about slack water. By the time I reached the 'Arrow,' I found that all my crew had been taken out, and were in the Mandarin boats alongside, bound by their elbows being tied behind their backs. I noticed that the old man who acted as a sort of priest on board was bound with a thicker rope and more completely secured; he was also separated

entirely from the others. I asked my boy when I went on board, who hauled the ensign down; he said it was one of the Mandarin Chinamen. I asked particularly if it was one of my men, and he said again it was the Mandarin's people. Immediately after I came on board they shoved off. I tried to ask what was the occasion of this conduct, but was unable to understand the reply; I asked why the flag was hauled down, and could get no satisfactory answer. I hoisted the flag again. Nothing was taken from the ship; but as I passed aft to hoist the flag, they called out to me 'yu na ma' and 'vrae tae.' I turned round and asked why they made use of such language, and the officers shook their hands at the seamen and made them keep quiet. They wished to take all the men away, but I asked them to leave two men to take charge of the vessel, and they did so. I understand a little Chinese, and asked them myself to leave two men; they then went away.

(Signed) THOMAS KENNEDY."

"Sworn before me, at the British Consulate, Canton, this 9th day of October, 1856.

(Signed) CHARLES A. WINCHESTER,
Vice-Consul¹."

Again, John Leach, of a vessel called the "Dart" which was lying near the "Arrow" at the time, deposed that he saw two Mandarin boats go alongside the "Arrow" and that afterwards he saw the English ensign hauled down².

¹ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 8.

² Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 9.

Chin Asing, one of the crew of the "Arrow," also testified before Mr. Parkes that, after the Mandarins boarded the lorcha, he heard one of them, who wore a crystal button, cry out, "This is not a foreign lorcha, for there is no foreigner in command; haul down her ensign." Chin Asing told Mr. Parkes that several of them told the Mandarin that they had a European captain. Then he saw one of the soldiers, ordered by the Mandarin, go and pull down the ensign and fling it "on the deck without unreefing it from the halyards¹."

Leang Ayung, who was busy in a sampan, or small boat, with another man in unmooring the "Arrow" when the Mandarins boarded her, also testified before Consul Parkes that he "distinctly saw the flag hauled down by one of the soldiers²."

There is some testimony on the other side. The Earl of Derby in the House of Lords on Feb. 24, 1857, referred to the issue of the "Friend of China," of November 13. According to Earl Derby this newspaper said that the evidence of the Chinese that no flag was flying, which statement we shall find Yeh affirms, had been corroborated by the depositions, "forwarded by the consuls, of the master and crew of the Portuguese lorcha No. 83, which was lying close by the 'Arrow' in the waters of Canton;" and it added that it was then "notorious at Canton that that flag had not been flying for six days previous to the seizure³."

But a new complication came into the course of the

¹ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 10.

² Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 10.

³ *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, Third Series, vol. 144, 1166.

dispute. We have seen that Consul Parkes wrote to Sir J. Bowring that the "Arrow's" certificate of registry was dated Sept. 27th, 1855. But the assault occurred Oct. 8th, 1856, and her certificate of registry ought to have been renewed each year. Governor Bowring, thereupon, wrote to Mr. Parkes that the "Arrow" had no right to fly the British flag, since her privilege to do so had expired Sept. 27th, 1856. "It appears," he said, "on examination, that the 'Arrow' had no right to hoist the British flag; the licence to do so expired on the 27th of September, from which period she has not been entitled to protection. You will send back the register to be delivered to the Colonial Office¹." The Governor then advanced the proposition that that was an affair of the British Government alone. He said, "But the Chinese had no knowledge of the expiry of the licence, nor do they profess that they had any other ground for interference than the supposition that the owner is not a British subject; that, however, is a question for this Government, who granted the register, and it is clear that the Chinese authorities have violated the 9th Article of the Supplementary Treaty, which requires that all Chinese malfaisants in British ships shall be claimed through the British authorities²."

Consul Parkes, therefore, acting under Governor Bowring's directions, demanded an apology from the Imperial Commissioner Yeh for what had happened and an assurance that the British flag in the future should be respected. This was an ultimatum, for, if no satisfactory reply were given within forty-eight

¹ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 10.

² Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 10.

hours, the English naval authorities were to be called on and the dogs of war let loose¹.

Yeh replied to Parkes, two days later, that he had had the naval officers, who had seized the men, examined. They stated that when they went on board the "Arrow" there was not a foreigner in the lorch. No ensign had been hoisted on the vessel. They were told that the flag was stowed away below but they saw nothing of it at all².

Yeh further wrote "Hereafter, Chinese officers will on no account without reason, seize and take into custody the people belonging to foreign lorchas; but when Chinese subjects build for themselves vessels, foreigners should not sell registers to them, for if this be done, it will occasion confusion between native and foreign ships, and render it difficult to distinguish between them. Thus may all parties conform their proceedings to the condition of the 9th Article of the Treaty³."

Hence the contention became a matter of words between Parkes and Yeh. Parkes said the flag had been insulted, while Yeh said that there had been no flag flying at the time to be insulted. We have seen the testimony by which each side supported its statements.

Long after the smoke and din of battle had replaced peaceful negotiations, an expert legal review of the case was sent by the Earl of Clarendon to Governor Bowring from the Foreign Office. It is interesting to follow the

¹ Oct. 12, 1856. Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 12.

² Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 14.

³ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 15.

case as influenced by the evidence of the termination of the "Arrow's" license. The Earl of Clarendon wrote as follows.

"FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 10, 1856.*

"SIR,

"I have received your despatches of the 13th and 15th of October, reporting what had passed in regard to the seizure by the Chinese authorities at Canton, of the crew of the lorch 'Arrow,' sailing under British colours.

"I have consulted the law officer of the Crown on this matter, and I have now to state to you, that I am of opinion that this act of the Chinese authorities constitutes an infraction of Article IX of the Supplementary Treaty.

"The only possible defence open to them appears to be, that the 'Arrow' was not 'an English merchant ship' within the true intent and meaning of the Treaty; but Article XVII, Rule I, in Supplementary Treaty, recognizes and includes this particular class of vessel; she had a British master, British colours and papers, and even if her licence had been improperly granted in August 1854, this was a matter of British internal regulation, and to be dealt with by the British authorities. This point is evidently an after-thought on the part of the Chinese, and the only evidence of it is in the uncorroborated assertion of one of the crew whilst in custody. No British lorch would be safe if her crew were liable to seizure on such grounds.

"I have further to observe, that there do not seem to have been any such circumstances of urgency in this case as would afford any justification or excuse for the

arbitrary conduct of the Chinese authorities, who were, probably, emboldened by the absence of any [of] Her Majesty's ships from Canton. The 'Arrow' was bound to Hong Kong, and if any of her crew could be identified as having been guilty of piracy, or were even suspected of it, there would have been no difficulty in securing their apprehension and delivery, had the Chinese authorities taken the course indicated by Article IX, viz., communicating with the British Consul. Only two of her crew were charged with piracy, viz., Le-ming-tae, and Liang-kien-foo, the third detained (Woo-a-jen) is apparently only wanted as a witness; and there was not the slightest pretext for seizing the other nine, who were afterwards released.

"The accidental and temporary absence of the British master on board a neighbouring vessel, could not affect the question. The British flag is clearly proved (by the deposition of Kennedy and Leach) to have been hauled down by the Chinese Mandarin crew, notwithstanding the denial of this fact by the Imperial Commissioner; but even if the flag had not been actually flying at the moment, it is obvious that the national character of the lorch was well known to the authorities.

"The expiration of the 'Arrow's' sailing licence on September 27, previous to her seizure, does not appear to have been known to the Chinese authorities; and this, again, is a matter of British regulation which would not justify seizure by the Chinese.

"The principle involved in this case is most important, and the demands made by Mr. Consul Parkes appear to me to be very moderate under the circum-

stances. I consider that the re-delivery of the three men still detained, and a subsequent formal demand for their extradition before they are given up again, should be insisted on as a *sine qua non*. They must be considered as having been forcibly taken in breach of Treaty, and without any justification or excuse, from on board a British vessel, and illegally detained in custody by the orders of the Imperial Commissioner, with full knowledge of all the circumstances and in defiance of a formal demand by the British Consul.

"Under all the circumstances of the case, I approve of the intention to seize and hold one of the Imperial junks as security for the redress which the High Commissioner has been called upon to afford in this case.

"I have only to add, that I conclude you will have caused a strict enquiry to be made into the circumstances connected with the grant of the licence to the lorch in the year 1854.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON¹."

To recapitulate. On the English side, the contention was that the lorch "Arrow" was a British vessel, for she had a British master and was owned by Chinese resident in Hongkong, in accordance with long-established treaty-rights with China. Her license had not been renewed, but this was a matter of British regulation and she was no less a British vessel because of any carelessness in this respect. Further, she may

¹ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 15.

have been said, by a pretty hard stretch of a legal meaning, to have been still "at sea," i.e. she had not yet returned to the colony to get her license renewed. Hence the assault of Oct. 8th was committed on a "British" vessel. The manner of taking the men from her was, therefore, contrary to treaty. There had been an insult to the British flag.

On the Chinese side, the argument was that foreigners had no concern in the matter at all. The "Arrow" was built by a Chinese in China. Further there was no flag flying at the time when the supposed insult to the British colours was said to have taken place.

Another question cropped out in the midst of all this mass of conflicting testimony. This was the smouldering, so-called "City Question," the right of foreigners to go into the walled city of Canton, which had been lying in the background for a long time, waiting to burst into the flame of a burning subject of dispute at any moment.

There had been long discussions and a checkered career of official squabbling in regard to this right of entry into that city. The necessity of the English officials at Hongkong to have the right of personal interviews with the Chinese authorities in their official residences, the yamens, in the city of Canton is also apparent¹.

¹ "The affair of the lorch *Arrow* is now relegated to its original insignificance: for we are face to face with nothing less than the old City Question—in a magnified form, but still the City Question." *Life of Sir Harry Parkes*, S. Lane-Poole, vol. I. p. 241.

A German view is as follows: "Nur der englischen Besitzung

Hence we find Governor Bowring writing to Mr. Parkes on Oct. 24th, 1856, "I have conveyed to Sir Michael Seymour an opinion that if his Excellency and yourself agree on the fitness of the opportunity, it would be well if the *vexata quæstio* of our entrance into the city should now be settled; at least, as far as to secure us an official reception there. This would be a crowning result to the successful operations of Her Majesty's naval forces; and at such a conference with the Imperial Commissioner many local arrangements might be made¹."

And again in the next month Sir J. Bowring wrote, "Care must be taken to show the Chinese authorities that the right to enter the city is not a novel demand now put forward by the naval commander-in-chief, but a right acknowledged and confirmed by reiterated promises and engagements—a right that the British Government has never surrendered, nor shown any disposition to surrender—of which their Excellencies Keying, Seu, and Yeh, have all been again and again advised, as is on record²."

The Earl of Derby, in the House of Lords, said in February of the following year that the free admission

Hongkong gegenüber verweigerte der Vicekönig von Canton jedem Europäer die Erlaubniss, Canton zu betreten, obwohl gerade dies im Frieden von Nanking besonders ausbedungen war. Diplomatische Versuche, diese Schwierigkeiten zu beseitigen, waren ohne Erfolg. Als dann der Vicekönig im Jahre 1856 ein unter englischer Flagge segelndes Schiff beschlagnehmen, die Bemannung gefangen setzen liess, entschloss sich England, mit Waffengewalt einzuschreiten." *Chinas Kriege seit 1840*, Berlin, 1900, p. 25.

¹ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 32.

² Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 57.

of British subjects into Canton had been made the real subject of dispute. It could be shown, he held, that this admission into Canton had long been the desire of Sir John Bowring and that he had only waited for a favourable opportunity to effect that object¹.

At the same time, the fact must not be lost sight of, that the primary cause of the war was the affair on the lorcha "Arrow." The animus of the British authorities in beginning hostilities was to avenge the insult on the British flag. When the flame of war began to burn, then came the opportunity to clear up in the process a good deal of the thick underbrush of diplomacy, like the *vexata* "City Question." As in every irrepressible conflict, there was plenty of gunpowder lying stored and if the lorcha "Arrow" had not lighted the match for the explosion, some other lorcha or some other event would surely have done so.

We can now summarize briefly the three leading points which led directly and indirectly to four years of warfare, to the two voyages of the two great Ambassadors, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, and the final establishment of permanent legations far up in the north at the Empire's heart in Peking. The demands were:

- I. An apology for the insult to the British flag.
- II. An assurance of future respect for it.
- III. The surrender of the men taken from the lorcha "Arrow," in the manner according to which Mr. Parkes interpreted his treaty-rights².

¹ *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, Third Series, vol. 144, 335.

² Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 29.

The assurance as to future respect for the flag, Mr. Parkes said Yeh perhaps had yielded, but there was no apology given for the insult, for Yeh denied that any had taken place. He finally returned all the captured men but in an unsatisfactory manner. Mr. Parkes said, "He [Yeh] then forwarded the twelve, but not in the manner required in my letter of the 8th and demanded that I should at once return two of them, without any 'proper officer' being deputed to conduct with me the necessary examination. I again declined to receive them on these conditions, or in any other manner than that described in my letter of the 8th, and the men were again taken away¹."

As a larger problem, throughout and underlying all, was the ever-present "City Question," the right of entry into Canton and of direct official intercourse with the authorities there. On the other hand, the underlying questions were not all a story of injustice to the foreigner. By no means. Williams says; "In order to develop the trade of the free port of Hongkong, its laws encouraged all classes of shipping to resort thither, by removing all charges on vessels and granting licenses, with but few and unimportant restrictions, to Chinese craft to carry on trade under the British flag. This freedom had developed an enormous smuggling trade, especially in opium, which the Chinese revenue service was unable to restrain or unwilling to legalize. These boats cruised wherever they might find a trade to invite or reward them, wholly indifferent to their own

¹ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 32.

Government, which could exercise no adequate control over them, and kept from the last excesses only on account of the risk of losing their cargoes. To the evils of smuggling were added the worse acts and dangers of kidnapping natives to supply baccaroons at Macao. The Portuguese had many of these lorchas to carry on their commerce, and gradually a set of desperate men had so far engrossed them in acts of daring and pillage that honest native trade about any part of the coast south of Shanghai became almost impossible except under their convoy. The two free ports of Macao and Hongkong naturally became their resorts, where they all took on the aspect of legitimate traders, which, indeed, most of them were—save under great temptations¹."

We may not be able to challenge the legal precision of the foreigners' contention in the "Arrow" case, and yet there is a broader law of toleration, to which an appeal might be taken. It might not be a question of the *right* to use power possessed but of the *time* to use power possessed, an appeal from law to sympathy. It might be like the story of the Irishman who, up for some offence before the court, was asked by his lawyer if he had any objections to any of his jurors and if he wished to challenge any of them as being prejudiced against him. "Oh no," he replied, "it is none of the jury but it is the judge himself whom I want to challenge. I have been convicted before him three

¹ *A History of China*, being the historical chapters from *The Middle Kingdom* by S. Wells Williams with a concluding chapter narrating recent events by F. W. Williams, p. 281.

times already and I think he has a prejudice against me!"

If to the Chinese mind right means might, and if their opinion of Europe is based on ignorance, plus what they learn in their experience of European prowess, the case of the "Arrow" must have led them to challenge their judges as being very much prejudiced against them. As to the *causa belli* we may conclude that the impression made on the Chinese was not calculated to increase their sympathy with foreigners or with ideals of foreign "progress."

But if we look at the affair from still a different standpoint, if we view it in its broadest relations as simply one step in the slow, steady, gradual but relentless wearing down of the wall of prejudice, arrogance and ignorance of China, then, perhaps, we shall see it in a different aspect, as a heavy blow, for the world's good and China's own ultimate benefit. We find the same story as in the trivial cause which led to the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, as in the cases of innumerable pretexts which in the long drama of human history have been seized on and raised into prominence, to begin the solution of so many knotty and thorny questions.

CHAPTER II.

THE STRUGGLE BEGINS.

A NAME of very familiar sound to those interested in the events of 1900, now comes into prominence—the name of Admiral Seymour. The seizure of a junk was the first step taken in that path which led through four years of strife and hatred to the armies of England and France at the Gates of Peking and the opening of China to diplomatic intercourse with the world.

The English naval forces, under Admiral Seymour's directions, took the Barrier Forts about five miles below Canton and the Blenheim and Macao Forts. This was soon followed by the capture of several others in the Canton waters¹. A further step was taken. On Oct. 27th, 1856, the Admiral opened fire on headquarters. Yeh's yamen inside the city was the objective point. From one o'clock in the afternoon until the setting of the sun, the thundering reverberations of the 10-inch pivot gun of the "Encounter" could be heard, as shot after shot was sent, pitilessly and relentlessly, at the Governor's Compound².

¹ Blue Book, 1857, xii. [2163] p. 95.

² Blue Book, 1857, xii. [2163] p. 96.

Yeh was content to offer a reward for the life of every Englishman. "Yeh, the Governor-General, proclaims the following:

"The English barbarians have attacked the provincial city, and wounded and injured our soldiers and people. Their crimes are indeed of the most heinous nature.

"Wherefore I herewith distinctly command you to join together to exterminate them, and I publicly proclaim to all the military and people, householders and others, that you should unite with all the means at your command, to assist the soldiers and militia in exterminating these troublous English villains, killing them whenever you meet them, whether on shore or in their ships.

"For each of their lives that you may thus take you shall receive, as before, thirty dollars. All ought to respect and obey, and neither oppose nor disregard this special proclamation.

"Heen-fung, 6th year, 9th month, 30th day (October 28, 1856)¹."

A breach was made in the wall of Canton and the city entered by the force of arms, after the unavailing display of words, but the "City Question" was too old and deep-rooted to be settled by gunpowder in a moment, and the English Admiral withdrew. His object, which was, as he said, to show Yeh that he had the power to enter the city, was accomplished².

Now another element appeared in the complicated warp and woof of events. The far-famed Taiping rebels

¹ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 40.

² Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 97.

enter. The insurgent leader sent a communication to Governor Bowring, saying that the Taipings would co-operate against the Chinese Government at Canton. His letter opened in this grandiloquent fashion:

“Hung-seu-tsung, of the Celestial Kingdom of Taiping, holding the Imperial Commission as Commander-in-Chief for the reduction of the two Kwang, and appointed a Prince of the Empire, lays this letter, with a hundred compliments, before his Excellency the Minister Plenipotentiary of Great Britain, and respectfully begs to make a statement¹.” His offers, which followed, it is needless to say, were not accepted.

Then came the capture of the Bogue Forts and of the Annunghoy, on the opposite side of the Bogue entrance, which gave the command of the river to the British².

Another actor appeared upon the scene. From one of the Chinese forts, an American man-of-war's boat was fired upon. The American policy up to this time had been to keep out of the conflict altogether. On Oct. 29th a circular had been issued at Canton by Andrew H. Foote, the Senior Officer commanding the United States naval forces at Canton at that time. It recited that the act of bearing the flag of the United States on the walls of Canton, when the British naval forces effected a breach in it, was entirely unauthorized and was disavowed. The neutrality of the United States was not to be compromised in the least degree³.

For three weeks Foote “preserved an armed neu-

¹ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 50.

² Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 99.

³ *Life of Admiral Foote*, J. M. Hoppin, p. 112.

trality and protected American interests." Commodore Armstrong, meanwhile, had arrived at Hongkong from Shanghai and ordered the American force to be removed from the city of Canton to avoid any danger to American neutrality¹. This removal was superintended by Commander Foote.

While in pursuit of this object, he, together with Mr. Sturgis, a partner in the American firm of Russell & Co., was passing the Barrier fortresses, now in possession of the Chinese, in a boat of the American war-ship. Suddenly, the boom of a gun came from one of the forts and the splash of the shot was seen in the water, not ten yards from the bow. The party were amazed and thought some mistake must have been made. Mr. Sturgis got up and waved the American flag. The answer to this display of neutral colours was another shot closer yet. Round and shrapnel also came from another fort on the opposite bank.

None of the party in the boat were injured on this journey, although the water thrown up by the projectiles wet their clothes, so close were the shots. Only when the boat retreated toward the ship, did the forts stop firing².

¹ *Life of Admiral Foote*, J. M. Hoppin, p. 113.

² Nov. 15, 1856. Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 109. *Life of Foote*, Hoppin, p. 113.

The great Orientalist and Chinese scholar, Neumann, thought there might have been a motive of revenge in this action of the Chinese. "Vielleicht wollten die Chinesen, wegen des feindlichen Auftretens der Neusachsen, welche sich, angeführt von ihrem Konsul Keenan, bei der Bestürmung und Plünderung Kantons stark betheiligt hatten, Rache nehmen." *Ostasiatische Geschichte vom ersten chinesischen Krieg bis zu den Verträgen in Peking*, von Karl Friedrich Neumann, p. 287.

Redress was as quick and sharp as a thunder-shower. Then the sky cleared and all became peaceful once more. The "San Jacinto," the "Portsmouth," the "Levant," were the three American war-ships close at hand. Commodore Armstrong, in command, ordered Captain Foote of the "Portsmouth" to take that ship and the "Levant" and destroy the Barrier forts¹.

On the 16th², the calm was broken by cannonading between the "Portsmouth" and the forts. Early on the morning of Nov. 20th, 1856, the American ships could be seen opening fire on the two nearest Barrier forts. A storming-party of 287 men with howitzers landed and went up to the fort, but the bird had flown, the Chinese soldiers had retired. The fort was entered and a lieutenant from the "Portsmouth" planted the American flag on the walls of the captured stronghold. Some further skirmishes took place but the fort was occupied until morning by the commander of the "San Jacinto³."

On the next day, forts on the opposite side of the stream were taken and also a breastwork. The last fort fell on Saturday the 22nd. The American soldiers in the lead sprang into the fort just as the enemy

A Chinese historian thus explains it: "On the 17th (? November) two American vessels came up the river from Macao, and were fired at in mistake by the defenders of the forts. The American Consul complained to the Viceroy, who took no notice of his letter; and thus bad blood with the Americans was engendered." *China's Intercourse with Europe*, translated selections from the *Record of Chinese and Western Relations*, by E. H. Parker, the Pagoda Library, Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., p. 65.

¹ *A History of China*, S. W. and F. W. Williams, p. 286.

² Nov. 16, 1856.

³ *Life of Foote*, Hoppin, p. 115.

abandoned it. They found some loaded guns trained on the United States boats and left with a slow match burning. The train was speedily cut by the soldiers¹.

Yeh seemed to think these episodes of the assault and the capture of the forts of very little importance. He wrote to Commodore Armstrong, "...there is no matter of strife between our respective nations. Henceforth let the fashion of the flag which American ships employ be clearly defined, and inform me what it is beforehand. This will be the verification of the friendly relations which exist between the two countries²."

Commodore Armstrong thought the old proverb, "Let sleeping dogs lie," the best solution of the difficulty. He wrote to Dr. Parker, "Here, I presume, it will end, and so long as he, the Imperial Commissioner, does not commit any act of violence against our flag or citizens, we should rest upon our arms³."

Commander Foote was severely criticized by some, afterwards, for his boldness in urging the Commodore to take redress. An extract from one of his letters, in reply to this, will be interesting, as also are his friendly sentiments in regard to England, therein expressed. "I still feel, as I often have expressed myself, that had I not promptly taken the force to Canton, and in counsel and deed approved the capture of the 'Barrier Forts' for having on three different occasions fired upon our flag, I ought to be turned out of the Navy as one wholly unworthy of holding a commander's commission in it. Had you been there, holding my commission,

¹ *Life of Foote*, Hoppin, p. 118.

² Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 144.

³ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2163] p. 143.

I believe also that your course would have corresponded with my own.

"I thus have freely commented, as I am justified in doing, on that part of your letter referring to acts in which I bore a prominent part; and now take the liberty of a friend in remarking that our sentiments toward the English are antipodal. I hold them to be a nation altogether in advance of any European in promoting Christian civilization and the highest interests of mankind. Your Anglophobia, pardon the expression, often leads you, though no doubt unintentionally, to do them an injustice. I am quite proud of our ancestry, even with all their faults, when I compare them with the other nations of Europe¹."

It is interesting to trace the patriotic work of Admiral Foote, in those years in the Far East, in cultivating good opinion towards Americans, particularly in Siam, and his energetic action in Japan. An extract from a kindly letter to his little son throws a side-light on the gallant commander's zeal, which was to shine so brightly afterwards, in other attacks on other forts, in waters nearer home. It was written from Bangkok.

"It is not every young gentleman who can say he has a correspondent in this far land. Our sitting or reception room here is sixty feet square and thirty-five feet high, with a great deal of gilding about it, and some twenty large mirrors on its walls. We have everything furnished us by the king. The attendants come in crawling on all fours, much as Willie did when he was a baby, and then they knock their heads on the

¹. *Life of Foote*, Hoppin, p. 126.

floor as they approach you. The king lately lost five hundred out of fifteen hundred elephants in a fight. We have put up a flag-pole in our yard as high as the one on the New Haven Green, and have hoisted the American flag upon it¹."

To return to Canton. In December came the burning of the foreign factories to the ground². The attack on the steamer "Thistle" ended the tale of blood for the year 1856. She was a mail-steamer plying between Canton and Hongkong. The Chinese passengers and freight came on board as usual when she left the former place on one of her regular trips. It was the rule to search passengers to see if any hidden weapons were on them but none were found on this fatal day. Afterwards, it was discovered that a woman had brought some knives hidden in her clothes.

As the vessel neared the Second Bar, some of the Chinese suddenly rose on the crew. They killed eleven Europeans. One was the Spanish Vice-Consul at Whampoa. They took the "Thistle" up Second Bar Creek. They cut off the heads of their victims to get a certain reward which was offered. Then they set the "Thistle" on fire and left her with the headless trunks in her hold. Before departing, the murderers cast off their loose outside apparel and underneath was seen the garb of the "braves" or Government militia³.

Just as in the events of 1900, so in those earlier

¹ *Life of Foote*, Hoppin, p. 135.

² Blue Book, 1857, xii. [2192]. Further Papers relative to the Proceedings of Her Majesty's Naval Forces at Canton, p. 1.

³ Blue Book, 1857, xii. [2192]. *Ibid.*, p. 27. *Annual Register*, 1858 [269].

days, the Chinese merchants, as a class, desired nothing more than peace. The great mercantile firms of Canton, as represented by the famous Howqua and by Kingqua, had frequent interviews with Mr. Parkes in the troublous times of 1856. They admitted the obstinacy of Yeh and his ignorance of the power of the English. They saw the danger from the menace of the rebels. They feared for "themselves, their families, and their city. They were very anxious that the difficulties could be speedily arranged¹."

In England, meantime, the news brought by each returning mail from the Orient caused much discussion. It led to prolonged debates in the House of Lords and the House of Commons. It cost the dissolution of a Parliament by an adverse vote. The masterful Lord Palmerston was obliged to appeal to the country, and events in the far-off East were drawn up into the tangled web of English home politics.

It is interesting to recall some of the opinions on China expressed by the great men of that generation, most of whom have already passed to the silent land. At no other time has China had the attention of the world so riveted upon her, as in those years from 1856 to 60, until the Boxer outbreak of the summer of 1900.

McCarthy says, "For years after the actual events connected with the lorch 'Arrow,' the very name of that ominous vessel used to send a shudder through the House of Commons²." On Feb. 9th, 1857, Lord Lyndhurst in the Lords asked the Secretary of State

¹ Blue Book, 1857, xii. [2192] p. 15.

² *A History of our own Times*, McCarthy, chap. xxx.

for Foreign Affairs if he would lay upon the table of the House a copy of the colonial ordinance under which registers were granted for vessels at Hongkong and in particular for a copy of the register of the ship "Arrow¹."

On Feb. 24th the Earl of Derby rose to move the resolutions in regard to China of which he had given notice and in his speech spoke of himself as an "advocate for weakness against power, for perplexed and bewildered barbarism against the arrogant demands of overweening, self-styled civilization." At the close of this speech, which took up the legal aspects of the case, he said, "I appeal to you by your vote this night to declare that you will not sanction the usurpation by inferior authorities of that most awful prerogative of the Crown, the declaring of war; that you will not tolerate, nor by your silence appear to approve, light and trivial grounds of quarrel and upon cases of doubtful justice as far as regards the merits of our first demands, the capture of commercial vessels; that you will not tolerate the destruction of the forts of a friendly country; that you will not tolerate the bombardment and the shelling of an undefended and commercial city; and that you will not on any consideration give the sanction of your voice to the shedding of the blood of unwarlike and innocent people, without warrant of law and without the warrant of moral justification²."

After this eloquent conclusion which expressed

¹ *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, Series 3, vol. 144, 332.

² *Hansard*, Series 3, vol. 144, 1194.

the ideas held world-wide in those days by a certain section of thinkers, he moved to resolve:

1st. "That this House has learnt with deep Regret the Interruption of amicable Relations between Her Majesty's Subjects and the Chinese Authorities at Canton, arising out of the Measures adopted by Her Majesty's Chief Superintendent of Trade to obtain Reparation for an alleged Infraction of the Supplementary Treaty of 8th October, 1843:

2nd. "That in the Opinion of this House the Occurrence of Differences upon this Subject rendered the Time peculiarly unfavourable for pressing upon the Chinese Authorities a Claim for the Admittance of British Subjects into Canton, which had been left in Abeyance since 1849, and for supporting the same by force of Arms:

3rd. "That in the Opinion of this House Operations of actual Hostility ought not to have been undertaken without the express Instructions, previously received, of Her Majesty's Government; and that neither of the Subjects adverted to in the foregoing Resolutions afforded sufficient Justification for such Operations¹."

The Earl of Clarendon followed. In his speech we see principles laid down which represent the attitude of another equally important section of thinkers toward the Chinese problem, both in his time and in ours, in England and through the world. He said, "The truth is that when, on the one side, there has been for a long series of years an habitual determination on the part of the Chinese to humiliate us, to restrict us in the exercise of our undoubted rights, to violate our privileges

¹ *Hansard*, Series 3, vol. 144, 1194.

secured by treaty; and when on the other side, as a natural consequence, there has been great annoyance and irritation, although tempered by a moderate and forbearing spirit, I think such relations can hardly be called amicable. \ So far has this been the case that for many years there has been no resident in China, official or unofficial, no matter to what nation he belonged, who has not felt that the present state of things was unendurable, that it could not last, and that sooner or later a rupture must take place¹."

In the case of the "Arrow," he informed the House, there was a great principle involved. Those persons who were on the spot in China felt, "that, whatever they possess in China, whatever they hope for as regards trade, the safety of their lives and property, the progress of their trade, all depend upon the maintenance of the treaty rights, upon the respect paid to the British flag, and upon the protection which it affords. \ If those rights can be violated, if that flag can be insulted with impunity, there is an end to all safety for British residents in China; British merchants will henceforth carry on their business, and their interests will depend upon a mere sufferance, which may be withdrawn in a day, and they will be in reality as dependent upon the mercy and forbearance of the Chinese authorities as those persons at present delight to represent them to the Chinese nation to be²."

Others spoke from one standpoint or another in this debate, including Lord Lyndhurst, the Lord Chancellor, and Earl Grey.

¹ *Hansard*, Series 3, vol. 144, 1195 and 6.

² *Hansard*, Series 3, vol. 144, 1196.

On Feb. 26, 1857, the debate was resumed. Lord Methuen thought that, "Yeh was evidently a very obstinate man; one would imagine that his name should have been 'Nay' instead of 'Yea'; and it was clear that he would never have given up those prisoners if he had not believed the vessel to be a British one¹."

The Earl of Malmesbury remarked that he had heard "in the House of Lords, ranged on both sides of the question, the arguments of the ablest lawyers, who, discussing the question with equal confidence, are firmly convinced that the opposite side is wrong." "If" he continued "the noble and learned Lords and Peers of England are perplexed with the technicalities of the question, how much more must a semi-barbarous officer like the Chinese Commissioner and his countrymen be perplexed by the accusations made against them? and surely if the Chinese are to be attacked and despised for their ignorance, those noble Lords who believe they have right on their side are much more open to scorn and derision²."

The Earl of Albemarle, on account of a certain rumour, which we shall find realized later, raised the question of the reception of Ambassadors at Peking, and hoped Her Majesty's Government would not take so unwise and impolitic a step, as to demand the reception of one. He quoted the historian Williams as to the treatment of the envoys from Holland³.

On Question, their Lordships divided Content 110,

¹ *Hansard*, Series 3, vol. 144, 1322.

² *Hansard*, Series 3, vol. 144, 1342.

³ *Hansard*, Series 3, vol. 144, 1357.

Not-Content 146. A Majority of 36 resolved in the negative against the resolutions¹.

In the House of Commons there was a different result. Here also we see some of the great minds of the age pitted against each other in the consideration of the Chinese Question and its corollary, the dissolution of a Parliament.

Mr. Cobden on Feb. 26, 1857, rose to submit the resolutions, of which he had given notice, respecting the hostilities in China, and started his speech by appealing to the national conscience².

Not very agreeable to mercantile representatives in China, yet interesting to the student of the history of political economy were his words; "If hon. Gentlemen opposite will not take offence at a reference to a bygone question, I should say that there may be too much protection for British merchants as well as for British agriculture. It is a fact, that while our exports are going on increasing they are passing more and more through the hands of foreigners and not through the hands of Englishmen. I speak from ocular observation and personal experience when I say, that if you go to the Mediterranean, or the Levant, or to any of the ancient seats of commercial activity, you will find the English merchants, with all their probity and honour, which I maintain is on an equality with that of any other people, have been for some time in foreign countries declining in numbers. At Genoa, Venice, Leghorn, Trieste, Smyrna, Constantinople, you will find that the trade has passed out of the hands of

¹ *Hansard*, Series 3, vol. 144, 1385.

² *Hansard*, Series 3, vol. 144, 1391.

British merchants, and into the hands of the Greeks, Swiss, or Germans, all belonging to countries that have no navy to protect them at all. This is the fact; and what is the inference? It may be that English merchants are not educated sufficiently in foreign languages. But it may be also that Englishmen carry with them their haughty and inflexible demeanour into their intercourse with the natives of other countries. The noble Lord inscribes '*Civis Romanus sum*' on our passports, which may be a very good thing to guard us in our footsteps. But '*Civis Romanus sum*' is not a very attractive motto to put over the door of our counting-houses abroad. Now, without wishing to do more than convey a friendly warning to a class with whom I have so great a sympathy, I may remark, that our merchants have at present a very large trade in China, in South America, and in India; but the same failings which have lost the footing of our merchants in the Mediterranean, may be also a disadvantage to us in China and elsewhere¹."

At the conclusion of a very long and able speech he moved two resolutions. One resolution was afterwards substituted for these as follows; "That this House has heard with concern of the conflicts which have occurred between the British and Chinese authorities in the Canton river; and, without expressing an opinion as to the extent to which the Government of China may have afforded this Country cause of complaint respecting the non-fulfilment of the Treaty of 1842, this House considers that the Papers which

¹ *Hansard*, Series 3, vol. 144, 1409 and 10.

have been laid upon the Table fail to establish satisfactory grounds for the violent measures resorted to at Canton, in the late affair of the *Arrow*¹."

Lord John Russell brought to mind the fear which has haunted so many statesmen in all the great Chinese crises. This same fear has been one of those strong, immaterial forces upon which China has relied, in her struggle for independence.

He said: "For my own part, I have no wish to see these operations entered upon. I fear they might lead to a long and bloody contest. I fear especially in the present disorganized state of China, that they might produce such social anarchy, such a complete rupture of all relations between man and man in that country, that it would cease to be a civilized nation—cease to be a nation with which we could advantageously carry on commercial intercourse. And uncertain and ambiguous objects like these are the benefits for which we are to risk the future prospects of our trade²!"

On March 3rd, Gladstone gave a speech of characteristic eloquence. "And I cherish the trust and belief that when you, Sir, rise in your place to-night to declare the numbers of the division from the chair which you adorn, the words which you speak will go forth from the walls of the House of Commons, not only as a message of mercy and peace, but also as a message of British justice and British wisdom, to the farthest corners of the world³."

Palmerston spoke, emphasizing vigorously the duty

¹ *Hansard*, Series 3, vol. 144, 1485.

² *Hansard*, Series 3, vol. 144, 1473.

³ *Hansard*, Series 3, vol. 144, 1808 and 9.

due to British subjects abroad. "But there are greater interests at stake in the vote to be given to-night. This House has now to determine a question of vast importance to British interests that now exist, and that may hereafter accrue. Not merely the property, but I will venture to say the lives of many of your countrymen depend upon your vote. Those who are most averse to the laws which inflict upon the greatest malefactors the penalty of death, may well pause before they come to a decision by which they may, it is to be feared, pass sentence of death upon many of their fellow-subjects abroad¹."

Another great mind was brought to bear upon the problem, a mind which perhaps from its own Oriental antecedents, could look at the question more sympathetically than others. Disraeli agreed with other members as to the desirability of the increase of commercial relations with China, but he said; "There is one idea too prevalent with regard to China—namely, that all England has to do is to act with energy in order to produce the same results as have been achieved in India. Fifty years ago Lord Hastings offered to conquer China with 20,000 men. So great a captain as the Marquess of Hastings might have succeeded; but since the time when our Clives and Hastings founded our Indian Empire the position of affairs in the East has greatly changed. Great Powers have been brought into contact with us in the East. We have the Russian Empire and the American Republic there, and a system of political compromise has de-

¹ *Hansard*, Series 3, vol. 144, 1833.

veloped itself like the balance of power in Europe; and if you are not cautious and careful in your conduct now in dealing with China, you will find that you are likely not to extend commerce, but to excite the jealousy of powerful states, and to involve yourselves in hostilities with nations not inferior to yourselves¹."

The Question was put and the House divided:—
Ayes 263; Noes 247: Majority 16².

Lord Palmerston announced two or three days after the great debate that the Government had resolved on a dissolution and appealed to the country. The result was a great triumph for him. Cobden, Bright and other leading men were defeated. The Opposition would, of course, attribute it to an appeal to the false pride of England³. Great had been the display of words and arguments and campaign tactics. If Yeh in his yamen could only have known the hue and cry raised about him and his cause in England, his joy would have been intense. Afterwards, when in exile in Calcutta, he is said to have enjoyed reading the reports of Debates more than any other occupation. His attitude in Canton had come near breaking a "British square" of political combinations. But the

¹ *Hansard*, Series 3, vol. 144, 1836—7.

² *Hansard*, Series 3, vol. 144, 1846.

³ *A History of our own Times*, McCarthy, chap. xxx.

"There were no music-halls of the modern type in those days. Had there been such, the denunciations of the insolent barbarian, and of his still baser British friends, would no doubt have been shouted forth night after night in the metropolis, to the accompaniment of rattling glasses and clattering pint-pots. Even without the alliance of the music-halls, however, Lord Palmerston swept the field of his enemies." *Ibid*.

victory of Lord Palmerston was a vindication of the Government's line of action. Now we shall see the "pushful" men of that generation, solid in the political support of the country, force on the strenuous policy to its conclusions. The argument of force had won the day and blood and iron were marching orders.

We have been able to judge the opposing principles which were debated on the floor of that Parliament, which, through the centuries, has witnessed the discussion of so many world-questions. In these principles, so expressed, we see crystallized the two radically opposite views in regard to things Chinese which have shaped opinion and guided action and formed, as it were, the two great parties among foreigners. These may be called the Pro-Chinese and the Anti-Chinese parties. These frames of mind are opposed to each other as strongly or more strongly to-day than in 1857. We hear some cry, "Down with the Chinese; give them the full measure of revenge." Others express opinions which might be summed up in the phrase, "If I were in China, I would be a Boxer myself and drive every foreigner out of the country."

But a study of the past shows that the best effects have followed from a parallelogram of forces, as it were, of the two opposed views. When both extremes have lost their harshness and compromised between themselves on a moderate line of action, the outcome has been definite progress.

The gentle, firm course, the policy which we shall find, later in our story, Lord Elgin adopted, has always brought the best results, because they have been the only

ones possible in that peculiar problem of the Orient. They ultimately will mean China's grandest good and the world's greatest benefit. \

Extremists in both ranks have rarely accomplished much in the solution of the puzzle, either those who say that the best thing for the human race would happen if all China were used to fill up a sun-spot, or those, on the other hand, who say that every foreigner ought to leave China and the highest kind of a wall be built to partition that land from all Western trade and influence and civilization and leave her in the peace of stagnation.

Taking a liberal allowance of deep sympathy with the great, suffering, patient, industrious people of China and mixing it with an ingredient of applied force to direct the energies of that race to a happier course, we might obtain a medicine which would work the cure of the sick man of the Far East. His recovery of national strength and vigour would heal a thousand causes of irritation and insomnia for the statesmen who guide the policies of the world.

In regard to this same cure, there is a great deal of hypocritical interest, it is to be feared, expressed as to the patient's condition. The highest moral sentiments are sometimes invoked to defend a cause which, after all, may be mostly an affair of the pocket-book. It is like the story which has been told of a certain curate. A young and unworldly-minded clergyman was in his first parish, a village in that county of England which is famous for breeding and racing horses. The clerk of the parish asked him to pray in the service for "Lucy Brown." The young curate innocently thought that

some worthy woman of the place was meant. After a few Sundays, during which he had complied with the request, the clerk came to him and said his prayers were no longer needed. The clergyman asked, "Is she dead?" "No, sir," was the reply, "but she has won the steeple-chase!" The curate is said to have become a great success in that parish. The moral of the tale as applied to China does not need to be elucidated.

CHAPTER III.

LORD ELGIN AND BARON GROS.

MEANWHILE, the condition of affairs had not been improving in the dim and distant Orient, not yet brought within diplomatic finger-tips of Europe by cable and land-telegraph. Too small a force on the side of the British, opposed by the passive obstinacy of Imperial Commissioner Yeh, led to greater irritation and tumult. 1857, a memorable date in the relations between Europe and Asia, in India as well as in China, was ushered in at Canton by a fight between the "Hornet" and "Comus" and a fleet of Chinese war-junks¹.

The burning of a portion of the suburbs of the city by Admiral Seymour followed². Just as later in 1900, the centre and south of the Empire maintained a comparative quiet, while the north was hoarse with foreigner-baiting, so in 1857 the British Consul at Shanghai, Mr. Robertson, could write to Sir J. Bowring ;

¹ Jan. 4, 1857. Blue Book, 1857, xii. [2192]. Further Papers relative to the Proceedings of Her Majesty's Naval Forces at Canton, p. 28.

² Jan. 12, 1857. Blue Book, 1857, xii. [2192]. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

"The events at Canton have made no sensible impression here. My relations with the authorities continue on the same friendly footing as heretofore, and as such it will be my earnest endeavour to preserve them¹."

But affairs at Hongkong seemed more and more threatening. Jardine Matheson & Company were obliged to get blue-jackets and marines to watch their property². The colony was in a condition of great apprehension. The Mandarins had commanded the respectable Chinese to leave, or their relatives would be executed. An immense number remained but there was a great fear of incendiary fires³. In all the periods of storm and brooding trouble in China, how often fire has added its horror to the intensity of anxiety. It seemed best to Admiral Seymour to retire from Canton and fall back upon Macao Fort⁴. Then the other out-works of the British Empire, up and down the East, were called upon for help. The Governor-General of India was asked for 5000 troops. The Governor of Singapore had said that in event of need at Hongkong he could supply 500 men. They were requested⁵.

At Hongkong, meanwhile, more insidious weapons than steel or shot were being put in operation. In January somebody put arsenic in the bread supplied to the foreigners in the colony. A Chinese by the

¹ Jan. 2, 1857. Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2192] p. 27.

² *Europe in China, History of Hongkong*, E. J. Eitel, Ph.D., p. 310.

³ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2192] p. 28.

⁴ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2192] pp. 29 and 33.

⁵ Blue Book, 1857, XII. [2192] p. 29.

name of Alum (whose name naturally caused many atrocious puns in England) was the proprietor of the bakery from which the disaster came.

Some hundreds of persons ate the poisoned bread. The fact of the poisoning, however, spread rapidly through the colony and measures were promptly taken to counteract the effects of the arsenic. There was much suffering but no direct loss of life, although the death of Lady Bowring, who was obliged to return to England, could be traced to its indirect results¹. The analysis of the bread showed arsenic in such great quantities that its very excess had caused its early ejection from the stomach².

Alum, the proprietor of the bakery, left that very morning for Macao. He was arrested the same night and brought back to Hongkong. With nine others he was tried at the criminal sessions of the Supreme Court on the capital charge of administering poison with intent to kill but was acquitted³. The mode of imprisonment of the suspected Chinese in the first instance was barbarous⁴.

¹ Blue Book, 1857, Sess. 2, XLIII. [2206]. Further Papers relating to the Proceedings of Her Majesty's Naval Forces at Canton, p. 6. *Europe in China, History of Hongkong*, E. J. Eitel, Ph.D., p. 311.

² Blue Book, 1857, Sess. 2, XLIII. 155. Hong Kong: Charge of Poisoning, p. 1. "Every 4 lb. loaf of white bread, subsequently analysed at Woolwich (by F. A. Abel), contained grains .92 per cent. of white arsenic. Toasted bread contained the smallest proportion (.15 grains per cent.) of poison, yet 4 ounces of it were found to contain $2\frac{1}{2}$ grains of arsenious acid. Brown bread contained about $2\frac{1}{2}$ times and white bread about 6 times the quantity found in the toast." *History of Hongkong*, E. J. Eitel, Ph.D., p. 311.

³ Blue Book, 1857, Sess. 2, XLIII. 155, p. 1.

⁴ "As many as 42 of them were kept for 20 consecutive days and

Neutral nations as well as the English were involved in this case of poisoning. Dr. Parker of the United States Legation protested vigorously to Commissioner Yeh against such a method of warfare. The Governor of Macao and the French Chargé d'Affaires did likewise¹.

Commissioner Yeh replied to Dr. Parker that it was a question of the revenge of private wrongs of the Chinese upon the English. Such an act, however, he said, was worthy of detestation but as it had occurred at Hongkong, it was outside his jurisdiction².

nights on remand, in an underground police cell, 15 feet square by 12 feet high. It was thenceforth justly termed 'the Black Hole of Hongkong.'" *History of Hongkong*, Eitel, p. 312.

¹ Blue Book, 1857, Sess. 2, XLIII. [2206] p. 6.

² Blue Book, 1857, Sess. 2, XLIII. [2206] p. 17. Commissioner Yeh to Dr. Parker. "The Chinese and Americans have usually been on good terms, and the trade between China and other countries has heretofore been conducted amicably; but the English have now, for several months, in a most unprovoked manner, brought their troops and engaged in hostilities, repeatedly setting fire to the shops and dwellings of people, and destroying a very great number of buildings, and have ruined some entire families. Doubtless there are many Chinese whose hatred against the English has been much increased by this; but to poison people in this underhand manner is an act worthy of detestation: still, as it all occurred in Hong Kong, it is impossible for me to examine into all the facts. The act is owing to the unnumbered evils which have been inflicted upon the Chinese by the English; and the natives of the surrounding districts have taken this way of revenging their private wrongs.

"The Americans having never injured the Chinese, there is, of course, nothing to mar the good feeling existing between them. Your Excellency might, with propriety, issue admonitory exhortations for the Americans quietly to attend to their own business, and there can be no question but the Chinese will always treat them in a proper manner. What could induce them to think of secretly poisoning them? a point worthy of your consideration."

Somewhat the same in tone was his reply to the French Chargé d'Affaires. The author of the attempt at poisoning was an abominable being, but Hongkong was outside the Commissioner's sway¹.

A measure of pin-pricks, this time under official sanction, was the ordering back of domestic servants. Governor Bowring received through the Governor of Macao a copy of a proclamation of the Magistrate of the district of Heang-shan, which furnished Hongkong with the greater part of its domestic servants. It ordered back every Chinese in English employ.

"Kew, Acting Chief Magistrate of the district of Heang-shan, issues the following proclamation:—

"The Chief Magistrate had some time since the honour to receive the instructions recited below from his Excellency the Governor-General.

"The English barbarians having assaulted the provincial city, a large body of troops has been assembled

¹ Blue Book, 1857, Sess. 2, XLIII. [2206] p. 21. Commissioner Yeh to the Count de Courcy. "La nouvelle de l'empoisonnement du pain à Hong Kong m'a indigné et attristé d'autant plus profondément que l'amitié et la bonne harmonie subsistent comme d'habitude entre la Chine et votre noble Empire. Mais depuis que, sans raison ou cause, les Anglais continuent leurs hostilités, durant des mois entiers, en incendiant et brûlant une infinité d'habitations du peuple et d'établissements de toute sorte, des familles entières sans nombre s'en trouvent nécessairement réduites à la misère et les populations de tous les districts ne respirent plus contr'eux que haine et vengeance. On peut s'en apercevoir à tout propos et votre dépêche le dit bien que 'lorsque la haine s'empare d'un peuple, il ne pense qu'à se venger, et, en écartant les droits de la raison, il n'a qu'un désir, celui de nuire à son ennemi.' Quoiqu'il en soit, l'auteur de l'empoisonnement est un être abominable, mais il se trouve actuellement à Hong Kong et il me serait difficile d'instruire son procès."

for purposes of defence and seizure; and as it is of course expedient that all trade with them should be prohibited, and all commercial dealings put an end to, every Chinese of any district (of the province) who may be in business at Hong Kong, or in barbarian service in houses or on board vessels there, is to be desired to return thence to his native place within a given time. Recusants will be severely dealt with as traitors; all their goods and property confiscated; and such of the gentry or elders as screen them will be held equally responsible.'

"In accordance with the above, it became the duty of the Chief Magistrate to issue a proclamation to the effect prescribed, as also to send written instructions to the gentry and elders of the several wards to act as they were therein directed.

"Fearing, however, that there may be hamlets and farms here and there to which the injunctions referred to have not penetrated, and being sincerely anxious to prevent the inhabitants thereof from falling into the net of the law, it is the duty of the magistrate now to issue a second proclamation.

"He accordingly notifies to all classes, military and plebeians, that if there be any of their sons or brethren still remaining at Hong Kong, or as employés in barbarian ships or houses, they must call on them to return home within five days, and to tarry no longer. If they be not forthcoming when the Chief Magistrate makes his visit, it will be seen that they are still hanging on at Hong Kong; their houses and property will be confiscated, and, as soon as they can be arrested, they will be punished as traitors to China. The gentry and

elders (of their wards), as well as their fathers and brothers, will all be proceeded against under the law against collusion.

"Let the good tremble and obey. Let them not act so as to have hereafter to repent.

"A special proclamation.

"Heen-fung, 7th year, 2nd moon, 1st day (February 24, 1857)¹."

Certain documents were seized during the capture of some junks by a party of seamen and marines in April, which throw a lurid light on the plots and peril which surrounded Hongkong at this time². The poisoning case was alluded to in these, but not in a manner to implicate Alum. There were references to attacks on the steamers and the rewards for the heads of Englishmen. Among the papers was a detached slip of paper in a different hand with the remarkable words, "On no account destroy the Temple of Jesus of the West, at Tsin-wan³."

In this same month of April, two boxes, a small parcel and a Chinese letter were discovered at Stanley, near Hongkong. One box, coloured yellow, contained a number of letters of little interest. In the other, a black box, were found two Mandarins' winter caps, a dagger in a leather sheath and some papers. The Chinese letter related to a plot to take the heads of Mr. Caldwell and Colonel Caine for which the per-

¹ Blue Book, 1857, Sess. 2, XLIII. [2206] p. 29.

² Blue Book, 1857, Sess. 2, XLIII. [2223]. Further Papers relating to the Proceedings of Her Majesty's Naval Forces at Canton, p. 14.

³ Blue Book, 1857, Sess. 2, XLIII. [2223]. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

petrator was to receive 50,000 dollars, a button of the sixth grade and a dark feather. If, the writer added, it was easy to slay Caldwell and Caine, the extermination of all in Hongkong, should it be required, would be as easy as taking anything out of one's purse by putting one's hand in¹.

Through all this maze of plot and counterplot, of poison and attempted assassination, we must not forget the moral geographical position, as it were. Read the early history of European nations and the same tale, or a story fifty times worse, of trick and stratagem, the secret knife and blazing brand is found throughout. In Japan we see the phenomenon, rapid and admirable, of the evolution in a generation from the art of making war in the old barbarous manner to the modern system of humanity. Read the history of her early intercourse with foreigners to see this change. In China, still stranded in the fog of old prejudice, we find the old, barbarous, inhuman methods of fire, poison and dagger.

But this is one phase, one result of the isolation of China. Her moral plane of the present is not irreparably different from the moral plane of the Japan of fifty years ago, or of the Europe of five hundred years ago. It is Japan and the West which have advanced. It is China which has remained stationary.

Remove ignorance of international usage and an entirely different result might, and probably would, easily follow. The method by which ignorance has been met, up to the present, as history shows, has been by the sturdy blows of outside forces.

¹ Blue Book, 1857, Sess. 2, XLIII. [2223] p. 11.

The ice of the frozen harbours of the north must be hammered and broken by powerful machines during the winter to permit the progress of steamers. With the advance of spring, the warmth melts the ice, and after a season of confusion, the great blocks jostling and pushing each other, the steamers glide easily through the placid waters. Just so, when the warmth of progress begins to be felt in China, the necessity for the hard hits from the nations which has been the rule in the past will cease, and the river of a new national life will flow freely and proudly, in a current which will sweep away the obstacles of unwise methods, old prejudices, hoary ignorance.

A number of minor naval operations of the English authorities took place during the early part of 1857 at Canton, but the general result was a concentration of forces and withdrawal from the upper part of the river. The month of May, however, was marked by two expeditions, the first under Commodore Elliot to Escape Creek and the next under Admiral Seymour to Fatshan. The effect of these operations was the entire destruction of the fleet of war-junks in the Canton waters¹.

On May 25th Commodore Elliot advanced up Escape Creek with his gunboats. The expedition found a number of junks at anchor in the stream. Fire opened and the junks fled. Sixteen of these were taken, the remainder escaping. The next day Elliot went up another channel in the ships' boats in tow

¹ *Annual Register*, 1858, 270]. The spelling of the name of the Commodore in the authorities for the period is either Elliot or Elliott. The Navy Lists give it with one *t*.

of the gunboats. They went up the Creek as far as the war-vessels could go. Then they rowed about twelve miles, rounded a point and suddenly found the large town of Tang-koon and its battery before them and a large fleet of war-junks. The Chinese were as much surprised as the intruders themselves and left the junks for the fort. The marines and blue-jackets destroyed twelve of the junks under a fire from the jingals in the fort¹.

For the second expedition and the battle of Fatshan, we have the story of an eye-witness, that alert and vivacious correspondent of the "Times," George Wingrove Cooke. At nine o'clock on the morning of May 29th, Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, Commander-in-Chief of the naval forces, left the flag-ship "Calcutta" and went on board the "Coromandel," a small paddle-wheel steamer². He steamed up past the Bogue Forts, some small gunboats following. In regard to the storming of these forts, one Chinese in the hearing of Mr. Cooke, answered the question as to why they ran before the storming-party, "No can. Two piecy men no can stand all same place. S'pose you *must* come in, I go out."

The attack was ordered for Monday morning, June 1st³, at four o'clock, and the advance was begun after the Admiral's last orders had been given, "Let no one up anchor till I am well in with the fort. Respect private property; and do no violence to unarmed

¹ *Annual Register*, 1858, 270].

² *Annual Register*, 1858, 270]. *China and Lower Bengal*, G. W. Cooke (1861 edition), p. 19.

³ 1857.

people¹." The "Coromandel" ran aground, but got free, as the tide was making. The fort on the steep hill on the left bank opposite Hyacinth Island was stormed by the boats' crews and the marines. The Chinese gunners could not depress their guns far enough to sweep them. In lieu, they rolled down 32-pound shot and three-pronged spears. The fort was soon taken, however, and the Chinese walked away down the rear of the hill².

Fire was now turned upon the junks and they were abandoned, 72 in all. The Admiral had cleverly chosen low water for the advance and so found the junks all aground. This obliged their crews either to fight or run. At even a quarter flood some of the junks could have made their escape into the innumerable surrounding creeks³.

But while the victorious party were beginning to think of breakfast, heavy firing was heard in the distance. This was from the other part of the expedition led by Commodore Keppel. They had gone up the channel to the right of Hyacinth Island and, transferring themselves to smaller boats, had attacked a number of junks protected by a battery of six guns which were soon taken. Pushing on, the party were stopped at a part of the Fa-shan branch, where the configuration of an island in the river allowed a tre-

¹ *China and Lower Bengal*, Cooke, p. 27.

² "They walk away down the back of the hill, and it requires many shots from the marines to make them run. The marines fire very badly; running up hill is not a good preparation for rifle-shooting at moving objects." *China and Lower Bengal*, Cooke, p. 31.

³ *China and Lower Bengal*, Cooke, p. 32.

mendous fire to be concentrated upon them¹.—Commodore Keppel retired for a short time but, on a second advance, the Chinese fled in their junks to the town of Fatshan. All the junks were secured except three and the British reached the walls of Fatshan and dispersed some Chinese soldiers drawn up before them².

The next day the British went down the river and the expedition was finished³.

In the hot July days following, while the little force continued at Hongkong and sickness and disease were the incidents in the dreary monotony of existence, while the weather was so sultry that it led the "Times"

¹ *China and Lower Bengal*, Cooke, p. 34.

² "But the braves of Fatshan would think it a shame that their five junks should be taken from under their eyes. They turn out in martial array; they ring bells and beat gongs, they come filing down a fosse, so covered from view that only their waving banners and their brandished swords and shields are visible. "We are terrible; flee before us!" they are supposed to sing or cry. Keppel has his own way of settling these matters. He turned his marines out of his boats, drew them up on the margin of the suburb, and poured into the Fatshan militia such a volley of Minié balls that the Chinese army went quickly back up its fosse again. He proposed to land his howitzers and pass the night in the city—a daring scheme, which might have produced a ransom of half a million of dollars or utter destruction, as the fortune of war might incline. A message from the Admiral, however, recalled him. He had his five junks towed out before him, and as he left the city he stood up in the stern-sheets of his boats and shook his fist good-humouredly, saying, "You rascals, I'll come back again to you soon"; and those extraordinary Chinese, they, too, laughed—a broad, good-humoured grin—and so they parted." Cooke, pp. 36—7.

³ *Annual Register*, 1858, 272]. See also *A Sailor's Life under Four Sovereigns*, by Admiral Keppel, London, 1899, chap. LXVI. (vol. III.), "Fatshan Creek."

correspondent to wish that some military purpose would necessitate the driving of a tunnel through the Peak to let in the south-west monsoon, the good ship "Shannon" dropped anchor beneath the shadow of the great mountain¹. On board of her was James, eighth Earl of Elgin and twelfth Earl of Kincardine, special envoy from England to the Emperor of China.

Let us now retrace our steps and see the method and manner of the sending of this great man from England. Another, Baron Gros, Ambassador of France, was to come in a few months, so let us trace these two new phases of the China war, first, the sending of two of Europe's great men to the Far East, and secondly, the beginnings of the joint action of the two allies, England and France, in Chinese affairs.

We have seen how Palmerston's government was threatened. A clever stroke was thought to be necessary by those in power, to give a satisfactory complexion to the much-abused Chinese war. Intimations had been given before and when Lord Palmerston selected the Earl of Elgin to be Plenipotentiary to China, a vigorous prosecution of the Government's policy could

¹ *China and Lower Bengal*, Cooke, p. 65.

"They promise us four months of beautiful winter weather, mildly bracing as an English spring. You might as well thus try to console the ice palace that was built upon the Neva. Before these winter months come we shall be racked with rheumatisms and expanded with furnace heats. Yet Hongkong is very healthy. Scarcely any English die here. True; but there is an enormous consumption of quinine and blue pill, and when these lose their effect, most Englishmen take a Peninsular and Oriental steamer. It is a mere question, then, of a preposition, whether they are to be carried off *from* or *on* the island." *Ibid.*, p. 61.

be expected. He had been Governor of Jamaica and had served with signal success as Governor-General of Canada. After the Chinese experiences, he was destined to become one of the long line of England's Oriental potentates, a Viceroy of India¹.

With him came an expeditionary force to back up the words of diplomacy. But at Ceylon there reached him premonitions of the terrible Indian Mutiny. On his own responsibility he detached troops from the China force to come up to the help of those in India. He wrote thus on June 5th, 1857, at Singapore: "I sent my last letter immediately after landing, and had little time to add a word from land, as I found a press of business, and a necessity for writing to Clarendon by the mail; the fact being, that I received letters from Canning, imploring me to send troops to him from the number destined for China. As we have no troops yet, and do not well know when we may have any, it was not exactly an easy matter to comply with this request. However, I did what I could, and, in concert with the General, have sent instructions far

¹ Walrond says of him; "But where was the man who, at a juncture so critical, in face of an adverse vote of the House of Commons, on the chance of its being rescinded by the country, could be trusted with so delicate a mission; who could be relied on, in the conduct of such an expedition against a foe alike stubborn and weak, to go far enough, and yet not too far—to carry his point, by diplomatic skill and force of character, with the least possible infringement of the laws of humanity; a man with the ability and resolution to insure success, and the native strength that can afford to be merciful? After 'anxious deliberation,' the choice of the Government fell upon Lord Elgin." *Letters and Journals of James, eighth Earl of Elgin*, T. Walrond, p. 178.

and wide to turn the transports back, and give Canning the benefit of the troops for the moment¹."

It was the turning of the transports back from far and wide which probably saved the day in India. Sir William Peel afterwards wrote: "Tell Lord Elgin, that it was the Chinese Expedition that relieved Lucknow, relieved Cawnpore and fought the battle of the 6th December²."

Even after his arrival at Hongkong, Lord Elgin's thoughts were still in India. Hence, he sailed back again from there to Calcutta with more troops. His return to China did not come until the last of autumn³.

Jean Baptiste Louis, Baron Gros, the representative whom France sent to China, had been in the diplomatic service on several missions in Mexico and South America. He had been engaged in other official work including the settlement at Athens in 1850 of the celebrated Pacifico case. In 1856 he had signed the treaty of Bayonne which marked the frontiers of France and Spain⁴.

So the second phase appeared, the entry of an ally into the contest. Writing from Paris, as far back as September, 1856, Lord Cowley had told the Earl of Clarendon that the French Government intended to take up energetically the question of the murder of a French missionary, Père Chapdelaine. He had been

¹ *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, Walrond, pp. 187—8.

² *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, Walrond, p. 188.

³ *Annual Register*, 1858, 272].

⁴ *Dictionnaire général de Biographie et d'Histoire*, Dezobry et Bachelet.

murdered by the Mandarin of Si-lin near the frontiers of Yunnan in the west of Kwangsi province¹. An expedition, even, was in the mind of the French Government for Lord Cowley wrote, "In the course of conversation, yesterday, Count Walewski alluded to the murder of a French missionary in China. He said that the French Chargé d'Affaires in China had stated his intention of taking up the matter very warmly—an intention which the Imperial Government highly approved. It was their firm determination to obtain ample reparation for this cruel murder, and, if the French Chargé d'Affaires did not succeed by negotiation, and had not other sufficient means at his command, an expedition would be sent from hence. Nothing, however, would be settled before the arrival of the next mail from China, but in case measures of coercion were found to be necessary, Count Walewski did not doubt that both Her Majesty's Government and that of the United States would join them in avenging the murder of unoffending Christians²."

Again how history repeats itself, the missionary question indirectly leading to the thunder of the French forces at the Gates of Peking, as years later it led to the amputation of Kiao-chow by another European power. In this way the fate of the missionaries, centres of the influences of the light and healing of a higher civilization, has been twisted up into the maze of diplomatic manœuvres. As to the

¹ See Blue Book, 1857, xii. [2175]. Correspondence respecting Insults in China, p. 220, M. Libois' letter to Sir J. Bowring.

² Blue Book, 1857, xii. [2175]. Correspondence respecting Insults in China, p. 221, Lord Cowley to Earl of Clarendon, Sept. 28, 1856.

ultimate causes of the French desire for such exemplary revenge for the slaying of a missionary, they may possibly be ascribed to the personality of one man, to the half-poetic Imperial dreams of glory and influence of the Emperor Napoleon III. The dreams of a Hohenzollern, no less glorious and Imperial than the dreams of a Napoleon in those earlier years, have in these latter days taken a more lasting vengeance for the murder of missionaries.

So the allies were beginning to gather during that eventful year 1857, Lord Elgin for England and Baron Gros for France, representing as it were, the fighting partners ready with the mailed fist of armed forces to beat a way through to Peking if necessary. The representatives of the other two nations—silent partners—were the Hon. W. B. Reed for the United States of America and Count Poutiatine for Russia. From that day to this the dread cordon of the allies has been drawn around helpless China, sometimes more loosely, sometimes more closely, at times quarrelling among themselves, but always like strong Bulls of Bashan threatening their hapless victim.

In the beginning of December, 1857, the tables were clear and the skill of Lord Elgin and Baron Gros was pitted against the tactics of Imperial Commissioner Yeh. The Earl of Elgin under date of Dec. 12, 1857, wrote to Yeh that at all the open ports in China commerce had been flourishing since the Treaty of 1842. There was one unhappy exception to this general rule, for at Canton the peaceful relations between China and the Treaty Powers had been strained. Finally, an insult to the British flag had necessitated

measures of coercion. The warfare, thus begun, had been carried on by the Chinese authorities in a manner repugnant to humanity. The Government of France was united with that of England in a determination to seek reparation for past and security against future wrongs. Therefore, Lord Elgin continued, he demanded the complete execution of all treaty engagements, including the admission of British subjects into the city of Canton; also compensation to British subjects and those under British protection for losses due to the late disturbances.

If Yeh accepted these demands of England and France within ten days, the blockade of the river would be raised and commerce be allowed to resume its course. However, even in that case, the island of Honam and the forts on the river were to be occupied by the English and French, until a treaty should have been agreed upon between Lord Elgin and a Chinese Plenipotentiary of equal rank. Should, on the other hand, Yeh meet their demands by a refusal, or by keeping silent or by evasion and dilatory pleas, Lord Elgin would direct renewed operations against Canton and make such additional demands as might seem justified¹.

Commissioner Yeh in his reply, two days later, first discussed the right of admission into Canton city, advised Lord Elgin to imitate Bonham's rather than Davis' attitude in regard to the question of admission and allow it to drop. No changes in treaty arrangements could

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, vol. xxxiii. [2571]. Correspondence relative to the Earl of Elgin's Special Mission to China and Japan, 1857—1859, p. 95.

be made. In regard to the "Arrow" incident, Commissioner Yeh asserted that no flag was flying on the lorch, that the boat had been built by a Chinese and was in the employ of the same, "for whom her captain obtained a register." Among the men captured were notorious pirates. He had returned the men to Consul Parkes, but he would not receive them. Any attempt on the part of the English troops to occupy the island of Honam could only lead to irritation and misunderstanding. He ended by urging the continuance of trade between Chinese and foreigners in the accustomed way¹.

Lord Elgin replied to this communication by a note reiterating the ultimatum already launched and the right to make additional demands². Yeh replied in a dispatch in which he restated his case and desired to consult in order that commerce might resume its course. He pleaded that his former reply had in no way been a refusal. Lord Elgin thought best not to answer this³. His private opinion of the situation is of great value and sums up the causes of the contest very neatly. He wrote; "It is clear that there will be no peace till the two parties fight it out. The Chinese do not want to fight, but they will not accept the position relatively to the strangers under which alone strangers will consent to live with them, till the strength of the two parties has been tested by fighting. The English do want to fight⁴."

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, vol. xxxiii. [2571]. Correspondence relative to the Earl of Elgin's Special Mission to China and Japan, 1857—1859, p. 121.

² Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, vol. xxxiii. [2571] *Ibid.*, p. 128.

³ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. [2571] p. 129.

⁴ *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, Walrond, p. 211.

Active operations had, however, begun and the struggle entered upon the second stage, leading to the capture of Canton. Lord Elgin's opinion written just before the outbreak of battle is of interest. He wrote; "On the afternoon of the 20th, I got into a gunboat with Commodore Elliot, and went a short way up towards the barrier forts, which were last winter destroyed by the Americans. When we reached this point, all was so quiet that we determined to go on, and we actually steamed past the city of Canton, along the whole front, within pistol-shot of the town. A line of English men-of-war are now anchored there in front of the town. I never felt so ashamed of myself in my life, and Elliot remarked that the trip seemed to have made me sad. There we were, accumulating the means of destruction under the very eyes, and within the reach, of a population of about 1,000,000 people against whom these means of destruction were to be employed! 'Yes,' I said to Elliot, 'I am sad, because when I look at that town, I feel that I am earning for myself a place in the Litany, immediately after "plague, pestilence, and famine."' I believe however that, as far as I am concerned, it was impossible for me to do otherwise than as I have done¹."

A proclamation was issued in the name of the naval and military authorities of the French and English forces to the authorities of Canton and a notification to the gentry, literati and people. The drafting of these was done by Lord Elgin himself². They recited that the replies of the Imperial Commissioner to the demands made

¹ *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, Walrond, p. 212.

² *Blue Book*, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 124.

upon him had been unsatisfactory and it had now become necessary to exact by force of arms that which peaceful negotiations had failed to obtain. The Commanders-in-Chief accorded the authorities a term of forty-eight hours within which "the military authorities and garrison, Tartar and Chinese, of all denominations" were to evacuate the city.

If they rejected the proposed terms the city would be attacked. In any case, whether the city were surrendered or occupied by force, the inhabitants were recommended to return when the allies were in possession. The gentry, elders and literati with the headboroughs, tithing-men and similar functionaries were advised to present themselves to the authorities of the allied force to help maintain order¹.

The gage of battle was thus thrown down. The whole force was to act keeping in mind as their principal object the capture of the heights within the city². Already, before the middle of December, a fleet of war steamers had gone up the Canton river to the island of Honam lying opposite the city of Canton. Troops had been landed on this island and buildings which were there utilized as barracks. Dutch Folly and French Folly were equipped with platforms for batteries³.

A Chinese coolie corps had been organized under the command of Captain Temple. These were brought to Honam and the cheerful willingness and obedience to their officers removed any uneasiness which might have

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. pp. 126 and 127.

² Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 132.

³ *Annual Register*, 1858 [273 and 274].

been felt as to their disposition. Mr. Loch (afterward Lord Loch), who was on the staff of Major-General Van Straubenzee, was led to remark; "the same good conduct has distinguished them throughout the operations, and shows how much may be done with the Chinese under good discipline and just treatment¹."

Here we see one of the early exhibitions of what is so frequently seen in China, the Chinese ready to assist foreigners against their own countrymen. The testimony as to the soldierly qualities of the race has been repeated by many trained observers. The same words which Henry Loch used in regard to military discipline might well be applied to the whole race and its other grades of society, substituting *good leaders* for *good discipline*.

The General and the English and French Admirals made a reconnaissance which showed clearly that the Chinese, either through fear of the allies or of the rebels, had directed the disposition of their defences solely against an attack from the quarter near Honam Point².

On Sunday, the Quartermaster-General, Major Clifford, with the sappers and a detachment of the 59th Regiment, landed at the place decided on for disembarkation. Through the whole of the long night, while the Chinese made no demonstration and did not appear even to notice them, they were busy making ready stages and pontoons for landing men and guns³.

Early in the morning, the great guns began to

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 144.

² Dec. 23, 1857. Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 144.

³ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 145.

boom and the bombardment of Canton had commenced¹. The tide was low and the landing did not begin until seven o'clock. First came the French Naval Brigade as they were in ships' boats. The 59th Regiment and the Royal Artillery followed closely. The plan was for the French throughout the operations to keep the left of the line. The English Naval Brigade were to hold the right, and the military the centre. The French and the 59th Regiment moved up to occupy some heights overlooking Lin Fort and the country to the north as far as Gough's Heights. The ground was one great burial-place except where it was cultivated. The graves formed natural rifle-pits but the Chinese were soon forced back and also driven out of a village below the heights.

Meanwhile Colonel Lemon's battalion of Marines had landed. In the valley between the position now held and Lin Fort, there lay a large Buddhist temple. The 59th Regiment took this and extending to the right around the south-western angle of the wall opened a heavy rifle-fire on the fort. Two guns and a few jingals and matchlocks alone returned the fire. The French saw that the Chinese were abandoning the fort, rushed forward and captured it².

¹ Dec. 28, 1857.

² Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 145.

De Moges thus describes the capture ; " Au bout de quelque temps, le sergent d'infanterie de marine Martin des Pallières, envoyé avec ses hommes en tirailleurs, s'apercevant qu'on ne lui riposte plus des embrasures du fort, a l'idée d'y pénétrer. Il trouve la porte ouverte, le fort abandonné, et plante le premier le drapeau français sur la muraille. Le 59^e anglais, qui avait tourné la position, accourt avec des hourras. Le pavillon de *la Durance* salue les vainqueurs. Lord

Immediately after the allies had taken possession of the fort, fire was opened from the walls, but most of it passed over their heads. A great company of braves advanced from the direction of Gough Fort with shouts and waving flags but halted at long musket-range and were soon driven back by the fire of the Artillery and the advance of some men¹.

A halt was made for the night, but very early, an hour before daylight on the morning of the 29th, the forces were under arms. The English changed their front to the left, bringing their right forward. The French and the 59th Regiment were opposite the East Gate. Colonel Lemon's battalion and the blue-jackets were opposite the wall between the gate and north-east angle. Colonel Holloway's brigade protected the rear and right flank².

The bombardment began and continued until 9 a.m., instead of stopping at 6 a.m., the hour originally intended. The consequence was that the force came under the fire of the shells from the ships. The General reconnoitred the field, which he was able to do in safety, by getting some guns down in the low ground in front of the wall. With these and with the help of some riflemen under cover, the fire from the embrasures was kept down. At this place Captain Bates was killed³.

The order for the assault on the walls was given at Elgin adresse ses félicitations au Baron Gros, alors en visite à bord du *Furious*." *Souvenirs d'une Ambassade en Chine et au Japon*, De Moges, pp. 106 and 107.

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 145.

² Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 145.

³ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 145.

half-past eight a.m. but a great rush took place as some men of the marines had anticipated it. When the first ladders were placed against the walls, resistance ceased. Laurence Oliphant wrote, "I do not know when I have felt a keener thrill of emotion than when we raced for the ladders at the taking of Canton, and clustered up them like bees, holding on to one another's legs and nearly pulling each other down in the eager scramble¹."

The Five-storied Pagoda and Magazine Hill offered no resistance and were easily captured. When the North Gate was reached the Chinese rallied, a heavy fire was opened and a courageous charge made, but in vain, and the gate was captured².

The next morning, white flags were observed to be hanging from those parts of the wall where the allies had not yet been and from the roofs of many of the houses³. The game was up. Canton was taken. In the afternoon the English and French moved round the wall from the North Gate westward⁴. At the West Gate there was a rush of people striving to leave the city before the dreaded foreigners came in.

Gough Fort at the north and Bluejacket Fort were blown up with gunpowder. Cooke, that chatty correspondent, thus described the scene; "On Friday Lord Elgin and Baron Gros came up to camp, and sat upon the roof of the Chinese battery on Magazine-hill to see the forts blow up. It was worth the trouble of getting up the hill to see this sight. When the

¹ *Episodes in a Life of Adventure*, Laurence Oliphant, p. 134.

² Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 146.

³ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 146.

⁴ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 146.

spectators took their seats, both the forts were full of men. The French, who, having no engineers of their own, were directed by Captain Stuart, took Bluejacket Fort; and Gough Fort was mined by the senior engineer officer, Captain Mann. When the appointed time had come and passed, a rocket went up, the men hurried out, and the solid stone buildings stood intact in their loneliness. They never looked so interesting as during the ten minutes which succeeded the rocket. Seated at only five hundred yards' distance, you could just see a small glimmering slow match burning down. Then came a succession of loud, sharp, cracking, shivering explosions, throwing fragments high in the air, and frightening, but not killing, a kite at the moment hovering over Fort Gough. There were at least twenty successive explosions at the larger fort. When the smoke cleared, a thousand years seemed to have passed in a few seconds. The square substantial fortification was a picturesque ruin, such as we see at Caernarvon or Drachenfels. It was intended that the two forts should go up together; but the French were ready first, and the spectators were tired of waiting, so the drama was divided into two parts¹."

For nearly a week the victorious allies occupied the walls from Magazine Hill to the south-east corner of the city, without going down into the streets and without any offer of submission being made².

The 5th of January, 1858, was an unhappy day

¹ *China and Lower Bengal*, Cooke, pp. 334 and 335. *Annual Register*, 1858, 274].

² *Annual Register*, 1858, 274]. *China and Lower Bengal*, Cooke, p. 334.

for the High Commissioner Yeh. The rain was falling over Canton when three columns of the red-coats of England and 400 of the blue-jackets of France were lost to sight in its narrow lanes as they penetrated into the city¹. The foreigners went to the yamens of the Governor and Tartar General, who were made prisoners. Consul Parkes, in the meantime, with his usual energy had been very busy. He had received information that Yeh was in the Imperial Library not far off. He found the great house empty and he and Commodore Elliot were just going to leave, when Mr. Parkes forced open a certain door. Inside, a venerable man was found reading. Where was Yeh? By dint of questioning it was discovered that he had been away five days and was now in the house of the Tartar Lieutenant-General.

Mr. Parkes got an escort of a hundred blue-jackets with Captain Key in command and they hurried to the yamen. They found the doors closed, burst them open and rushed in².

The blue-jackets swarmed through the place. It was full of baggage hastily packed. Mandarin were hurrying about³. An old man in Mandarin's cap and coat came forward and said he was Yeh, but his appearance belied him. Captain Key rushed to the back entrance where people were heard escaping. He saw a large fat man in a narrow passage who looked

¹ *China and Lower Bengal*, Cooke, p. 336.

² *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan in the Years 1857, 58, 59*, by Laurence Oliphant, vol. i. p. 140. *China and Lower Bengal*, Cooke, p. 340.

³ *China and Lower Bengal*, Cooke, p. 341.

like the picture he had seen of the Imperial Commissioner. Captain Key and the coxswain of Commodore Elliot threw themselves upon him and secured—Yeh¹.

Now that the august prisoner was captured, what was to be done with him? He was kept at first on board H.M.S. "Inflexible" as a prisoner of state². Later, Lord Elgin wrote to Baron Gros that he had been informed by persons who understood the under-currents of Canton affairs, among others by Mr. Parkes, that Yeh's presence so near the fever-spot of politics was disquieting the public mind and hindering the establishment of order in the city³.

It seemed best, therefore, to have him removed to Madras or Calcutta. The latter place was decided on. Mr. Cooke has given a rattling description of the voyage from Canton to India during which he was a fellow-passenger with Yeh⁴. An Imperial edict was issued degrading him. He never returned to China. He lived in a villa in the suburbs of Calcutta for some time and there he breathed his last.

After the capture of Yeh, a number of official documents were found. Among them were the treaties of China with the United States, England and France. Thus Canton fell and Yeh disappeared from the scene of action. New cities and fresh actors must occupy our attention from this time on.

But before bidding farewell to the great southern

¹ *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Laurence Oliphant, vol. I. p. 141. *China and Lower Bengal*, Cooke, p. 342.

² *Annual Register*, 1858, 275].

³ *Blue Book*, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. pp. 212—3.

⁴ *China and Lower Bengal*, Cooke, chaps. xxxiii. and xxxiiii.

city, it will be profitable for a few minutes to discuss a most interesting side eddy in the general flow of war and change between China and the West, a fairly peaceful interlude in the midst of the smoke and smell of gunpowder.

The question of the government of Canton after its capture by the allies was of prime importance. As far back as Dec. 22, 1857, the Earl of Elgin had written to the Earl of Clarendon in regard to the conference of the Plenipotentiaries and Commanders-in-chief of the English and French forces as follows, "When this matter had been disposed of, I observed that several very delicate and difficult questions, with respect to the arrangements to be adopted in the event of a military occupation of the city, whether after surrender or after assault, remained for consideration. I called attention to the deplorable consequences which had, on more than one occasion, attended the capture of cities by our forces during the last Chinese war, and of the importance of endeavouring, by every means in our power, to avert their recurrence. I offered, if the Commanders-in-chief should see fit to entrust this office to me, to direct my particular attention to the subject, and, with such assistance as I could command, to frame a plan which would be submitted for their consideration. This proposal was agreed to, and I am now engaged in collecting from the best available sources the information necessary to enable me to execute the task which I have undertaken¹."

After the capture of Canton was completed, Lord

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 125.

Elgin again wrote to the Earl of Clarendon about the perplexities of its government. He spoke of the difficulty of holding communication with the people, as Mr. Parkes, Mr. Wade and a gentleman attached to the French Mission were the whole body of interpreters. The entire province of Kwangtung with its millions of souls was virtually deprived of its government and would be faced by the peril of anarchy. Pih-kwei, the Chinese Governor, would have to be accepted "as a necessity of the situation."

If he were restored to office, however, it was obvious that it would have to be under such restrictions as would prevent him from using his power to the prejudice of the allies. The plan Lord Elgin proposed was to have Pih-kwei return to his yamen, and resume his functions as Governor. At the same time there was to be established at the yamen a tribunal of officers, appointed by the Commanders-in-chief of the allied forces. There was to be a sufficient military guard for support. This tribunal would deal with all criminal cases where foreigners were either plaintiffs or defendants¹.

There had been some display of the remarkable propensity of the foreigner in warfare with the Chinese, to act fully up to, and a little beyond, the theory that "to the victors belong the spoils." Lord Elgin wrote before the city was completely taken, "As it is, my difficulty has been to enforce the adoption of measures to keep our own people in order, and to prevent the wretched Cantonese from being plundered and bullied.

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. pp. 140 and 141.

This task is the more difficult from the very motley force with which we have to work, composed, firstly, of French and English; secondly, of sailors to a great extent—they being very imperfectly manageable on shore; all, moreover, having, I fear, a very low standard of morality in regard to stealing from the Chinese. There is a word called ‘loot,’ which gives, unfortunately, a venial character to what would, in common English, be styled robbery.....¹” There was also the great danger of plunder and violence from native villains.

The scheme outlined above was put in practice. A letter was written to Pih-kwei detailing the plan as follows.

“January 9, 1858.

“The undersigned, Commanders-in-chief of the allied force of England and France, have the honour to intimate to his Excellency Pih-kwei, Governor of Kwang-tung, &c., that the Governor-General Yeh being now their prisoner, the following are the conditions duly communicated to, and approved by, their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of their respective Governments, under which it is agreed that his Excellency shall continue to exercise the functions of his office during the occupation of Canton by the allied force under their command.

“1. A committee of officers, civil and military, of the allied force, shall be appointed by the Plenipotentiaries and Commanders-in-chief. Its members will reside at the Governor’s yamun, and will assist the Governor in maintaining order. To this end they

¹ *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, Walrond, p. 215.

will be supported by a military force, parties from which will, from time to time, patrol the city.

"2. Beyond the limits of the positions held by the allied force, all cases in which Chinese alone are concerned shall be disposed of by the Chinese authorities; but the above Committee will take cognizance of all in which foreigners alone, or in which foreigners and Chinese, are concerned. Offences committed within the limits above indicated will be dealt with under martial law.

"3. No proclamation shall be issued by the Governor, nor under his authority by his subordinates, until it shall have been submitted to the Committee aforesaid, and shall have been sealed with their seal.

"4. All depôts of arms, magazines, and military stores, shall be handed over to the allied Commanders-in-chief.

"The Undersigned, &c.¹"

Some ceremonial to mark the restoration of Pih-kwei to his position as Governor was deemed necessary. In the afternoon of a day in the early part of January², the "Avenue of Benevolence and Love" in Canton was full of an attentive, animated Chinese crowd, who watched closely as the Plenipotentiaries of England and France went in procession through the city with military bands playing at the head of the parade and followed by the regular swing and the heavy tramp of a large body of troops³.

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. pp. 142 and 143.

² Jan. 9, 1858.

³ *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, vol. i. p. 152.

The procession streamed through the entry of the yamen of the Governor in imposing array to a ceremony which was to inaugurate the new government for the Chinese people, by aid of the Chinese authorities but with the stern military hand of the allies ready to assure confidence. Lord Elgin delivered an address to the Governor. Baron Gros also made a short speech. Pih-kwei replied in a very satisfactory way, hoping for the establishment of a good understanding¹.

While there was some difficulty at first in getting things into running order, the following extract from Mr. Parkes' report of Jan. 27, 1858, will give an idea of the working of the scheme. "Patrols made daily by the Commissioners themselves, in different parts of the city and suburbs, have furnished them with good means of judging the temper of the people, and with excellent opportunities of collecting much varied information. The last one, made yesterday, proved to us that throughout the great western suburb, the people have returned to their trades, their silk-looms, and their ordinary occupations, and this is fast becoming the case in both the old and new city, although it may naturally be expected that the eastern portion of the latter, which suffered more from the attack than any other quarter, will continue, for some time, to feel its ill-effects²."

The horrible condition of the prisons in Canton was discovered in an unexpected visit of Lord Elgin, which led to correspondence with Pih-kwei on the subject³.

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. pp. 141 and 147.

² Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 161.

³ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. pp. 166, 167, 168. See also,

The blockade was also finally taken off Canton and merchants recommenced trade¹.

Prof. Douglas says of this period in the history of Canton; "For three years, under the sway of these officers, a just and equitable rule was substituted for the tyranny which had up to that time disgraced the administration of justice in the city. The change was fully appreciated by the natives, who, for the first time in their existences, had their property guarded and their lives protected²."

Lord Elgin was criticized for his humanity toward the Chinese in regard to certain questions at this time. A characteristic repartee of his is related as follows: "Baron Gros and I were conversing together yesterday on affairs in this quarter, and among other things he told me that we were both much reproached for our laxity, and that I was more blamed on that account than he. I said to him: 'I can praise you on many accounts, my dear Baron, but I cannot compliment you on being a greater brute than I am³.'"

The study of this experiment in government at Canton in those earlier days raises many interesting questions. A comparison of the methods and results of the government in Canton of the two allies in 1858

China and Lower Bengal, Cooke, chap. xxix. *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, vol. i. chap. x. *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, Walrond, pp. 222 and 223.

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 181. *Souvenirs d'une Ambassade*, De Moges, p. 147.

² *China* (The Story of the Nations Series), Prof. R. K. Douglas, p. 269.

³ *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, Walrond, p. 221.

with the manner and outcome of the provisional government in Tientsin in 1900—1901 would be instructive.

The consideration of the scheme of the control of Chinese cities by foreigners might, likewise, lead very readily to another thought. If foreigners can so easily control small slices of Chinese territory like Canton in 1858, like Hongkong, like Kiao-chow, why could they not manage the whole territory of China, if split into separate pieces? Extend the process from the parts to the whole, it might be said, and you ought to obtain like results.

Thus the old bogey of a chronic state of revolution in China, if under foreign control, would disappear. The thought of a people in arms against its conquerors would no longer terrify ambitious governments and the partition of the ancient Empire would be easily realized, according to this view.

To many, the task would be very congenial and would seem to be the manifest destiny of the Occident. It would even wear the aspect of kindness to the Chinese themselves. Perhaps it might be as excusable as the plea of a certain kleptomaniac. The judge asked a prisoner at the bar what he had to say, in answer to the charge of stealing a plank walk in front of a house. "I took it by the advice of my physician, your honour," was the reply. "He told me to take a long walk every day."

But is there not a fallacy underlying the idea that China could be easily governed, if divided into sections among the stronger nations? Can we apply to the whole Empire the experiences as seen in the Canton scheme of government in 1858 and in so many other

cases? No doubt the military force of China would be easily crushed. A united Western world whether in 1858 or 1860 or 1900 crashes through the faulty system of Chinese polity like a 7-lb. round shot through rotten wood-work, but if time be given, the same rottenness may be replaced by strong, healthy, well-seasoned material, as tough as armour-plate.

In the interval, meanwhile, we must be careful to distinguish between place-patriotism and race-patriotism. To illustrate the difference. Oliver Wendell Holmes says somewhere, that every little village or town seems to consider that the axis of the earth sticks out visibly through the centre of its particular locality. In other words, no matter how small the place, it is apt to think itself the hub of the universe. That is local patriotism. Again, he mentions some inn at Paris which he noticed, bearing the sign, "Hôtel de l'Univers et des États-Unis." This led him to the sage conclusion that as Paris is, indeed, the universe to a Frenchman, naturally, therefore, the United States needed a separate recognition outside the universe. That is race-patriotism or race-exclusiveness.

Now to apply. Place-patriotism may be so weak in a Chinese that he cares not who rules his city, England, France, Germany. He is secure in person, property and freedom. But touch his race-patriotism and you immediately raise another proposition. By race-patriotism we need not mean just the same emotion as the spirit of nationality which we call patriotism in the West. With the Chinese it is not entirely patriotism for China, as a nation. In fact, many claim that he does not possess that quality. Race-patriotism

may very readily and probably will become national patriotism. Race-patriotism now, however, is different, in that it is a bond of sympathy throughout the East, in China itself, in the Straits Settlements and the islands of the sea, in all the varied lands where the Chinese have spread, binding them together as the "Sons of Han." Attempt to destroy the idea of an Empire, the thought of a central home of the race, and you attack this powerful sentiment. ✓

Hence, we can very well understand the comparatively easy task of controlling one or several Chinese cities by foreign force, of overcoming place-patriotism. Hence, likewise, we can very well imagine the infinitely more difficult and utterly different operation of ruling the Chinese Empire from Europe, of conquering race-patriotism. We cannot extend the argument from the parts to the whole. It is a difference in kind and not a difference in degree which confronts us.

The history of the German struggle for unity, with the national spirit, the centripetal force, triumphing over "particularism," the centrifugal force, would be repeated in Asia. The long story of the Italian secret societies, of plot and counterplot, hidden discontent and persistent revolt, stern repression and unflagging struggle, before Italy became united, would be acted over again on a vaster stage.

The story might take years, perhaps centuries, to spin its toilsome length in China, but, meanwhile, the governments responsible for order, responsible, from the very fact of having parcelled out an Empire among them, would have the same tale of worry and anxiety, of secret dread and open revolution to face.

CHAPTER IV.

THE TREATIES OF TIENTSIN.

WE have seen, how, out of an attempt to get an apology for certain actions done to the lorch "Arrow" with the sanction of the High Commissioner Yeh, to whom we have now said good-bye, there sprang up again the question of the admittance of foreigners into the city of Canton. We now enter upon a new phase of the story. Out of the question of the admission to Canton, which was solved by the wholesale taking of the city, there cropped up in turn another question, which had long been discussed and which it was now resolved to settle once for all.

Were foreign nations to be allowed to penetrate to the arcanum of Chinese mysteries, to the strange and wonderful city of Peking, and were they to be allowed to have representatives stationed there? In the solution of this question, we shall find much blood spilled, we shall see the hosts of the mighty assembled and the proud capital unsealed by the force of greater might.

The Earl of Elgin was armed with instructions

from Her Majesty's Government. He was to proceed to the mouth of the Peiho river. There, in the way which seemed most feasible, he was to be ready to meet a suitable Plenipotentiary sent by the Emperor of China and settle all matters in dispute between the two nations. He was to act in conjunction with the representatives of France and the United States as far as possible, should they desire to make any communication to the court of Peking.

Should a meeting be arranged with the Chinese Plenipotentiary, Lord Elgin was to demand reparation for injuries to British subjects, the execution at the ports of the treaty-rights and compensation to British subjects who had suffered in the late disturbances.

Most far-reaching of all were the demands for the assent of the Chinese Government to the residence of a British Minister at Peking and the right of the British representative to communicate directly in writing with the high officials at the Chinese capital. One clause which we shall find of great importance, as we progress with this story, was the option given to Lord Elgin to substitute an occasional visit of the British representative to the capital for his permanent residence at Peking. Lastly, there must be a revision of the treaties to afford increased opportunities for commerce¹.

Now let us see the reverse of the picture. What was the Chinese standpoint? In Yeh's yamen in Canton, in those eventful January days, a certain document was found and translated by Mr. Wade

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 1.

(afterwards the British Ambassador at Peking). It proved to be an Imperial Edict under date of March 24th, 1856, before the unfortunate lorcha had stirred up such a wake of trouble, turmoil and disaster in the waters of Canton. This voice from the throne repelled the thought of a change in treaty-relations which had been asked for by the Americans and English. The Government of Canton province was the one with which foreigners must have intercourse. No other provincial Government was authorized to conduct business with them in its place. The Governor of Kiangsu province and the Governor-General (Viceroy) must request the foreigners to hand over their applications to the Imperial Commissioner at Canton and they must be persuaded to sail for that city¹.

The possibility of an amicable settlement by the arts of diplomacy alone, after blood had been shed, did not seem hopeful, when we bear in mind the two opposed views, "I will find a way to Peking or make one," and, "Let not the foreigner approach nearer than Canton to communicate."

Meanwhile, reports had been sent in to Lord Elgin from different British Consuls stationed in China, giving their opinions in regard to the existing tariff with that country and making suggestions for future methods of commercial intercourse².

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 152.

² In the very early days of trade with China some ludicrous mistakes had been made in regard to the wants of the Chinese consumer. Mr. Cooke writes; "In 1843, 1844, and 1845, when the northern ports had just been opened, the people at home were wild with excitement. An eminent firm at Sheffield sent out a large

The Earl of Elgin prepared a note to the Senior Secretary of State at Peking. This enclosed the correspondence between the English Plenipotentiary and Commissioner Yeh, gave the demands served upon him, recited his refusal to comply and the consequent fall of Canton. The representatives of England and France, it said, now intended to go to Shanghai. There they hoped to meet a Plenipotentiary from the Emperor of China, to arrive at that place "before the end of the month of March." Compensation and indemnities must be given by China. The Earl of Elgin also had full powers to conclude "such Treaties, Conventions, or Agreements, as may obviate future misunderstandings, and tend to develop commercial relations between the two countries." Further, he could not "consent to treat with any Chinese Ambassador who does not hold from the Emperor of China full-powers equally extensive."

It showed that among the defective points in the existing treaty with Great Britain were the inaccessibility to the capital and the lack of permission to foreigners to circulate, at all, in the interior of the Empire. Further, there was the evil of the growth of an unrecognized trade at ports not opened by treaty. The

consignment of knives and forks, and declared themselves prepared to supply all China with cutlery. The Chinamen, who know not the use of knives and forks (or, as they say, abandoned the use of them when they became civilized), but toss their rice into their mouths with chopsticks, would not look at these best balance-handles. They were sold at prices which scarcely realized their freight, and the shops in Hongkong were for years afterwards adorned with them, formed into devices, like guns and spears in an armoury." *China and Lower Bengal*, Cooke, pp. 168—9.

duties on imports and exports had become "in process of time, unjust and unreasonable, because they remain fixed, while the price of the articles on which they are levied, changes." It proved "the necessity of a periodical revision of the tariffs." Piracy should be dealt with. The persecutions of Christians should cease. If no Plenipotentiary, Lord Elgin concluded, presented himself before the end of the time appointed or if a Plenipotentiary should not have sufficient powers, he would have recourse to such further measures as it seemed best to adopt and no declaration of hostilities would be necessary¹.

Mr. Oliphant, private secretary of Lord Elgin, was commissioned to be the bearer of a dispatch to the Governor-General of the Two Kiang provinces and the Governor of Kiangsu. Enclosed in this was Lord Elgin's note to the Senior Secretary of State². The bearer of the French note, the Vicomte de Contades, went with Mr. Oliphant from Canton. About the same time, notes from the representatives of America and of Russia went by the United States frigate "Mississippi"³.

At Shanghai, Mr. Oliphant found that the Taotai, who usually served as a channel of communication between the Consuls and the higher authorities, was absent for the Chinese new year and the date of his return was uncertain⁴. There were, therefore, two alternatives before him, either to wait for the Taotai, or go directly

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 182.

² Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 185.

³ *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, vol. i. p. 186.

⁴ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 228.

to Soochow and deliver the notes personally to Chaou, the Governor of the province of Kiangsu, to whom they were addressed¹. The latter course was decided on. The American and Russian notes came in the interval and Mr. Freeman, the United States Vice-Consul, handed them to Mr. Oliphant. Mr. Oliphant and M. de Contades were, therefore, the bearers of the notes of the Four Powers².

They left Shanghai on the 24th of Feb., 1858. The British and French Consuls and the American Vice-Consul went with them. Mr. Lay, the Inspector of Customs at Shanghai, whose knowledge of the Chinese language made him a most valuable acquisition to the party, accompanied them also³.

It was deemed prudent not to seem to take the Governor by surprise. Hence Mr. Oliphant and M. de Contades wrote a joint-letter to him, from a spot at a distance of about three miles from Soochow, and told him they were near the city. They followed this communication in person, in about two hours' time⁴. As they approached the walls of Soochow on their boats through the canal, vast crowds swarmed on the banks, viewing with wonder the flags of the United States, of Britain and France. They came before the water-gate so suddenly that the officials had hardly time to shut it, had they wished, and were content

¹ *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, i. 189.

² Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 228.

³ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 228. *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, i. 189.

⁴ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 228. *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, i. 196.

with making signs and gesticulations to them to turn back. The foreigners, however, pushed on, making a pretence of an appearance of stupid stolidity, paid no attention to the officials, and were within the gate¹.

They had an interview with Governor Chaou at his yamen. After an exchange of courtesies, the messengers informed him that they were the bearers of notes from the Four Powers, England, America, France and Russia for the Minister of State, Yu. These, they trusted, he would lose no time in forwarding to their destination. The Governor replied that he would send them immediately². Afterwards, he sent them receipts for the dispatches they had delivered to him. Thus one step in the entrance upon an era of friendly intercourse seemed to have been achieved with great success³.

But it was doomed that cold water should be dashed on these hopes. The scene now shifts to Shanghai. Mr. Reed and Count Poutiatine, the Ministers of the United States and of Russia, had already reached that place when Lord Elgin arrived. Baron Gros was to follow⁴. By way of reply to Lord Elgin's dispatch to the Senior Secretary of State, there came to him at Shanghai, a communication from the Governor-General of the Two Kiang provinces and the Governor of Kiangsu to whom the notes for the Secretary had been entrusted by Mr. Oliphant and M. de Contades. It quoted a letter from the Secretary of State, Yu. This, in the old, old way, referred all

¹ Oliphant, i. 198.

² Blue Book, p. 229. Oliphant, i. 202.

³ Oliphant, i. 206. Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 229.

⁴ *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, Walrond, p. 239.

matters in dispute to a new man in the former channel and harked back to the unsatisfactory method of conducting all negotiations with foreigners through Canton. Hwang had been appointed the new Governor-General of the Two Kwang provinces and all business was to be settled at that city¹.

The principle of direct communication with the Imperial Government of China at the capital was, perhaps, the most important object of Lord Elgin's mission to that country. He thought that it was best to join issue with the Prime Minister of State of the Emperor, because of his refusal to communicate directly with him. He returned, therefore, to the Governor-General of the Kiang provinces and the Governor of Kiangsu the letter which they had sent him.

He directed another communication to them to be forwarded to the Prime Minister. In this dispatch, Lord Elgin claimed that by refusing to correspond directly with him, the Prime Minister had set at naught the terms of the treaty between Great Britain and China, by which communication with the Chinese high officers both at the capital and in the provinces had been agreed upon. Lord Elgin further stated that he should go at once to the north to put himself in more immediate touch with Peking².

The Ministers of America, France and Russia had received communications in reply in much the same tenor. Count Poutiatine was told to go to the Amoor to communicate instead of Canton. The representatives of the Four Powers agreed with Lord

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 241.

² Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 257.

Elgin that the policy to be pursued was to advance quickly with a strong force to the mouth of the Peiho and enforce the right of communication¹. At Shanghai no Imperial Commissioner had arrived by the last of March. This was the date set to begin negotiations at that place and the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers were therefore released from their engagements to treat there².

A hitch came in the proceedings in regard to the start of the armed force for the north. This was the delay in sending gunboats. There was a controversy on this point which it is, in no way, necessary to describe here. On April 3rd, 1858, news came from the south that the Admiral had been obliged to postpone his departure for ten days. This was embarrassing. Lord Elgin, however, believing himself in accord with the representatives of the other Powers in his attitude, judged that it would be better to push on to the north lest the Chinese should think the delay due to wavering. The rice-junks for Peking might also be stopped at that time. Further, he had been informed that the season for operations in those parts ended with the last of May³.

As large a naval force as possible was brought together, and leaving a message for the Admiral to hurry on gunboats, the little fleet sailed from Shanghai at daylight on an April morning⁴. Beautiful weather

¹ *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, vol. I. p. 249.

² *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, I. 251.

³ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 258. *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, I. 258.

⁴ April 10, 1858.

accompanied them through the Yellow Sea. At the mouth of the Peiho it was found that the spring tides had passed. There was only one gunboat available to sail by the forts, and as there was a possible risk that she might be fired on as she went by, nothing was to be done but wait¹. On April 21st Baron Gros arrived and the representatives of the Four Powers now assembled in the Gulf of Pechili resolved to send dispatches once more to the authorities².

Again there was a sound of knocking at the gateways of the Empire of China. From the war-ship "Furious" in the Gulf of Pechili off the Peiho, the Ambassador of England sent another letter to the Prime Minister of the Emperor. Mr. Wade delivered it, enclosed in a letter to the Governor-General of Chihli, to a Mandarin at the landing-place of the Taku Fort.

It was as follows :

"'Furious,' GULF OF PECHELEE, April 24, 1858.

"In a letter bearing date the 1st instant, and written from Shanghae, the Undersigned had the honour to apprise the Prime Minister, &c., that the Prime Minister having, by refusing to correspond directly with the Undersigned, set the provisions of the Treaty between Great Britain and China at naught, the Undersigned had resolved to proceed at once to the north, in order that he might place himself in more immediate communication with the high officers of the Imperial Government at the capital.

¹ Oliphant, i. 266.

² Oliphant, i. 269.

“He has now to state that, in pursuance of the above intimation, he has arrived off the mouth of the Tien-tsin river, and that he is prepared to meet at Takoo, either on board of his own ship or on shore, a Minister duly authorized by the Emperor of China to treat with him, and to settle by negotiation the several questions affecting the relations of Great Britain with China, which are detailed in a letter of the Undersigned to the Prime Minister, bearing date February 11.

“If, before the expiry of six days from the date of the present communication, a Minister so accredited shall not have presented himself at Takoo, the Undersigned will consider this pacific overture to have been rejected, and deem himself to be thenceforward at liberty to adopt such further measures for enforcing the just claims of his Government on that of China as he may think expedient.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE¹.”

But the truculent tone of the last portion of this letter was not borne out by the facts during the weeks of weary waiting which were to follow for the foreigners in the Gulf. The consequences of the delay to the cause of the allies were deplorable. They gave to Lord Elgin's proceedings a character of changeableness. There was the necessity of waiting, however, because of the non-arrival of the gunboats².

From the maintop of the “Nimrod,” Laurence Oliphant could look down on the row of batteries beneath, in which the Chinese “were working like

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 266.

² *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, vol. i. p. 275.

ants, happily thoughtless of throwing up any works in their rear, solely occupied in getting more guns into position, and strengthening the front face¹. Negotiations were opened on May 6th with the Chinese Commissioner Tau to gain time².

But the long wait was coming to an end. A conference was held on board the frigate "l'Audacieuse" at which it was resolved that a forward movement should begin. The plan was to take the forts and advance up the river to meet a Plenipotentiary. ~~The Ministers of Russia and of the United States would join this movement after the forts were captured.~~ There were present at the conference the Earl of Elgin and Baron Gros, and the Admirals of the English and French forces, Admiral Sir M. Seymour and Admiral Sir C. Rigault de Genouilly³.

The Earl of Elgin then addressed a dispatch to Commissioner Tau, detailing the steps in the negotiations and demanding that the forts at the mouth of the Peiho river should be placed in the hands of the Commanders-in-Chief of the allied force⁴. This demand was due to Admiral Seymour's opinion that the forward movement toward Tientsin ought not to be commenced while the forts at the Peiho's mouth were in possession of the Chinese⁵.

On May 20th came the first attack. A communi-

¹ *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, vol. 1. p. 277.

² *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, vol. 1. p. 279. Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 300.

³ May 18, 1858. Blue Book, p. 306. Oliphant, 1. 288.

⁴ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 306.

⁵ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 307.

cation was made about 8 in the morning to the Imperial Commissioner Tau. No answer was given. At 10 came the signal to the gunboats to take up position. As they moved toward the mouth of the river, the Chinese fire began and soon the allied gunboats were replying furiously. Oliphant thus describes the advance: "...I had obtained permission from Lord Elgin to accompany the attacking squadron, and accepted the invitation of the late Captain Roderick Dew to go on board the *Nimrod*, the ship told off to lead the attack. When I saw the rows of batteries bristling with cannon on each side of the narrow river, between which we were to run the gauntlet, I somewhat repented of my warlike enthusiasm, and suggested to my kind host that I thought I should be safer in the maintop than on deck. He recommended me, however, to wait and see how the shot went; and it was fortunate I took his advice, for one of the first carried away the whole maintop. The Chinese had trained their guns, making sure we should attack on a high tide. As we attacked at low water, nearly all their shot passed over the attacking gunboats and we escaped with but few casualties, the whole number not amounting to thirty. A year later when the same forts were attacked, the Chinese had profited by experience, and repulsed the British force under Admiral Hope with a loss of over 400 men out of 700¹."

The cannonade continued about one hour and a quarter. The garrisons were driven out of the forts which had become completely dismantled². After the

¹ *Episodes in a Life of Adventure*, Laurence Oliphant, p. 135.

² Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 310.

assault, one of the fortifications was filled with Frenchmen. Suddenly a deafening explosion startled those standing near. A swarm of French sailors rushed from the falling buildings. Some were horribly wounded and while assistance was speedily given, out of forty who were seriously injured, the larger part lost their lives. Oliphant narrates one incident which he saw. "One of these wretched sufferers I observed scramble out upon the opposite bank, after rolling in the muddy pool, and though blackened to a degree which gave him more the appearance of a cinder than a man, shout with characteristic vivacity, 'Vive l'Empereur! Vive la France!' as he feebly waved his cap over his head¹."

The forts on each side of the river were taken possession of by landing-parties of the allies. The party on the north side afterwards moved forward and with the help of the gunboats took, after a sharp fight, the battery at the first bend of the river and some strongly entrenched camps. Then a line of junks on fire bore down on the allies' ships. They grounded and the fire from the boats drove the Chinese who had them in charge from the river banks. A move was made up the river to Taku, where some rows of junks were found, fastened with chains across the river. A battery of 15 field-pieces in front of an abandoned camp was taken possession of and then the first row of junks was occupied².

After waiting a day or two, Lord Elgin embarked on the "Slaney," crossed the bar at high water and

¹ *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, I. 301. Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 310.

² Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 310.

started on the voyage up the river to Tientsin. At the mouth of the river, Baron Gros and some gentlemen of the French Mission were taken on board the "Slaney" on account of some difficulty with their own conveyance. There followed the Ministers of America and of Russia, Mr. Reed and Count Poutiatine, on the Russian steam-ship "America¹." Steadily they pushed their way up the river. It was a beautiful night with the moon throwing its soft, white light on the banks of the mysterious stream. Lord Elgin was led to the thought of the result of the mission on which he was busy.

He wrote: "Whose work are we engaged in, when we burst thus with hideous violence and brutal energy into these darkest and most mysterious recesses of the traditions of the past? I wish I could answer that question in a manner satisfactory to myself. At the same time, there is certainly not much to regret in the old civilisation which we are thus scattering to the winds. A dense population, timorous and pauperised, such would seem to be its chief product²."

Very early in the morning of May 30th they rested in the suburbs of Tientsin where the Grand Canal joins the Peiho river³. Now, after another knocking, this time still louder and more terrific, had been heard at the gateways of the sleeping Empire, Lord Elgin again addressed the Prime Minister of the Emperor. In this he expressed the hope that the Imperial Government would send to him without delay a Plenipotentiary

¹ May 29, 1858. Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 312.

² *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, Walrond, p. 250.

³ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 312.

qualified to negotiate¹. At last the sleeper stirred. Kweiliang and Hwashana had been appointed Commissioners to treat with the foreigners².

On a June afternoon³ as Laurence Oliphant and a friend were taking a quiet pony ride and exploring for the first time the road running out to Peking, a great cloud of dust was seen approaching along the highway. It soon dissolved and disclosed beneath it a stream of runners with rods of office, forcing the people from the road to right and to left. Then came two grand sedan-chairs, each with its eight bearers. These evidently contained some exalted personages. The people by the roadside showed their respect and awe. Behind, came a crowd of men on horse and on foot, covered with the dust of the road and looking weary and worn with travel. The Imperial Commissioners had arrived⁴.

Now the question of full powers came up, a question which has been of importance in the course of Chinese negotiations down to the times when the Japanese required the full powers of Earl Li, and the allies in Peking, after the Boxer outbreak, were careful about the Great Seal.

But on that intensely hot day in June, when the conference was held with the Imperial Commissioners⁵, it was a newer question, inherited from the Treaty of Nanking of 1842. Lord Elgin and his suite in

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 315.

² Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 313.

³ June 2, 1858.

⁴ *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, i. 335.

⁵ June 4, 1858.

twelve chairs went with a guard of honour of 150 marines and a band from the war-ship to the meeting. After the usual compliments the full powers of Lord Elgin were read. The powers of the Commissioners Kweiliang and Hwashana were then produced. They seemed rather large, but on making enquiries, Lord Elgin found that they were not in possession of their proper seal of office or kwan-fang. He said, therefore, that as their Excellencies did not seem to have a document similar to the powers held by him he must take time for consideration. He refused the refreshments which were offered him, and brought the conference to an abrupt close. The Commissioners were dismayed and frightened. They hurried after Lord Elgin to his chair with many protests, but in vain¹.

After this, a semi-official channel of communications was kept up through Mr. Lay, the Inspector of Customs². Within two or three days, however, following the incident, the American, French and Russian Ministers had interviews with the Chinese Commissioners and were satisfied with their full powers³.

Now a different tone prevailed with the Imperial Commissioners, Kweiliang and Hwashana. In a letter received on June 11th, which Lord Elgin described as the fruit of the communications with Mr. Lay, they

¹ *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, i. 341—3. Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 318. *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, Walrond, p. 252.

² Oliphant, i. 343.

³ *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, i. 347.

announced themselves as prepared to yield the larger part of the English demands¹.

Count Poutiatine informed Lord Elgin that he had succeeded in getting his treaty, in the following letter.

“TIEN-TSIN, *June 15, 1858.*

“MY LORD,

“I had the honour to inform your Excellency that at my first interview with the Chinese High Commissioners, I had proposed to them to treat with me on the bases set forth in my draft of Treaty. The negotiations on this subject have since proceeded with more success and rapidity than I could have hoped at the beginning, so much so that the evening before last I was able to sign a Treaty, which in substance differs in nothing from the draft which I had the honour to communicate to your Excellency. I shall not fail shortly to forward to you, my Lord, an exact translation of the Treaty which I have concluded.

“It is right that I should here express the great obligation which Russia owes to Great Britain and France for such a happy and speedy result. It is the success of the arms of the two allied Powers which has forced the Chinese to yield, at last, to the just demands of civilized nations. As the principal actors in the great events which are about to open a new era in the existence of the Chinese people, the names of your Excellency and Baron Gros will have a well-merited place in history, and every good man will pray that the efforts which have been made for the purpose of spreading real civilization, and for the

¹ *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, I. 410.

propagation of Christianity, may bear abundant fruits in this vast Empire.

"From the concurrence of different circumstances, Russia has not thought it right to take part in the measures of coercion employed against China; she will thank God for it, but she can appreciate at the same time the difficulties to which two Great Powers are exposed.

"The spirit of moderation which has presided over all the actions of your Excellency and of Baron Gros has caused the Chinese people to feel little of the disastrous consequences which war necessarily brings with it. It is, without doubt, one of the most fortunate circumstances in the present complications, that these great results have been obtained by means of a comparatively insignificant force, and principally by a salutary pressure, and one of but short duration, in the immediate vicinity of the seat of the Supreme Government.

"It is for your Excellency now to decide on the future fate of the present Government, and it will depend on you to place the necessary check on the stream which might otherwise deluge China, now newly opened, and cause so many disasters. The too great concessions which might be exacted from a Government so roughly shaken would but precipitate its fall, which would only produce new and much graver difficulties. It is repose that is necessary for China, and it will be alike profitable both to the commerce and general interests of other states, who certainly desire nothing so much as to see the Chinese Government arrive at the conviction that the concessions which it has now made are, above all, of utility to itself.

"Permit me, my Lord, to offer you my personal and most sincere thanks for the frankness of the communications which you have been good enough to make to me, and which have aided me in accomplishing the mission with which my Government has entrusted me.

Accept, &c.

(Signed) COUNT POUTIATINE¹."

Some days afterwards Mr. Reed signed the American treaty. Oliphant thus sums up the results of these two, the Russian and American treaties². "On the 14th [?] of June, Count Poutiatine signed his treaty, in which the chief concessions gained were, the right of corre-

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. pp. 332—3.

² *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, vol. i. pp. 409 and 410. See Richardson, *A compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Pres. Buchanan's Annual Message of Dec. 6, 1858, vol. v. p. 506. We must not forget the other very important treaty of Russia with China signed in this year 1858 at Aighoun. See *Ostasiatische Geschichte*, K. F. Neumann, pp. 311—3, and *The Russians on the Amur*, E. G. Ravenstein.

The chronological order of the treaties was as follows :

1. Russia with China.—May 16, 1858.
2. Russia with China.—June 1st, 1858.
3. United States with China.—June 18, 1858.
4. Great Britain with China.—June 26, 1858.
5. France with China.—June 27, 1858.

For the treaties see *British and Foreign State Papers*.

For Russian treaties with China, see also, Сборникъ Договоровъ Россіи съ Китаемъ 1689—1881 гг. изданіе министерства иностранныхъ дѣлъ. Санктпетербургъ типографія императорской академіи наукъ. Вас. Остр. 9п., No. 12, 1889.

spondence upon an equal footing between the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister or First Minister of the Council of State at Peking; permission to send diplomatic agents to that city upon special occasions; liberty of circulation throughout the Empire of missionaries only, under a system of passports; and the right to trade at ports at present open, and, in addition, at Swatow, at a port in Formosa, and another in Hainan." In Mr. Reed's treaty "the same privilege of special missions to Peking was accorded to the Government of the United States, and the same additional ports opened to its trade."

A strange and melancholy incident occurred at the appearance of Kiyong, the negotiator of the treaty of 1842 with Great Britain. He sent the following letter to Lord Elgin; "Ki (Kiyong), a member of the Imperial family, by title a Vice-President, &c., makes a communication.

"Having had the honour to receive the commands of His Majesty the Emperor, in a Decree appointing me to manage the business of the different nations, I am arrived at this place, and in the course of the next day or two shall come to pay my respects to your Excellency, to whom I wish prosperity without limit.

"As in duty bound, before (appearing), I address you.

"A necessary communication addressed to the Earl of Elgin, &c.

"Hien-fung, 8th year, 4th moon, 28th day (June 9, 1858)."

He, later, obtained the powers of Minister Plenipotentiary and associated himself with Kweiliang and

Hwashana. He was dismayed, however, to find that the English were in possession of a communication of his, sent to the Emperor from Canton in 1850, praising his own skill in deceiving the foreigners. From Tientsin, therefore, he retired to Peking in disgrace with the Emperor. The foreigners learned afterward that he had committed suicide by drinking a cup of poison before the Imperial officers who were commanded to superintend this form of the death-penalty¹.

The matter of full powers came to a satisfactory settlement. Their seal or kwan-fang had been received². After several discussions between Messrs. Bruce, Wade and Lay and the Chinese Commissioners the English treaty was ready for signature³. The right of the permanent residence of the Ministers at Peking ran a close chance, as the following extract from Lord Elgin's Journal will show: "...On Friday afternoon, however, Baron Gros came to me with a message from the Russian and American Ministers, to induce me to recede from two of my demands—1. A resident minister at Peking; and, 2. Permission to our people to trade in the interior of China; because, as they said, the Chinese Plenipotentiaries had told them that they had received a decree from the Emperor, stating that they should infallibly lose their heads if they gave way on these points.....The resident minister at Peking I consider far the most important matter gained by the Treaty; the power to trade in the interior hardly less

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 334. *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, i. 376.

² Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 331.

³ *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission*, Oliphant, i. 410.

so...I had at stake not only these important points in my treaty, for which I had fought so hard, but I know not what behind. For the Chinese are such fools, that it was impossible to tell, if we gave way on one point, whether they would not raise difficulties on every other. I sent for the Admiral; gave him a hint that there was a great opportunity for England; that all the Powers, were deserting me on a point which they had *all*, in their original applications to Peking, demanded, and which they all intended to claim if I got it; that therefore we had it in our power to claim our place of priority in the East, by obtaining this when others would not insist on it? Would he back me?...This was the forenoon of Saturday, 26th. The Treaty was to be signed in the evening. I may mention, as a proof of the state of people's minds, that Admiral Seymour told me that the French Admiral had urged him to dine with him, assuring him that no Treaty would be signed that day! Well, I sent Frederick to the Imperial Commissioners to tell them that I was indignant beyond all expression at their having attempted to communicate with me through third parties; that I was ready to sign at once the Treaty as it stood; but that, if they delayed or retracted, I should consider negotiations at an end, go to Peking, and demand a great deal more, &c.....Frederick executed this most difficult task admirably, and at 6 p.m. I signed the Treaty of Tientsin...I am now anxiously waiting some communication from Peking. Till the Emperor accepts the Treaty, I shall hardly feel safe. Please God he may ratify without delay! I am sure that I express the wish just as much in the interest of China as in ours

Though I have been forced to act almost brutally, I am China's friend in all this¹."

On June 26th, 1858, the anniversary of the ratification of the treaty of Nanking, the eventful treaty of Tientsin was signed, amidst the pomp of military force². Williams says of the treaties of Tientsin: "The high commissioners were ignorant beyond conception of the gravity of their position and the results which were to flow from these treaties, whose provisions, linked into one compact by the favored nation clause, were, in fact, to form the future magna charta between almost the two halves of the human race³."

Walrond thus sums up the results of the British treaty of Tientsin:

"The Queen of Great Britain to be at liberty, if she see fit, to appoint an Ambassador, who may reside permanently at Peking, or may visit it occasionally, at the option of the British Government;

¹ *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, Walrond, pp. 253—4. See also Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 339.

² Oliphant, i. pp. 418—9.

³ *A History of China*, being the historical chapters from *The Middle Kingdom* by S. Wells Williams, with a concluding chapter narrating recent events by F. W. Williams, p. 300.

Neumann thus describes the extraordinary character of the signing of the treaties and their result: "Die Zugeständnisse waren ausserordentlicher Art. Sie wurden erzwungen mit dem Schwert in der Hand; Lord Elgin drohete, er würde Truppen kommen und sie gegen Peking ziehen lassen. Kaum dass China noch zur Reihe der unabhängigen selbständigen Staaten zählen konnte. Der tausend-jährige Hochmuth, das alleinseligmachende Chinesenthum musste aufgegeben und die Ebenbürtigkeit der anderen Nationen in voller Ausdehnung anerkannt werden." *Ostasiatische Geschichte*, K. F. Neumann, p. 314.

"Protestants and Roman Catholics to be alike entitled to the protection of the Chinese authorities ;

"British subjects to be at liberty to travel to all parts of the interior, under passports issued by their Consuls ;

"British ships to be at liberty to trade upon the Great River (Yangtze) ;

"Five additional ports to be opened to trade ;

"The Tariff fixed by the Treaty of Nankin to be revised ;

"British subjects to have the option of clearing their goods of all transit duties by payment of a single charge, to be calculated as nearly as possible at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *ad valorem* ;

"The character 'I' (Barbarian) to be no longer applied in official documents to British subjects ;

"The Chinese to pay 2,000,000 taels (about 650,000 *l.*) for losses at Canton, and an equal sum for the expenses of the war¹."

On the following day, June 27th, 1858, the French treaty was signed. In regard to one clause of this, relating to missionaries, there has been much discussion. A diplomat of long experience in China, and of wide acquaintance with Chinese affairs, thus sums up the matter: "There is no sufficient ground for the assertion, sometimes made, that missionaries have been smuggled into the interior of China, against the will of the government and people, by taking advantage of the interpolation of a spurious clause in the French treaty of 1858. It is a fact that a spurious clause was added

¹ *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin, Walrond, p. 254.*

to the Chinese text of that treaty by a French missionary, who was acting as interpreter. The body of the article, thus meddled with, provided that missionaries, being engaged in philanthropic work, should, together with their converts, receive the protection of the Chinese Government. It conceded no specific right of residence in the interior. The interpolated clause contained these words: 'It is, in addition, permitted to French missionaries to rent and purchase land in the interior, and to construct buildings thereupon at their convenience.' As has been stated, this spurious provision was added to the Chinese text only, and not to the French, which was made the official or authorized version in all cases of discrepancy between the two. The forgery was discovered at once, was of no value, as the French text of the treaty alone was authoritative, and was never taken advantage of, directly or indirectly, by either the American, British, or French governments. The French Minister at Peking officially notified the Chinese authorities that his government recognized the spurious character of this clause, and would claim no rights under it¹."

The revision of the tariff took place at Shanghai and was signed on Nov. 8th, 1858, by Lord Elgin after his return from Japan. One great feature was the legalization of opium². On that date also the convention and regulations of trade were signed with the United States of America. In the same month came the commercial regulations with France.

¹ *The Real Chinese Question*, Chester Holcombe, 1901, pp. 159—60.

² Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 400 and p. 424.

To some, the signing of the treaties of Tientsin might seem like the yielding of the Chinese before superior military force alone, without any good result. We must be careful, however, to distinguish between the position of prejudice which claims that the West has no right in China at all, the "Boxer" position in fact, and the sympathy which desires to see that Empire influenced by the higher civilization and given a chance to learn its own capabilities.

The only way in which it has seemed possible for China to learn in the past, has been by the steady pressure of outside forces. China has acted much as the son of Erin did, of whom the story is related. He was employed by an estate agent and was once about to show a visitor around a house which was for rent. The gentleman thought it was too small. "Wait," was the reply, "until I show you through. You will find the house much larger on the inside than it is on the outside, sir." In much the same way, China, in its pride of place and race, has considered the interior, has had its thoughts turned inward, until in truth the Middle Kingdom has come to seem larger than the outside world.

To break up this idea, the use of outside force has been imperative. In the application of this power, we find the policies of foreign nations swaying between two opposite ideas, one, the desire for stern measures, for the harsh, immediate, masterful "opening up" of the Chinese Empire; the other, the dread of anarchy, if the operation be carried too far.

La Fontaine has served us up the fable of the bear and the man who became very friendly together. The

bear used to busy himself with brushing the teasing flies off his friend's face while he was asleep. One day, a very persistent fly bothered Bruin very much in his efforts to drive him away from the face of the sleeping old man. The bear, finally, seized a huge stone and exclaiming that he would stop the buzzing of the pest, who would wake his companion, dashed it at the insect and not only killed it, but also his friend at the same time.

The result of the fable can be very readily applied to the motives of the actions of the allies in China. In 1858 and again in 1860, as we shall see later on in our story, England and France knew that the Taiping rebellion hung like a huge sword of Damocles ready to crush the Empire. Action, therefore, vibrated between the two poles, of an insistent "forward" policy, and of a conciliatory attitude. One, the positive pole, was the great world-service of compelling China to exert its latent strength and become companionable with the outer regions; the other, the negative pole, was the fear, that by excess of zeal, their efforts for the good of China, as well as for the world's benefit, would, like the heavy stone in the fable, crush the one they sought to aid in spite of himself.

CHAPTER V.

A CHINESE REBUFF.

IT would be of the utmost interest to follow Lord Elgin as he left the shores of China and went to the Empire of Japan, that other mysterious country of the Far East as it was at that time, to sign another treaty. We must, however, examine instead some matters which were working below the surface during these weeks of waiting, making ready a new conflagration to redden the sky of the Orient with the flames of carnage and of strife. The treaties of Tientsin had been signed. Would they be ratified?

On his return from Japan to China to sign the revision of the tariff and while at Shanghai, Lord Elgin received communications from the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang and Hwashana. They pleaded that the treaty of Tientsin had been almost extorted by military force and that the Chinese authorities feared the establishment of a permanent Embassy at Peking more than anything else¹. Lord Elgin was also led to fear for the safety of the Imperial Commissioners

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. pp. 408 and 411.

themselves, if they did not carry out the very imperious wishes of their Imperial master on this head. Further, the Earl of Elgin had a great desire to go up the far-famed Yangtze river so that the public of China might see it actually demonstrated before their eyes, that the Great River was open to navigation and that its ports could be approached for purposes of trade¹. This element, by the way, a species of *quid pro quo*, is frequently lost sight of in discussions which charge Lord Elgin with making a terrible blunder in refusing to demand absolutely, at that time, the right of a Minister to live in Peking. We can never know what the other course might have led to, but probably the permanent residence in Peking would have caused trouble in any case. We do know, however, the great results flowing from that first cruise up the Yangtze to Hankow, since become the Chicago of China. Somebody has said that a politician is a man who can talk and a statesman is a man who can hold his tongue. Great statesmen at critical times are by their very professional responsibility frequently deprived of the power to defend themselves.

Lord Elgin adopted a conciliatory attitude in regard to the option which the British Government had secured by the treaty either to permanently maintain a Minister at the capital or to have him reside elsewhere and visit it occasionally. He, therefore, submitted to Her Majesty's Government his opinion that if the Ambassador were received properly at Peking at the time of the ratification and if the treaty of Tientsin

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 407.

were faithfully carried out, it would be best to have the Ambassador reside at a different place than Peking and visit it occasionally¹. The effect was noticeable. The attitude of the Commissioners toward the scheme of ascending the Yangtze was almost cordial. Lord Elgin had written to the Commissioners saying that he desired to go up river without delay and to judge by personal observation what ports it would be best to open according to the Tientsin treaty. They wrote that they were preparing letters to inform the authorities along the line of his journey. They also offered to send officers with Lord Elgin with letters, that there might be "a satisfactory understanding on both sides"².

On Nov. 8th, 1858, Lord Elgin embarked on the steam-frigate "Furious" for the ascent of the river³. Any ground of international jealousy had been removed by correspondence with the Ministers of the United States and of France at Shanghai⁴. They found the charts continually at fault. This was due to the shifting shoals⁵. They advanced past the city of Nanking after a slight scrimmage with the Taiping rebels⁶. The three cities, Hankow, Wuchang and Hanyang possessed the reputation of having a tremendous population. By their visit to these places they were able to pierce this bubble⁷.

On the return voyage Lord Elgin was obliged to

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 408.

² Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 413.

³ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 441.

⁴ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 440.

⁵ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 442.

⁶ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 444.

⁷ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 443.

leave the "Furious" on account of a bar, over which it seemed unwise to force the vessel. He, therefore, embarked with the mission on the gunboat "Lee" and returned to Shanghai¹.

He then went to the south, thinking his presence near Canton might be of value owing to the rather critical condition of affairs there². One event of the time was an expedition to Fayuen, a town about thirty miles from Canton³. An Imperial Edict which was received seemed to indicate the partial triumph, at least, of the party of peace in China over the anti-foreign party. This Edict transferred Ho, the Governor-General of the Two Kiang provinces and a liberal man, to the Two Kwang provinces, replacing the reactionary Hwang Tsung-han⁴.

Lord Elgin now sent a farewell letter to Kweiliang and Hwashana. He wrote that the hostile feeling at Canton had happily ceased. He announced that the Honourable F. Bruce, newly-appointed the British Minister to China, would shortly arrive. He would bring with him the ratification of the treaty of Tientsin. He told them that the British Government had assented to the permanent residence of the Ambassador at some other place than the capital, if he were properly received at Peking and full effect given to other particulars of the treaty of Tientsin. He could visit Peking as need arose. He added a sound bit of moralizing as follows:

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 446.

² Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 478.

³ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 480.

⁴ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 482. *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, Walrond, p. 309.

“In now taking leave of their Excellencies, the Under-signed would earnestly impress upon them that continuance of peace depends entirely upon the strict observance of engagements. Between equal nations there is no plan for management—as man is to man, so is nation to nation. There is peace, so long as each respects the rights of the other; and there is interruption of peace, so soon as either withholds that which is the right of the other, or presumes to claim that which is in excess of his own¹.”

Lord Elgin sailed away from China, turning his face joyfully toward England, but the shortness of his term of absence he could not imagine. The curtain rises on a new actor in a wilder scene but the drama is to be played with the old surroundings and at the same locality as before. For the present, however, a new era seemed dawning, an epoch of peaceful trade and the spread of the influences of the new civilization over the old. A happy quiet seemed to have settled upon the troubled waters of Chinese politics. The long wished for peace had arrived. Canton was at rest. The treaties had been signed and, it was thought, would soon be ratified by China to make them complete. Lord Elgin had left for his homeward voyage². But it was only the heavy, ominous, murmuring calm before the outburst of the fierce tempest.

In the instructions which were issued to the new Minister, Mr. Bruce, Lord Elgin's brother, he was told

¹ Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 485.

² This is indicated by an address of the British community at Hongkong to Lord Elgin just before his departure from China. Blue Book, 1859, Sess. 2, xxxiii. p. 487.

on his arrival at Hongkong to relieve Sir John Bowring of his duties as Chief Superintendent of British trade. He was to transfer the general direction of British affairs in China to Shanghai, where their management was to be carried on until circumstances would permit a permanent establishment at Peking. The French Government had arrived at the same conclusion as the English. It would forego for a time the enforcement of the right to a permanent residence at Peking. Mr. Bruce was, however, to be careful to let the Chinese authorities at the capital and at Shanghai distinctly understand that there was no renunciation of the right to a permanent residence at Peking. He would enforce the right immediately, if any trouble were made in regard to communications between the British Minister and the Government at the capital or a disposition shown to evade the treaty.

Mr. Bruce was to resist any excuses put forward to prevent his going to the capital to ratify the treaty upon his first arrival. He was to communicate with Peking before he left Shanghai, and ask that arrangements be made for receiving him at the mouth of the Peiho and at Tientsin. His journey from that city to the capital was to be suitably provided for. The Admiral was to send a sufficient naval force to accompany him to the mouth of the Peiho. Probably it would be best to go to Tientsin in a British ship of war. No ceremony was to be complied with which could in any way be considered an admission of inferiority of Her Majesty to the Emperor of China. Mr. Bruce was told that, perhaps the best way would be for him to declare that he would immediately leave even the Presence

Chamber of the Sovereign, if there were the least approach to a disposition to treat himself or his office with disrespect. His treatment must be in no way less honourable than that given to the representatives of the other Powers.

After the ratification of the treaty of Tientsin, he was to insist upon prompt attention being given by the central authorities to representations which he might see fit to make. He was to be allowed to employ messengers of his own, either European or Chinese, to convey his dispatches. The treaty obligations must be acted up to. The necessity of paying visits to the capital, if matters ran smoothly, might occur only rarely. As, however, the residence of foreign representatives at the capitals of the Sovereigns to whom they were sent, was regarded in Europe as an indication of friendship, it was hoped that the presence of a British Minister at Peking would soon be received with satisfaction. A representative of the Emperor of China would be welcomed in Great Britain¹.

Rumours came at Hongkong to the Minister which could not be reassuring to him. They were that the old forts at the mouth of the Peiho were being repaired and that new defences were being made along its course. Also, while Mr. Lay urged the Commissioners Kweiliang and Hwashana to go to Peking to be ready to greet the foreign Ministers on their arrival, they were delaying at Soochow.

¹ Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587]. Correspondence with Mr. Bruce, Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in China, p. 1.

It was reported, further, that a Russian Mission had reached Peking. Its members had walked through the streets of the city in European garb and were unmolested. Discussions had "taken place between its chief and the Chinese Government on matters of etiquette in which it is reported that the Russian has receded from his first demand."

At this stage of affairs, Mr. Bruce received a note from M. de Bourboulon, the representative of France, that Admiral Rigault probably could not spare from the operations which France was then conducting in Annam more than two vessels. One of these could probably ascend the river as far as Tientsin. Mr. Bruce, therefore, conferred with Admiral Hope and Sir Charles Van Straubenzee on the matter. They agreed with him that he ought to be accompanied on his journey with an imposing force¹.

Mr. Bruce sent to Kweiliang the announcement of his readiness to exchange and ratify the treaty of Tientsin and that he was about to proceed without delay by ship to Tientsin². He reached Shanghai on the evening of June 6th, 1859. M. de Bourboulon, the Minister of France, with whom he desired to act in concert throughout, came on the following morning³.

At Shanghai Mr. Bruce found three letters from the Imperial Commissioners. These proposed that he should stay there and discuss some details in regard to carrying the treaty into operation. This was to be in place of going to the north. They said that Lord

¹ Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587] p. 3.

² Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587] p. 5.

³ Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587] p. 8.

Elgin on leaving for Canton had not finished the discussion of all these details¹. Again Mr. Bruce wrote to Kweiliang, saying that he was determined to proceed to Peking. He refused to enter into any discussion until the treaty had been ratified. He would not have an interview at Shanghai. Evil consequences, he intimated, would attend a failure to provide a reception befitting the dignity of his nation². M. de Bourboulon sent a note to the same effect on behalf of France to the Commissioners³.

Mr. Bruce heard more disquieting accounts. It was told him on the best authority, that a high Chinese official had said that he would not go north. There was going to be trouble. He also learned that a war-party was in existence at the capital which had acquired great influence during the winter. He took no notice of an attempt of the Commissioners to make arrangements to his satisfaction in regard to the Canton indemnity⁴.

The scene shifts again from Shanghai to the north. Mr. Bruce arrived at the mouth of the Peiho late in June⁵. The ships were already there and Admiral Hope had sent the gunboats over the bar on account of the heavy sea outside⁶. The Minister learned that the Admiral had reached the Islands of Sha-loo-tien

¹ Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587] pp. 10 ff.

² Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587] p. 13. For a French account of these occurrences see *Affaires Étrangères, Documents Diplomatiques*, 1860, Expédition de Chine.

³ Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587] p. 9.

⁴ Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587] pp. 9 and 10.

⁵ June 20, 1859.

⁶ Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587] p. 16.

on June 16th. On that day he left in the war-ship "Fury" with two gunboats to announce the arrival of the Ministers of England and France to the Chinese authorities. Commander Commerell and the interpreter, Mr. Mongan, went in the gig of the "Fury" to deliver the message. There was an armed crowd on the bank who would not let them land. Commander Commerell demanded an interview with the authorities. They replied that there was no authority at the place either civil or military. The people had placed the barriers in the river at their own expense and they were constructed against the rebels and not against them. The leader who called himself an engineer, or Clerk of the Works, said he would take any message they desired to give him to Tientsin and bring back an answer¹.

Commander Commerell was sent in again to say that the Ministers had arrived and demand that a passage be opened within three days to let them go up the river to Tientsin. The reply was that a messenger had already been sent and a passage would be opened in the required time². On June 21st Mr. Bruce jointly with M. de Bourboulon requested Admiral Hope to take steps to clear the river, so that they could go to Tientsin. No passage was opened as the leader of the crowd on shore had promised. Mr. Ward, the Minister of the United States, who had also come to the north, went in a small steamer, the "Toeywan," on the 24th of June to the forts. He requested a free

¹ Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587] p. 16, and *Personal Narrative of Three Years' Service in China*, Fisher, pp. 184—7.

² Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587] p. 16.

passage up the river. The interpreters whom he sent to the landing-place were told that the passage to Tientsin by way of the Peiho had been closed. The Governor-General Hangfuh was at Pehtang, about ten miles up the coast. He was ready, they were told, to receive the American Minister at that point¹.

On the 25th a junk came alongside the "Magicienne." A Mandarin stepped on board with a letter for Mr. Bruce. It was from the Governor-General and asked him to go by land to Peking by way of Pehtang². The overland route thus suggested was the time-honoured road by which the bearers of tribute from Annam, Lewchew and other tributaries of China came³.

In the letter from the Governor-General, the name of the Queen was not on the same level with that of the Emperor of China. This violated the principle of equality laid down in the treaty. Mr. Wade, therefore, returned the letter to be revised and said that Mr. Bruce intended to go by way of Tientsin. There was one peculiar thing about the communication which did not escape Mr. Bruce's attention. The letter had been dated the 23rd but had not reached him until the 25th in spite of the great need for haste. It appeared that this could be nothing else than intentional.

The note had come too late from the Governor-General. An attempt to force the river was to be made at 10 a.m. and the Admiral was nine miles away from Mr. Bruce's ship. It would have been difficult to

¹ Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587] p. 18. *A History of China*, Williams, p. 313.

² Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587] p. 20.

³ Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587] p. 35.

communicate with him at that time, and he was already engaged in operations¹. It seemed to Mr. Bruce, after comparing the note of the Governor-General with the last letter sent to him at Shanghai by Kweiliang, that the new proposal was very different from any which the Commissioners had recommended. He could only solve the puzzle by the idea that the war-party were in the ascendancy at Peking. It seemed entirely at variance with Kweiliang's acknowledgment of the propriety of ratifying the treaty within the time appointed. Moreover, he had proposed that a person should meet Mr. Bruce, at the place where he then was, to take him to Peking². The letter of the Governor-General seemed, however, to be another attempt to postpone the ratification of the treaty indefinitely. No like communication had been addressed to M. de Bourboulon³. Hence, Mr. Bruce concluded that the only solution was the employment of force.

Once more, the Peiho was destined to be the scene of strife. Once more, the soft answer of diplomacy seemed to have failed and the voice of cannon to be the only arbitrator. The allies seemed confident of success. The year before a victory had been obtained at the same place. A great deal of effort, however, had been expended by the Chinese in improving the works at the

¹ Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587] p. 18.

² "They would wish that on his arrival at the mouth of the Tientsin river (the Peiho), he should anchor his vessels of war outside the bar, and then, without much baggage, and with a moderate retinue, proceed to the capital for the exchange of the Treaties." Kweiliang, Hwashana &c. to Mr. Bruce. Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587] p. 15, also p. 18.

³ Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587] p. 18.

river mouth. They were in a much different condition from the year of the treaty of Tientsin.

The defences appeared to consist principally in the reconstruction in earth, in an improved manner, of the works destroyed the year before. They were strengthened by additional ditches and abattis. There was an increased number of booms of a very formidable nature. Very few guns were to be seen, but a large number of embrasures were masked with matting, evidently, as it appeared, to conceal hidden cannon¹.

On the 24th Admiral Hope had gone with the force inside the bar and had given notice that after eight o'clock that same night, if no satisfactory reply came, he would take his own course². During the night a force under command of Capt. G. O. Willes cut one of the cables of a boom and blew away two others with powder. The following day these last were found reunited. No other mode of attack seemed feasible except to begin on the front of the works and follow with an attempt to storm, should their fire be silenced³.

The 25th of June 1859 came with calm, clear weather. Those on the vessels could look off from the

¹ *The Times*, Sept. 17, 1859. (From the *London Gazette* of Sept. 16.) "The booms, as at present arranged, consist of four distinct barriers or barricades, each one presenting a formidable appearance, and, independent of their intrinsic value, are commanded by several heavy guns. It should also be known that the state of the defences here in June, 1859, is very different from what they were in June, 1858. The number of booms has been increased, the forts rebuilt, enlarged, and strengthened—there has been some science in the work, either Chinese or foreign—and the result is a powerful and almost impregnable fortress." *Times*, Sept. 30, 1859.

² *Times*, Sept. 17, 1859.

³ *Times*, Sept. 17, 1859.

shining decks through the burning air of a hot summer day toward the forts where strange developments were soon to happen. The morn of the fateful day was occupied in getting the boats into position. At two in the afternoon, the "Opossum" pushed her way through the first barrier and moved up to the second with the "Plover," the "Lee" and the "Haughty¹." The French were under Commandant Tricault. From the forts there belched the fire of thirty or forty guns. At three o'clock the ships were so disabled that they had to drop out and get more men before they could renew the fight².

Slowly, great masses of white, wreathy smoke rose high over the ships and forts, over besiegers and besieged, over white man and yellow man, Occidental sailor and Oriental fighter, until its embrace had almost covered the combatants, seeming a white, peaceful mantle drawn over the rough, bloody scene of battle. Admiral Hope was compelled to shift his flag from the "Plover" to the "Cormorant" and on account of a severe wound was obliged to give Capt. Shadwell the immediate command³.

At 5.40 the "Kestrel" sank and the "Lee" had to be put on the ground or suffer the same fate. At half-past six fire from the north forts stopped and that from the south side with the exception of a few guns ceased a half-hour later⁴. Consequently, at 7.20 a force under Captain Shadwell and a detachment of French seamen under Commandant Tricault landed opposite the outer bastion of the south fort. This part seemed the most

¹ *Times*, Sept. 17, 1859.

² *Times*, Sept. 17, 1859.

³ *Times*, Sept. 17, and Sept. 30, 1859.

⁴ *Times*, Sept. 17, 1859.

injured by the fire of the squadron and here the attack could be best supported by the ships' guns¹.

The marines and sailors were eager for the assault. The boats were exposed to the fire of the enemy and many fell even while getting in position on shore. The "thin, red line" slowly struggled on after the landing, through the deep, clinging, tenacious mud². The troops were met by a heavy fire from the guns, which had not been silenced, and from jingals and rifles. One hundred and fifty officers and men pushed on to the second ditch and fifty came close up under the walls³.

And now, let us hear the story of the ill-fated assault, from one who was an eye-witness, who was in the front of the attack. Fisher thus describes it: "About one hundred yards from these was a bed of green rushes, perhaps forty yards wide; after which a little more mud, and then a ditch about fifteen feet wide, and five feet deep: this was tidal, and at the time of the assault was consequently nearly dry, but extremely difficult to cross from the great tenacity of the mud. Having dashed into it rather impetuously, I thought I should never get out. I was really some minutes crawling across. Here also many a rifle got full of mud. A few yards in front of this was another ditch, but this was kept full of water; and it was quite a pleasure to have something to swim in, after all the sticky walking we had had. I was unfortunate enough here, when swimming, to kick up my scabbard, and drop my sword to the bottom. The earth excavated for this ditch had

¹ *Times*, Sept. 17, 1859.

² *Times*, Sept. 30, 1859.

³ *Times*, Sept. 17, 1859.

been thrown up on the bank, and gave us a little cover, under which we squatted, with our legs in the water, waiting for the bridges and ladders to be brought up, to enable the mass of the men to get across: but it became evident before long that the attack must fail; the bridges were shot to pieces; three ladders only were brought up, and these were soon broken. There were about sixty of us in the front ditch and perhaps half-a-dozen serviceable rifles.

“ We sent back for dry ammunition and spare arms, as our only chance, but it was evident that the assault had failed. And shortly after, an order was sent to us to remain under cover, if we could, until dark, and till the tide should rise, when boats should be sent to bring us off. So here we lay, huddled up against the bank, with our legs in the ditch, whilst the enemy plied us with shot and arrows, which, however, could not do us much harm so long as we lay close, until it struck them to fire their arrows vertically, so that they fell among us. They also fired a kind of light-ball, of which the burning composition fell among us. We were about twenty yards from the work. The space in front of us was covered with pointed stakes, driven in the ground, and the bank, in front and behind us, was like a hedgehog's back, from the arrows sticking in it. We soon got pretty jolly, and you could hear a voice in the dark, ‘ Who has got a light? has anyone a light?’ Some one was evidently adapting himself to the circumstances. Between eight and nine p.m., it struck us that it would be unpleasant if the enemy popped out unawares, so we swam back across the front ditch, and placed it between us and the work; lying in the next, which was now

getting filled by the flowing tide, and where we were secure from attack¹."

Captain Shadwell, Captain Vansittart and Colonel Lemon had all been wounded. The command, therefore, came to Commander Commerell. A consultation was held. It was found that the positions could be maintained but it would be impossible to storm unless reinforcements came. The order to retire was given². The night had now fallen and the force went to the boats in detachments with their wounded and by the wee sma' hours of the morning of June 26th the last had left³. Still more misfortune was to come. While going down the river, the "Plover" grounded within the range of the forts and the "Cormorant" also ran on the bottom. Sunday morning dawned calm and still and peaceful⁴ with the mist lying low on the horizon as if the day were mournful and meditative after all the deeds of blood and woe which had happened so recently and so near.

During this unfortunate battle, there occurred an incident which, although a technical violation of International Law, has a well-marked niche in history with its famous remark, "blood is thicker than water." Josiah Tattnall, Commodore in the United States Navy, was an interested observer of the hard luck of the British forces. His own graphic description of the events following is most striking. He first narrated a kindness

¹ *Personal Narrative of Three Years' Service in China*, by Lt.-Colonel Fisher, pp. 196—7.

² *Times*, Sept. 17, 1859.

³ *Times*, Sept. 17, 1859.

⁴ *Times*, Sept. 30, 1859. There is an account of the fight on the Peiho in *Blackwood's Magazine* for Dec. 1859, vol. 86, p. 647.

which the British Admiral had shown to him on the 24th of June, before the battle had begun, when Mr. Ward, the United States Minister, had wished to see if the Chinese would allow Americans to ascend the river as has already been told. Commodore Tattnall thus describes the event: "We had approached to within 300 yards of the first barrier, at which point, should we not be fired on, I had proposed anchoring, when we grounded and failed in all our efforts to back off. The tide was falling fast, and our situation was critical, not only from the facility with which the batteries might demolish us, but, as we were on the edge of a steep bank, from the probability of the steamer falling over and filling.

"At this moment I received from Admiral James Hope an attention and kindness which must place me under lasting obligations to him.

"Although he had reason to think that she would be fired upon by the forts he sent a gunboat to my aid, with the message that had he known of my intention to pass up he would have furnished me a pilot, and that he expected to see me fired on.

"The gunboat failed in her efforts to extricate me, and there being, as I have said, a probability of the Toeywan falling over and filling, the admiral despatched a second gunboat to me, placing her entirely at my disposition, with the handsome and generous offer that I should hoist on board of her the American ensign and my own personal flag.

"I declined the offer with a just appreciation, however, of the personal kindness to myself and the delicate compliment to our service.

"The Toeywan was more fortunate than I expected,

and a favourable wind having sprung up we got her off at high water¹."

Then came the battle of the 25th of June. Commodore Tattnall thus tells of the part he played. He wrote: "The fire of the Chinese was directed with fatal skill, and was chiefly concentrated on the [English] admiral and the vessels nearest to him. His flag-vessel being disabled and her crew cut up, he shifted his flag to a second, and, on her meeting the fate of the first, he again shifted it to the Cormorant, one of the larger (despatch) steamers. Here again the fire was concentrated on the flag of the gallant admiral.

"By this time, 4 p.m., several of his vessels had been sunk, and it was evident to me that nothing could enable him to extricate himself and retire from the hopeless conflict but the reserve of boats and men at the junks; but at the time the tide was running too strong for the crowded boats to stem.

"The officer in charge of these boats now visited me. He said nothing of aid, but his silent appeal was powerful indeed. In the few moments he was on board he would look anxiously, alternately at his Admiral and at the boats.

"After he left I held a consultation with Mr. Ward, and he agreed with me perfectly that, under all the circumstances of our position with the English, and the aid the Admiral had tendered me the day before, I could do no less than to tow the boats to his relief.

¹ Commodore Tattnall to Hon. Isaac Toncey, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, "Off Peiho River, July 4, 1859," in *Times* of Oct. 25, 1859.

"I made the offer, which was thankfully and promptly accepted¹.

"While the boats were making fast to hawsers, which I veered astern, I insisted on Mr. Ward and his suite leaving the Toey-wan and going on board one of the junks, for reasons that will be obvious.

"He at first reluctantly yielded, and left us, but soon returned in one of the English boats, declaring that, as the Toey-wan was his home, and was going under fire with his approbation and concurrence, he would remain in her. I reluctantly yielded to his gallant impulse.

"At this time a young British officer came to me from the vessels engaged, to say that the gallant Admiral was dangerously wounded, and had but six men left. He (the officer) had two boats sunk in reaching me.

"I towed the boats through the British line to within a short distance of the admiral, whose flag was flying on the Cormorant, when, casting them off, I retired to the rear of the line, near the French gunboat, and anchored for the night.

"I took up this position as it might enable me

¹ "...I cannot end without referring to one matter that, in connexion with this battle, should be ever remembered. Were we children of the same mother, we could not have received more sympathy and kindness than we met with from the Americans. Never were men more unwillingly neutral. As we passed in to the assault Flag Officer (*Anglicæ*, Admiral) Tutnell [Tattnall] was heard to say, 'Blood is thicker than water,' and in 100 different ways he and all his people, to the very cabin boys, acted up to this homely proverb." Letter of "An Eye-Witness" to the *Times*, Sept. 16, 1859. "Whatever may be the result of the fight, England will never forget the day when the deeds and words of kindly Americans sustained and comforted her stricken warriors on the waters of the Peiho." Leader, *ibid.*

to aid the wounded, and, should boats be sunk, to rescue their crews.

"After anchoring I thought of the Admiral, and of his chivalrous kindness to me the day before, which, from an unwillingness to intrude on him when he was preparing for action, I had in no way yet acknowledged.

"I, therefore, with my Flag Lieutenant, Mr. Trenchard, went in my barge to visit him. When within a few feet of the Cormorant a round shot struck the boat, killed my coxswain, and slightly bruised my Flag Lieutenant. We fortunately reached the Cormorant before the boat entirely filled.

"I found the Admiral lying on his quarter deck badly wounded. I informed him that I had called to pay him my respects, and to express my regret at his condition. After remaining on board the Cormorant about ten minutes, I took advantage of an English boat that was passing to return to the Toey-wan¹."

The whole incident, thus described by the gallant Commodore Tattnall, is illustrative of the good feeling between the representatives of the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race in the Far East, which has even recently been again shown in the words of an American General at Peking², and which has such potential possibilities for reinvigorating the Orient and for the peace and progress of the world.

The journey of the United States Minister to the capital by way of Pehtang, in the manner desired by

¹ Commodore Tattnall to Hon. Isaac Tancey, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, "Off Peiho River, July 4, 1859," in *Times* of Oct. 25, 1859.

² Vide *Daily Telegraph*, London, May 8, 1901.

the Chinese, in order to have the American treaty ratified, is an interesting commentary on the attempt of the other two Powers to force the entrance to the Peiho and go by way of Tientsin.

It was with some difficulty that the American Minister, Mr. Ward, had notified the Governor-General at Pehtang of his arrival at that place¹. In the latter part of July, however, the Minister started for Peking with an escort of Chinese officials and soldiers². The route lay across the flat, dull plain to a place on the Peiho, ten miles above Tientsin. Here boats were ready for the further journey to the capital. One huge boat, a kind of three-decker, pulled by sixteen men, was especially reserved for the Minister³. They travelled for several days, between banks stretching out into monotonous plains, to Tungchow, the port of Peking.

Here they took carts, which were found so intolerable on the rough-paved highroad that the Mandarins kindly gave them their horses. At the gates of the capital, however, they were requested to make their entry in the carts⁴. At last they were in Peking, the great mystery of the Far East. They were given lodgings in a nicely-furnished house and fed bountifully but "were guarded like criminals." They were

¹ *A History of China*, S. W. and F. W. Williams, p. 316.

² *A Cycle of Cathay*, W. A. P. Martin, p. 195.

³ *A Cycle of Cathay*, W. A. P. Martin, p. 197.

⁴ *A Cycle of Cathay*, W. A. P. Martin, p. 198.

"The streets were lined with thousands of people, who had evidently taken their stations long in advance, waiting to see the conquered barbarians led in triumph. There can be no doubt that we were represented as prisoners, or rather as a vanquished enemy who had come to make submission." *Ibid.*, p. 199.

not even allowed to receive a visit from the Russian Minister¹.

A meeting was arranged for the 30th² between Mr. Ward and the Chinese representatives, Kweiliang and Hwashana. The whole time was taken in the discussion of arrangements regarding the audience with the Emperor³. The Minister was informed that the ceremony of the kowtow was a necessity. The disputes continued for a fortnight and finally a settlement was reached by which the Minister was to have in front of him a curtained table so that he would seem to be kneeling. Kweiliang informed him that two chamberlains would take hold of his arms and exclaim at the critical moment, "Don't kneel, Don't kneel⁴."

But at the eleventh hour, when everything was ready for the start for the Summer Palace, an official came to say that the Emperor insisted on the full ceremony. The answer of Mr. Ward was a direction to the staff to remove their uniforms and a command that the horses should be sent away. The audience did not take place. The next day they were told to leave Peking. The treaty would be ratified at the sea-coast⁵. The ratification took place at Pehtang on Aug. 15th, 1859⁶.

¹ *A Cycle of Cathay*, W. A. P. Martin, p. 199.

² July 30, 1859.

³ *A History of China*, S. W. and F. W. Williams, p. 317.

⁴ *A Cycle of Cathay*, W. A. P. Martin, p. 200.

⁵ *A Cycle of Cathay*, W. A. P. Martin, p. 200.

"In a trying situation, Mr. Ward displayed courage enough to atone for the questionable diplomacy that had got him into such a scrape. In refusing to kneel he confirmed the Chinese in a belief, which they had expressed during the first war, that 'foreigners had no knee-joints.'" *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁶ *A History of China*, S. W. and F. W. Williams, p. 318.

The next year when the Yuan-ming-yuan Palace of the Emperor was taken, as the allies were marching on Peking, the following draft of an Imperial Rescript in the vermilion pencil was found. It related to Mr. Ward's desire to have an audience with the Emperor in 1859.

"We have this day perused the reply of the American barbarians to the communication of Kwei-liang and his colleagues.

"(It shows that), in the matter of their presentation at Court, nothing more can be done to bring them to reason (1). Besides, these barbarians, by their averment that their respect for His Majesty the Emperor is the same as that they feel for their Pih-li-si-tien-teh (President), just place China on a par with the barbarians of the South and East (2), an arrogation of greatness which is simply ridiculous.

"The proposition of yesterday, that they should have an interview with the Princes, need not either be entertained.

"NOTES.

"(1) Lit., there cannot be any more good means for bringing them round (to the right way). Argument is exhausted, so let the question of an audience drop.

"(2) The Mivan [Mwan = Man], ancient barbarians of the South, the 'I' of the East¹."

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754]. Correspondence respecting Affairs in China, 1859—60, p. 205. See, further, in regard to this journey, *Journal of the North-China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, no. III. Dec. 1859, p. 315. Also, *The American Historical Review*, vol. II. p. 639. Diplomatic Missions to the Court of China, W. W. Rockhill. Also, Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2587]. Correspondence

The phenomenon which we have seen in the incident of the repulse at the Taku forts was attributed to the influence of a powerful war-party which had risen at Peking.

In all this discussion we must get at the real causes, if possible, of the known results. There is a story which has appeared in the press which will illustrate this. It is as follows. A schoolboy was asked to write an essay on the Tudor period of the history of England. He wrote about Raleigh. "Sir Walter was the first man to introduce the use of tobacco into England. One day while he was initiating some friends into the mysteries of smoking, he turned around and said very impressively to Ridley, 'We shall this day light such a flame in England that it will never be put out.'"

The moral of this blunder is plain. In dealing with historical facts we must not be led astray by results but must go to the causes behind the results. To apply to China. To the casual observer the actions of the Chinese at the fight at the Peiho in '59 and in many other instances appear obstinate and reactionary. Here again we do not go to the causes behind this outward appearance. If we did so, we should find that it was largely a question of the difference of political parties within the governing class in China.

The better elements have been crushed out and the worse have prevailed. The whole people have been

with Mr. Bruce, Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in China, p. 47. An extract from the *North-China Herald* of Aug. 22, 1859, in regard to the affair is given on p. 51. Also, *Ostasiatische Geschichte*, K. F. Neumann, p. 374.

blamed for the results of the influence of one party. It was a party which led to the rejection of signed treaties and the repulse at the Peiho in 1859. It was a party of bad advisers which led to the horrors of the summer of 1900. It is just as certain that, if the party of peace had overcome the war-party in 1859, the battle of the Peiho would have been avoided, the whole after-current of Chinese relations diverted into a newer, safer, satisfactory channel and the Far Eastern question decided, perhaps, at its birth.

Under constitutional governments there is almost always a periodical change in the supremacy of political sects. In China, the time needed for political movements must be counted by centuries, while in the West decades are sufficient. But the long sweep of the pendulum may turn at any moment in China and the influence of the party of a new-born public opinion of the best people in that Empire bring about vast and far-reaching changes. The difference in the way of progress and a new national life may startle the world as much as the progress in pugnacity exhibited in 1900, but in a happier fashion.

CHAPTER VI.

ON TO PEKING.

THE disaster to the arms of the allies at the Peiho was naturally received with consternation in the home countries. One letter to "The Times"¹ proposed that the celebrated "Great Eastern" steamship should go out to China armed with Armstrong guns or cannon. Lord Elgin might go out again by means of the big ship. If the French desired to coöperate, room could be found for a brigade of their troops on the "Great Eastern" with the English².

¹ *Times*, Sept. 14, 1859.

² The hostilities with China in 1860 are spoken of by some writers as the third Chinese War. They thus separate that struggle from the previous events occurring from 1856 to 1859 which they class as the second war between Great Britain and China. The events of 1860, however, were only renewed hostilities and not a new war. It must not be forgotten that the treaties of 1858 had not yet been ratified on both sides. The repulse of 1859 at the Peiho happened when the Ministers of England and France were on the way to have their treaties ratified, so that a final peace had not yet been concluded, definitely and formally bringing the war begun in the previous years to a close. According to International Law while "war is terminated by the agreement of the belligerents set out in a treaty of peace," yet, "a treaty is not definitive as between the parties until its ratification on either side." See *A Manual of Public International Law*, by T. A. Walker, M.A., LL.D., p. 155. The case of the "Eliza Ann" is cited, I. Dodson's Admiralty Reports, 248.

While the forces of "reeking tube and iron shard" were collecting, Mr. Bruce in March of 1860¹ launched an ultimatum at the Senior Secretary of State, Pang Wan-chang. He recited that the letters of the Imperial Commissioners, sent to him at Shanghai, had not notified him that the natural thoroughfare to the capital by way of the Peiho had been closed to foreign envoys. They had not told him to go to the port of Pehtang for the overland journey to Peking. Toward Admiral Hope, also, the same silence had been preserved, when he had come to the mouth of the river in June of the last year to announce the coming of the Ministers of England and France. The Admiral was told that the passage had been closed by so-called militia. These had said that it was blocked against the rebels and not against the foreigners. The obstacles which they had promised to remove from the mouth of the river, they had not taken away. The ships of England had advanced to remove the obstacles and had been fired upon from the batteries.

The British Government, he wrote, considered the events which had taken place at the mouth of the Peiho an outrage, for which the Chinese Government was responsible. Therefore, the English Government demanded an immediate acceptance of these terms.

1. An apology was due for the acts of the troops at Taku.

2. The British Minister was to go by way of the river in a British vessel to Tientsin, and thence to Peking, where the treaty of 1858 should be ratified without delay.

¹ March 8, 1860.

3. Full effect must be given to the provisions of the treaties, including the indemnity for the Canton affairs.

It was to be considered, further, that the agreement made between the Earl of Elgin and the Imperial Commissioners in October 1858, in regard to the residence of the British Minister in China, was at an end. Therefore, the option, as to whether the British Minister should reside permanently at Peking or not, rested entirely with the British Government.

Further, since the Peiho affair had cost that Government a considerable sum, the "contribution that may be required from the Chinese Government towards defraying this expense, will be greater or less according to the promptitude with which the demands above made are satisfied in full by the Imperial Government." If Mr. Bruce did not receive within thirty days from that date an answer giving the assent of the Emperor to this ultimatum, force would be used, "for the purpose of compelling the Emperor of China to observe the engagements contracted for him by his Plenipotentiaries at Tien-tsin, and approved by his Imperial Edict of July, 1858¹."

The French coöperated with like demands². The Great Council of State replied in a communication to Commissioner Ho, which he was to transmit to Mr. Bruce. In this, they held that Mr. Bruce had refused an interview with the Imperial Commissioners. If he had accepted a conference, they would have told

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754]. Correspondence respecting Affairs in China 1859—60, pp. 34—6. March 8, 1860.

² *Annual Register*, 1860, [259].

him of the fortifications at Taku and that he must go by way of Pehtang. The Minister had refused a communication sent from an officer to tell him that he must go by way of that place. The English demand for indemnities was against propriety. The British ships had suddenly been dispatched to Taku and had begun to destroy the defensive apparatus there.

Mr. Bruce could come north, the letter said, to exchange the treaties after negotiation with the Chinese Commissioner. He must come, however, without war-ships and wait at Pehtang to exchange the treaties. If he came with war-ships, it would show that his true purpose was not to conduct the ratification, and the high officer in charge of the defences of the coast was to take such steps as might be necessary¹.

The message concluded as follows: "The [English] despatch written on this occasion is, in much of its language, too insubordinate and extravagant for the Council to discuss its propositions more than superficially (lit., to go deep into argument). For the future the British Minister must not be so wanting in decorum.

"The above remarks will have to be communicated by the Commissioner to the British Minister, whom it will behove not to adhere obstinately to his own opinion, as, so doing, he will give cause to much trouble hereafter²."

Meanwhile, the big pieces were being moved into position for the renewal of the game of war and diplomacy. A powerful expedition was prepared to go

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] pp. 52—3.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 53.

to China. The chief in command was General Sir Hope Grant, who was then in India. Several Sikh regiments shared the enthusiasm and volunteered to serve in China¹. The Emperor Napoleon III was again animated with the idea of an expedition to the East. A large French force was sent to China under a General who had formerly served with distinction in Algeria and who was destined, years after the march to Peking, to have a part to play in the great struggle with Prussia and to become of note in trying to bolster up the Imperial sway after disastrous Sedan. This was General Montauban, later created Comte de Palikao as we shall see in the progress of our story².

As a commentary on certain phases of International Law, the following portion of an Order in Council, defining the remarkable status of International Law as applied to warfare with China, is of interest. Peculiar conditions have always been met in the wars with China whether in 1842, in 1856—60 or in the troubles of 1900—1. "And it is further Ordered, that, notwithstanding the existence of hostilities between Her Majesty and her august Ally on the one hand, and the Emperor of China on the other hand, and during the continuance thereof, all and every the subjects of Her Majesty and of her august Ally the Emperor of the French, shall and may, during such hostilities, freely trade at and with all ports and places wheresoever situate in the dominions of China, and also with all persons whomsoever, as well subjects of the Emperor

¹ *Annual Register*, 1860, 258].

² *Dictionnaire général de Biographie et d'Histoire*, Dezobry et Bachelet, Article, Cousin—Montauban. *Annual Register*, 1860, [259.

of China as others residing or trading within any part of the dominions of the said Emperor¹."

Our old friends Lord Elgin and Baron Gros again embarked for the East as Plenipotentiaries of England and France. On the way out an unfortunate omen occurred. Both were on the steamer "Malabar" at Point de Galle in Ceylon. The ship succeeded in striking a hidden rock in the harbour and was entirely wrecked. The lives, even, of the Ambassadors were in danger and important papers were lost².

Lord J. Russell on Apr. 17, 1860, wrote to Lord Elgin outlining a course of procedure³. He was instructed in the first place in regard to territory. If a sufficient apology were made for the Taku affair and the treaty of Tientsin ratified, the need for an occupation of Chinese territory as a guarantee for the indemnity might be avoided, by appropriating a portion of the Chinese Customs duties. If these schemes were impossible, he could consult with the French Ambassador as to the joint occupation of Chusan or some other portion of China besides Canton, until the indemnity had been paid.

In regard to the reception question, the envoys of England and France must go to Peking and "be received there with honour." They could use their judgment as to the continued residence. But there was one great danger threatening in all these plans. It

¹ Order in Council, March 7, 1860, Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 56.

² *Annual Register*, 1860, [259. *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, Walrond, p. 325.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] pp. 29 and 30.

was present in Lord Russell's mind as it has been in the minds of so many statesmen of so many countries. The Emperor of China, Lord J. Russell feared, might leave Peking and go to Tartary. This would be very embarrassing to the allies. How close the parallel with the events of 1900! In 1860 the flight, as we shall find later, was to Tartary. In 1900 it was to Hsian.

A course of operations, Lord J. Russell continued, on the sea-coast during the winter, and a blockade, would be expensive and, further, might place the Chinese Emperor in great peril. The rebellion might spread and the Empire be reduced to anarchy¹. Hence, the need of great caution on the part of the two Ambassadors, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros. But there were, according to the instructions, three matters which were essentials. These were, "First. An apology for the attack on the allied forces at the Peiho.

"Secondly. The ratification and execution of the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

"Thirdly. The payment of an indemnity to the allies for the expenses of naval and military preparations²."

The troops reached China and on Apr. 21, 1860, the forces of England and France occupied Chusan³.

At Shanghai, meanwhile, there was trouble brewing. It is one of the strange characteristics of warfare in

¹ "The rebels would take heart; the great officers of the Empire might find it difficult to maintain the central authority; the Governors of Provinces might hardly be able to quell insurrection. In short, the whole Empire might run the risk of dissolution." Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 30.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 30.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 58.

China that, while in the north the legions of the allies were fighting against the Emperor, in Shanghai the troops of those same nations might be assisting the soldiers of the Emperor to overcome the rebels who had lifted their heads against his Government.

On May 25th, 1860, a traveller entered the Foreign Settlements of Shanghai. He brought news of the greatest moment. The Taipings were just sweeping down upon Soochow when he had left that place. Many boats filled with fugitives were coming to Shanghai¹.

Mr. Bruce in concert with M. de Bourboulon, the Minister of France, decided that it was necessary on "grounds of policy and humanity," that the scenes of carnage and loot which had occurred at Hangchow, when that city was attacked by the rebels, should not take place at Shanghai². Since it was an open port and the connection was so close and intimate between the Foreign Settlements and the native city, Mr. Bruce considered that the latter could not be attacked without great danger to the former. He, therefore, thought that "without taking any part in this civil contest, or expressing any opinion on the rights of the parties," the forces of England and France "might protect Shanghae from attack, and assist the authorities in preserving tranquillity within its walls³."

He and M. de Bourboulon, therefore, issued proclamations separately, but in the same terms, promising to call upon the foreign forces, in case of need, "to

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 61.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 60.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 60.

prevent the inhabitants of Shanghai from being exposed to massacre and pillage, and to lend their assistance to put down any insurrectionary movements among the ill-disposed, and to protect the city against any attack¹."

The Taotai of Shanghai, in his great anxiety, prayed that this same protection might be extended to Soochow. The Roman Catholic missionaries joined in these intreaties. There were some 13,000 native Christians in that city, whose welfare caused them great uneasiness, should the rebels make good the capture of the place. They begged the French General de Montauban to send troops to save Soochow. The General was inclined to do this and asked Colonel Foley to tell Mr. Bruce that he would send 1500 men, if Mr. Bruce would send 400 marines with them².

Mr. Bruce, however, did not feel able to join or to allow the English forces to take part in such a project for several reasons. In the first place, the British Commanders-in-Chief had stationed the marines at Shanghai to protect that port and not to make expeditions into the interior. Information about the rebels was uncertain. Further, it seemed hazardous to send a force of only about 2000 men to keep themselves at Soochow and retain their communications with the coast. The Chinese authorities, also, were evidently interested in trying to induce the foreigners to fight against the rebels and therefore postpone or defeat that which was the object of the allies in the north, during that season. Moreover, it did not seem politic,

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 62.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 65.

“to intervene beyond the legitimate protection of foreign interests, without a previous settlement of” their “differences with the Court, and a distinct understanding with the Government as to the extent and nature of the assistance that is to be rendered¹.”

M. de Bourboulon agreed with Mr. Bruce that the scheme to advance to Soochow was subject to grave objections and it was dropped. The protected radius did not extend four miles from the town. The English Minister suggested that two of the gates of the native city of Shanghai should be given to the foreigners to hold and this was done².

It was thought that Shanghai might escape the Taiping visitation after all, but the hot summer season was not destined to go by, without a call from them. Toward the last of August³ they made their advance. It took Mr. Bruce by surprise, for it was thought that if they did attack, the overture would not come for a fortnight⁴.

The rebels said afterwards that they had been invited by the foreigners to come to Shanghai. Mr. Bruce held, however, that they had been told in the most unmistakable fashion that it was the intention to defend the town⁵.

On the night of Aug. 17th, 1860, the western horizon, as seen from the Foreign Settlements of Shanghai, was aglow with the light from the flames

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 66.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 66.

³ 1860.

⁴ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 129.

⁵ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] pp. 129, 148.

of burning towns and villages¹. The Taipings were approaching. Early the next morning the rebels took possession of the Roman Catholic Church and College at Sicawei and this became the head-quarters of the Chung Wang or insurgent leader, who came from Soochow to command the siege.

A fort of Imperial soldiers situated between Sicawei and the West Gate of Shanghai was now the object of attack. There were only about fifty Imperialists in it and after a sharp fight they broke into a dead run for the West Gate. The Taipings hoped to rush through the gate in pursuit and so capture the city by a method by which they had succeeded in capturing other cities. This time it was a failure. Captain Cavanagh commanded the bridge to be destroyed and the rebels were met by the fire of rifles and canister from the wall. High wooden towers had been put up at different places along the walls and at the Ningpo Joss-house. From these the flat level country around Shanghai could be observed for a great distance. During the day the Taipings hid in large numbers among the houses in the south suburb. The country around, with its trees and graves, and houses, made an admirable cover for the foe. Driven from the South Gate, the rebels retired for the night toward the Baby Tower. Among those killed on the side of the Taipings was one European, but a half-breed who

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 145. Extract from *North-China Herald* of Aug. 25, 1860. See also *London Gazette Extraordinary*, Nov. 14, 1860, and *The Story of Shanghai*, by J. W. Maclellan, published at *North-China Herald Office*, Shanghai, pp. 47—50.

was with him escaped. There were several foreigners observed among the rebels.

During all Saturday night, fire was set to the houses in the suburbs outside the West and South Gates, to prevent them from being used by the enemy as cover. One pathetic incident is related. The people who were firing the houses near the South Gate found an old woman in a cottage. She was sitting on a coffin which she refused to abandon, saying that she would like to be burned. The men then took the coffin, metamorphized it into a boat and she was taken over the city moat¹.

Sunday was also a day of fire. The insurgents had almost reached the French quarter during the past night. The French had thereupon set fire to this rich suburb and a great stock of goods was consumed. The flames from a sugar hong or soy factory are said to have shot upwards from it in fearful grandeur². At 2 o'clock a couple of gunboats came down the river. The firing from the South Gate began again.

Sunday night there came the ominous calm pre-saging the tempest. On Monday³ files of men could be seen moving toward the West Gate. They were the Taipings advancing again to the attack. It is said that the Imperialist soldiers, after firing a couple of shots, ascended the battlements, hung their legs over it and enjoyed a good smoke, while their enemies were hiding in the graves and rushes below. But the

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 146. Extract from *North-China Herald*.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 146. Extract from *North-China Herald*.

³ Aug. 20, 1860.

insurgents now seemed to have turned their attention to the English Settlement. They placed their flags within 200 yards of the race-course stand but slowly retired before the shell-fire of the foreigners. Shells were also dropped from gunboats in the river among the Taiping forces¹.

The insurgents had had enough, for on Monday evening and Tuesday they retreated out of range of the powerful missiles. On Wednesday came the daring ride of Mr. Forrest who volunteered to take to the Taipings some dispatches. He, with one soldier who had a white napkin fastened to his bayonet, rode out to the rebel camp. There they met an officer to whom they delivered the communications².

The next day a party found that the rebel camp had been abandoned and only a few badly-clothed insurgents were seen. In the evening the church at Sicawei was visited by two gentlemen who discovered the damage and murders committed there³. The Taipings were in the full swing of retreat. Their victorious march had been arrested by a handful of foreigners and their soaring plans checkmated in the design. On Aug. 31st, 1860, Lieutenant Pritchett reported that he, together with Mr. Forrest and a mounted escort, had made, the day before, a reconnaissance of the villages and country in the outskirts of Shanghai near the Bubbling Well and Sicawei. At

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 147. Extract from *North-China Herald*.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] pp. 147—8. Extract from *North-China Herald*.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 148. Extract from *North-China Herald*.

a small collection of houses, about a quarter of a mile from the Bubbling Well in the direction of the race-course, he was told that the rebels had been there, but as he was likewise informed that "they had killed and carried off 'myriads,'" he considered that he could not trust the accuracy of the testimony, especially in regard to numbers!

In the village at the Bubbling Well he found several houses burnt and destroyed. The extensive village called "Fei-who" on the road between the Bubbling Well and Sicawei seemed to have had almost every abode broken into by the Taipings and some had been set fire to. At Sicawei the French priests gave the party much information and told them of the damage done there¹. The retreat, however, of the Taipings was in earnest and they seemed to have vanished into the distance, leaving their trail of conflagration and destruction behind them. The battle of Shanghai was finished¹.

We must resume the thread of the narrative of the events at the north and go back a little to the month

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 136. Mr. Maclellan thus describes one of the scares among the Chinese in Shanghai during the affair. "But the frequent panics among the natives were fearful things. As an instance of them: one day an alarm was given in the Maloo that the rebels were at the Bubbling Well, and almost in an instant, crowds of Chinese in that quarter, and the adjacent alleys, fled toward the Bund. Women and children were trampled to death in the mad flight; men who were carrying off silver and other valuable[s] left them in their chairs and joined the shrieking, terrified flood of fugitives. Many when they reached the Bund rushed into the river and several were drowned." *Story of Shanghai*, J. W. Maclellan, p. 50. *North-China Herald Office*, Shanghai.

of June in 1860 before the occurrences at Shanghai. On June 28th Baron Gros arrived in Shanghai and the next day the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine came¹. The English force concentrated at Taliénwan. The French were at Chefoo. The plan at first had been that General de Montauban should disembark with the French to the south of the Peiho, about 25 miles from the Chinese forts². This scheme was afterwards given up³.

Lord Elgin found that the demands had not been accepted by the Chinese which Mr. Bruce had made in his March ultimatum and that the French demands had also not been complied with. On the other hand no signs of hostilities on the part of the Chinese had yet appeared. A passive attitude had been the only policy. He, therefore, consulted with Baron Gros and decided to await the seizure of the Taku forts and the opening of the way to Tientsin before another communication should be made to the Emperor of China. This was to be the course pursued, unless circumstances should arise making some other method preferable⁴.

The French had decided to land at the same place as the English and, on Aug. 1st, 1860, the troops began disembarking from the ships at Pehtang, north of the Peiho⁵. The Commanders-in-Chief were obliged

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 75.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 76. Also see *Incidents in the China War of 1860 compiled from the private journals of General Sir Hope Grant*, by Henry Knollys, p. 34.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 94.

⁴ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] pp. 87—8.

⁵ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] pp. 94 and 96.

to step out into the mire, and where the soldiers first landed the mud came up to their knees. After about five hundred yards they came to drier ground.

Some Tartar cavalry watched this first step in the invasion of China but they quickly disappeared. That night Mr. Parkes went up toward the town to investigate the fort. When he reached its gate he pushed it open and found everything deserted. Next day the troops occupied the town and fort. A reconnaissance was made on the 3rd towards the Peiho. Some Tartar horsemen succeeded in wounding six men each of the French and English forces during the sortie but retired when guns were brought to bear on them¹. After the landing there was some correspondence between Lord Elgin and the Governor-General of the province, named Hang, but there was no prospect of an acceptance of the allies' demands².

On account of the heavy downfall of rain, making the country almost impassable, the troops did not leave Pehtang until Aug. 12th, 1860. A column under Sir Robert Napier struck off to the right of the road from Pehtang to Sinho to turn the left of the Tartar force. It was delayed by the heavy condition of the ground. The main column, however, proceeded along a causeway which ran between the two towns.

Sir R. Napier's force, on getting to a distance of 1500 yards from the Tartar cavalry, opened fire. The fierce horsemen were surprised but not dismayed. There was a marsh which separated them from their adversary but they streamed out across it through a

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 97.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 104.

narrow passage and surrounded the foreigners in a huge circle. The cavalry under Brigadier Pattle then charged and the Tartars retired from the field in disorder. During this and other fighting on the left, some Tartars came to within 450 yards of the Buffs, "and bore unflinchingly for a considerable time such a fire as would have tried any troops in the world." Finally, the whole opposing force fled and Sir R. Napier's men joined again the allied column¹.

Meanwhile, Sir John Michel's division and a French battery attacked the Chinese works. These were left and the Chinese were pursued into the second line of works at Sinho and then again retreated. Some interesting documents were seized here in the apartment of the Chinese General. This personage had fled so quickly that a cup of tea on the table was still warm when the foreigners entered the room².

On the 13th³, the ditches and creeks on the banks of the Peiho towards Tangku were bridged during the night and on the 14th the allies arrived within a mile of that place. Here a battery and some junks on the right bank were silenced by the allies' guns, and the junks burned⁴.

Then came the advance to Tangku. The artillery came to within 350 yards of the works. A passage was found across a double ditch at the side of the river and the 60th Rifles went in as the Chinese fled.

¹ *London Gazette Extraordinary*, Nov. 4, 1860, General Sir J. Hope Grant's dispatches to the War-Office.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 107.

³ Aug. 13, 1860.

⁴ *London Gazette Extraordinary*, Nov. 4, 1860.

The French, at the same time, entered by the main gate. The Chinese were in this way pushed back slowly but relentlessly. The garrison at Tangku retreated, some to the north forts and some across the river¹.

Tangku had fallen. The next object in view was the attack on the Taku forts. Here, there was a difference of opinion between General Sir Hope Grant and General de Montauban of the French force, as to the scheme of operations. The French general wished to cross the river to attack the town of Taku but the English commander saw grave dangers in the plan. An extract from his private journal will be of interest in this connection. He wrote: "The French general now proposed to me that both our armies should cross the river, and attack the town of Taku, which was intrenched, and the large southern fort on the right bank. This plan, upon further consideration, appeared to me very hazardous, as our right flank would thereby be uncovered and exposed to the attacks of cavalry; while even were the main fort, with its numerous and powerful armament, to fall into our hands, the remaining defences would give us much trouble. I therefore determined to adhere to my original intention and endeavoured to convince General de Montauban that by gaining possession of the upper northern fort, we should be able to command all the others. In vain; he remained unmoved, but told me that if I was determined to carry out my plan, he of course would give me his assistance—

¹ *London Gazette Extraordinary*, Nov. 4, 1860.

but that he should feel obliged to write a protest against it¹."

Hence, the next step was to reduce the fort on the left bank of the Peiho, two miles from Tangku. To this end, siege guns and ammunition were brought from Pehtang and the Admirals agreed that the gunboats should cross the bar that morning. They were to attack the outer north and south forts, while the inner north fort was to be the aim of the troops on land. The Chinese were up with the lark on that day, however, and the land forces were obliged to begin work an hour before they had planned². But, at 7 a.m.³, the fire of the foreign artillery began to tell. A tremendous explosion showed that the magazine had been reached. Not many moments elapsed before the gunboats effected a similar explosion in the outer north fort.

The French infantry now advanced on the right and the English on the left. A part of the storming party got to within thirty yards. The French crossed the ditches and tried to escalade the walls but could not succeed as they met a stout resistance. The Sappers also were having hard work in trying to lay a pontoon bridge. Then two howitzers were brought to a distance of fifty yards from the gate. A breach just capable of admitting one man had been made, when the English storming party, crossing, partly by the French bridge and

¹ *Incidents in the China War of 1860 compiled from the private journals of General Sir Hope Grant, by Henry Knollys, pp. 76—7 and see ff.*

² *London Gazette Extraordinary, Nov. 4, 1860.*

³ Aug. 21, 1860.

partly by means of swimming, forced their way in most bravely, one by one, and the regimental colours of the 67th were planted on the cavalier by Ensign Chaplin¹. The French also at the same instant had got in and the Chinese fled in confusion and were fired on by the storming party and by some of the guns, so that "the ground outside the fort was literally strewn with the enemy's dead and wounded²."

After an hour, all the forts hoisted flags of truce but "an evasive and insolent reply" was returned upon enquiry and the allies were "defied to come on to the attack." The infantry, supported by the guns, moved toward the outer north fort but not a shot was fired by the Chinese. The ditches were crossed, the walls scaled, without any resistance, and the garrison of 2000 men made prisoners³. The loss of the Chinese general in command, and of the second in command and the hard times at the capture of the first fort were the reasons assigned by Gen. Sir Hope Grant, for the confusion which seemed to prevail in the forts, after the first was taken.

The day had been won by the allies. As evening came on, detachments of troops were sent over the river in boats to occupy the south forts, whose garrisons were seen to be leaving⁴. Thus fell the great Taku forts and the way to Tientsin was open.

The booms across the river were taken away but

¹ *London Gazette Extraordinary*, Nov. 4, 1860.

² *London Gazette Extraordinary*, Nov. 4, 1860.

³ *London Gazette Extraordinary*, Nov. 4, 1860.

⁴ *London Gazette Extraordinary*, Nov. 4, 1860. See also Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] pp. 128—9.

the iron stakes, in two double rows, were a more difficult obstacle to meet and not until the next day was a passage opened for the gunboats to pass up the river and moor off Tangku¹. During the movement toward Tientsin, when the ships came to a spot about ten miles below the city, Mr. Parkes learned that the Chinese had abandoned the idea of defending the works recently constructed there by the Tartar General Sang-ko-lin-sin². The garrison and guns had been taken away. The next morning the gunboats started out and on arriving at Tientsin, Admiral Hope informed the Viceroy that the city must be considered in the possession of the allies. The marines during the interview took the East Gate and put up the English and French flags³.

Again, Lord Elgin took another trip up the Peiho to Tientsin. Again, as on the voyage through those same waters two years before, the moon shone down on the unaccustomed scene as the ships of the strangers passed up the river⁴. Again Kweiliang, whom we have already met as a negotiator of the treaty of 1858, was appointed to act with Hangfuh, the Governor-General

¹ *London Gazette*, Nov. 6, 1860. Admiral J. Hope's dispatch to the Admiralty.

² "Sang-ko-lin-sin's Folly. The mud wall built during the last war to keep off the Allied Forces from the city of Tientsin by the celebrated Mongol general of that name, who was familiarly known to the British sailor of the same period as 'Sam Collinson.'" *A Glossary of Reference on Subjects connected with the Far East*, by H. A. Giles, M.A., LL.D. See also, for an account of the career of the general, *A Chinese Biographical Dictionary*, Sêng-ko-lin-sin, by the same author.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] pp. 126—7.

⁴ *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, Walrond, p. 3: 7.

of Pechili, as a Commissioner¹. Hang-ki was appointed Assistant Imperial Commissioner².

On Aug. 29th the Earl of Elgin wrote to Kweiliang reaffirming the March ultimatum, which had been sent by Mr. Bruce. Further, in regard to the amount of the contribution from the Chinese Government which had been left indefinite in that ultimatum, Lord Elgin said he was authorized to receive 4,000,000 taels in addition to the 4,000,000 already arranged for by the treaty of 1858. As a guarantee, the port of Tientsin must be opened, forthwith, to foreign trade. The British would then retire to Taku and Teng-chou until the indemnity had been paid in full. If the demands were not agreed to, a further advance would be made from Tientsin³.

On Sept. 2nd the Commissioners in reply gave a positive assurance that the treaty of 1858 would be faithfully observed. All the points in the March ultimatum and in Lord Elgin's dispatch of Aug. 29th were conceded in full⁴. A draft convention was then drawn up⁵. So, at last, the dawn of peace seemed assured, and after all these years of weary warfare, the white dove appeared about to descend and the Orient to emerge once more from the welter of blood and carnage. But again hope was doomed to disappointment and again must the weary advance be made, until, after penetrating to the Empire's capital, these

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 124.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 150.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 152.

⁴ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 152.

⁵ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 153.

great questions were to be settled in a new order, which was to last for the long forty years to come.

A serious discovery was made. At Lord Elgin's request Mr. Wade and Mr. Parkes visited the Assistant Commissioner Hang-ki on Sept. 6th, with the draft of the convention which has just been mentioned. Then it leaked out that there was some doubt about the full powers to negotiate, possessed by Kweiliang and the other Commissioners. Vague language was used in regard to these powers which had so often been insisted upon before. It could not be guaranteed that the convention would have effect, without a previous ratification, unless it was submitted to the Emperor for approval. This, to Lord Elgin, seemed to spell delay, delay, delay. Winter was approaching in the not very far distant weeks and a most disastrous check would thus be given to the plans of the allies.

He, therefore, after conferring with Baron Gros, told the Commissioners that on account of this matter he was determined to advance to Tungchow, the city near the capital. He said he would not communicate with them again until he had reached that place¹.

After vain protests from them the advance was commenced toward Tungchow. No resistance was made at first. At Yangtsun, which was reached Sept. 10th, 1860, Lord Elgin received a note from two still higher Imperial officers, Tsai, Prince of I, President of the Clan Court and a near relative of the Emperor, and Muh-yin, President of the Board of War². Lord Elgin, in his reply, said that he had already written that he

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] pp. 156—8.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 162.

would sign no treaty before reaching Tungchow and that he intended to hold to this decision¹.

Early in the morning of the next day, the Earl of Elgin was in the saddle ready to push on. Suddenly "two white-buttoned mandarins arrived in hot haste from the North." The Imperial business required haste. They had an important letter for the British Ambassador from the Commissioners². According to this, the negotiators could not understand the hostile advance of the allies. The troops of the Chinese Government, they said, held "positions throughout the neighbourhood of Ho-se-woo, and if there should be any misunderstanding between them and the others, the negotiations of peace will be seriously prejudiced by it; nor is it possible for the Prince and his colleague to interfere³."

But Lord Elgin took no notice of this communication and pushed on to Na-tsie-tsun, about eight miles from Yangtsun. Here another letter from the Princes met him, but milder in tone than the other. They hoped Lord Elgin would halt at Ho-se-woo or Nganking to negotiate. The following sentences excited a species of grim humour in Lord Elgin's mind. "If negotiations should not run smoothly, what difficulty would his Excellency have in recommencing his march upon Tungchow? It would never be too late⁴."

Still more powerful considerations influenced the Ambassador of England to reopen the correspondence.

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 163.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 163.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 166.

⁴ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] pp. 166—7.

He found that the Commander-in-Chief considered it necessary, before beginning a march which might mean an attack on Tungchow, to collect many stores at Hesse-woo, one of the villages named in the letter of the Commissioners. Further, heavy guns must come up and all this meant a delay of at least eight or ten days and perhaps more. Also, if he persisted in the immediate advance, Lord Elgin thought that the Chinese would feel sure that the subjugation of the whole Empire was intended¹.

The Ambassador therefore requested Mr. Wade and Mr. Parkes to have an interview with the Prince and Muh-yin and deliver a letter from him, if it seemed expedient, and, at any rate, to make arrangements for the further advance². The two gentlemen undertook the perilous message, one similar to which cost so many lives as we shall see later in the story. They met the Prince and his colleague at Tungchow. Along the road they saw that a large Chinese force was in the neighbourhood but observed none of the works built later³.

After a long discussion lasting for upwards of eight hours, until past midnight, Mr. Wade and Mr. Parkes took their leave⁴. The result was a letter from the Prince of I, and Muh, to Lord Elgin⁵, in which they agreed to conclude the convention which had been communicated to Kweiliang, and after that to exchange the ratifications of the treaty of 1858 in Peking. One

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] pp. 164 and 167.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 164.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 168.

⁴ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 169.

⁵ Sept. 14, 1860.

portion of their letter, regarding the disposition of the troops during the subsequent negotiations, is very important in the light of the unexpected occurrence so soon to happen. It was as follows: "The Prince and his colleague, having thus accepted the above conditions without exception, have now to express an urgent wish that his Excellency the Ambassador will not bring up the main body of the British forces to Tung-chow, but will limit his escort to about 1,000 men: also, that the former shall not occupy any position nearer than five *li* from the town of Chang-kia-wan*. They have further to urge that English forces shall make no onward movement after the Convention shall have been sealed and signed, and that this being done, they shall be withdrawn at an early date." * "Chang-kia-wan is 12 *li* (or rather less than 4 miles) from the south face of Tung-chow: the distance alluded to will therefore be about five miles from the latter city.—H. S. P.¹"

Mr. Parkes was then requested to carry to the Prince of I and his colleague at Tungchow, another letter from Lord Elgin² which informed the Chinese Commissioners that he was willing to agree that the British main force would "not advance beyond five *li* on this side of Chang-kia-wan." It was to begin marching the next day and would not use any violence along the route, if it did not meet resistance. It was requested that a proclamation be issued stating that negotiations for peace had begun. After that, Lord Elgin would be ready to go on to Tungchow accompanied by 1000 men and sign the convention. Then he would proceed to Peking with the

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 171.

² Letter dated Sept. 16, 1860.

same escort and there exchange the ratifications of the treaty of Tientsin. He had also an autograph letter from the Queen which, he wrote to the Commissioners, he would present to the Emperor.

On behalf of Baron Gros and France, M. de Bastard was given a dispatch to take to the Imperial Commissioners. He was to go, together with M. de Méritens and M. l'Abbé Deluc, the interpreter of General de Montauban, to Tungchow, to have an interview with them. The French convention of peace, he was to tell them, would be signed in that place. The French troops would not enter the city but would encamp at a distance before reaching it. An escort of 1000 men without artillery would go with Baron Gros to Peking as well as to Tungchow. After the ratifications of the French treaty of 1858 in the capital, the army would retire to Tientsin¹.

Mr. Parkes took his letter and left on the fateful journey to Tungchow². With him went an escort of five of the King's Dragoon Guards and twenty of Fane's Horse under Lieutenant Anderson. Mr. Loch (afterwards Lord Loch), the private secretary of Lord Elgin, accompanied him. General Sir J. Hope Grant sent with this party Colonel Walker, Quartermaster-General of the Cavalry Brigade, to settle with the Chinese Commissioners a site for the camp, and also Mr. Thomson (of the Commissariat Department) to obtain supplies which were promised for the troops³.

¹ *Négociations entre la France et la Chine en 1860*, Livre Jaune du Baron Gros, p. 87.

² Sept. 17, 1860.

³ Supplement to the *London Gazette*, Nov. 27, 1860.

Mr. de Normann, an attaché of Mr. Bruce, and Mr. Bowlby, the "Times" correspondent, also went with them¹. The troops of the allies followed after an interval². The little band disappeared into the jaws of death without a suspicion.

The next morning about ten, the sound of heavy guns was heard in the distance³. M. de Bastard, the bearer of the French letter, had left Tungchow with the answer at two o'clock in the morning and now reported to Baron Gros. He had resisted the entreaties of his companions to remain in Tungchow until daylight but had come away at once with the dispatches which he had received⁴.

At noon there came a Sikh to Lord Elgin from General Sir Hope Grant's camp with a letter from Mr. Parkes. It was dated 4.30 a.m. at Tungchow and stated that the Commissioners had raised objections to Lord Elgin's dispatch. They were opposed chiefly to the request of the Ambassador that he might present an autograph letter from the Queen to the Emperor⁵. This was the last communication from Mr. Parkes until an agony of doubt had been passed through. A treacherous attack had been made on the party.

A portion under Colonel Walker were obliged to cut their way out of the Chinese army, but Mr. Parkes, Mr. Loch and one Sowar (or Sikh horseman), Captain Brabazon, Lieutenant Anderson, Messrs. de Normann

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 172.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 173.

³ Sept. 18, 1860.

⁴ *Négociations entre la France et la Chine*, Baron Gros, pp. 91—2.

⁵ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 173.

and Bowlby with a dragoon and 18 Sowars were captured¹. We shall follow their fate subsequently. For the present they remain wrapped in a veil of obscurity.

Both armies had advanced, as we have seen, following Mr. Parkes and the escort. They were amazed to see Tartar cavalry drawn up to dispute their way. Treachery was feared. When Colonel Walker escaped to the allies' lines doubt was changed to certainty. An attack was the immediate order. The French were to turn the left and the English assail the front. The result was that the Tartars were completely defeated and the English occupied Chang-kia-wan with the French encamped on this side².

All was anxiety at headquarters. The eagles would gather back their nestlings. A notification was sent to the chief Mandarin of Tungchow saying that the Commanders-in-Chief of the allied armies required all British and French subjects to return to the headquarters of the armies. If any hindrance was offered to their return Peking itself would be attacked and taken³.

On the 21st the Tartar troops were attacked and defeated and their camps, which were on the banks of the canal between Tungchow and Peking, taken⁴. The French won a great victory at the bridge of Palikao. This bridge was so named because it marked the distance of eight *li*, about two miles and

¹ *Annual Register*, 1860, [267].

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 176.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 173.

⁴ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 177.

three-quarters, on the paved road leading out from Tunchow¹. The Chinese and Tartars fought with great bravery and coolness here² and it was from this engagement that the French General de Montauban gained his title, Comte de Palikao. Then a halt was made for reinforcements. Supplies and ammunition must come up before the relief of the prisoners could be attempted³.

A still greater man now appeared on the Chinese side. A communication came from Prince Kung⁴, the brother of the Emperor, announcing that Tsai, Prince of I, and Muh-yin had been deprived of their Imperial Commission and that he himself was named Commissioner with plenipotentiary powers. He would send Hang-ki and Lau-wei-wan for an interview, and asked that hostilities be suspended⁵. Lord Elgin replied that until the missing men reappeared he would not stop hostilities or negotiate in regard to peace⁶.

¹ *Narrative of the North China Campaign of 1860*, Swinhoe, p. 259.

² See *Expédition de Chine*, Varin, chap. xxxiv.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 177.

⁴ "Prince Kung. Born A.D. 1832. The sixth son of the Emperor Tao Kuang, and brother of the Emperor Hsien Fêng who in 1850 conferred upon him the title by which he has since been known. His first appearance in public was in 1858, as member of the commission which tried Ki-ying, the great Minister who had signed the Treaty of Nanking. In the following year he was nominated member of the Colonial Board which controlled the affairs of the 'outer barbarians;' and was subsequently appointed plenipotentiary for the conclusion of peace with the victorious Europeans when in 1860 they reached the gates of the capital." *A Chinese Biographical Dictionary*, H. A. Giles, M.A., LL.D.

⁵ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 175. Letter received Sept. 22, 1860.

⁶ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 175.

In further correspondence Prince Kung said that the prisoners would be returned when the English forces left Taku¹. This was of no avail but Lord Elgin intimated that their immediate surrender would increase the prospects of peace². More correspondence took place while reinforcements were coming up to prepare the foreign armies to advance to the gates of Peking and demand the return of the prisoners.

The allies seized the Summer Palace, Yuan-ming-yuan, which the French had entered first. Much loot and many valuable papers were found there, including several memorials to the Emperor in regard to his leaving the capital for Tartary³. Some urged him to go. Others prayed him to remain in Peking, but his flight is a fact of history. On Oct. 7th the place was a terrible scene of loot. "Officers and men, English and French, were rushing about in a most unbecoming manner, each eager for the acquisition of valuables. Most of the Frenchmen were armed with large clubs, and what they could not carry away, they smashed to atoms. In one room you would see several officers and men of all ranks with their heads and hands brushing and knocking together in the same box, searching and grasping its contents⁴."

During the evening of Oct. 7th a note was handed to the deputy of the Prince of Kung, Hang-ki. In it the writer Thomas Wade said, "unless the Chinese

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 179.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 180.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 189.

⁴ *Narrative of the North China Campaign of 1860*, Swinhoe, pp. 305—6.

Government immediately send in to their respective camps the officers and subjects of the two Powers still in their hands, their Excellencies will cause the capital city of Peking to be stormed, in order to show to those who break faith and do injury to others, that sooner or later their offence will be punished¹." If the prisoners were sent back the Ambassadors of the allied Powers would name a day for the signing of the conventions and the ratifications of the treaties. On account of late events, extra precautions seemed necessary and therefore a demand was made for one of the gates of Peking to be given into the keeping of the allies and thus insure security*.

The occurrences narrated in this chapter bring to mind, in many particulars, the somewhat similar events which happened in that same capital in 1900. In 1860, as in 1900, we see the West aroused, sparing no effort, reckoning on no consequences, to rescue its fellow-countrymen in the power of the foe.

Readers of Dr. Conan Doyle's romance "Micah Clarke" remember its illustration of the old proverb "politics make strange bed-fellows." Decimus Saxon, the wandering soldier of fortune, Sir Gervas Jerome, the fop and exquisite, Micah Clarke, the grave young Puritan, forget their differences of temperament, tastes and pursuits, join their swords in a common cause and follow Monmouth to the bitter end. In much the same way, on a greater scale, in those battles still more strange across the seas, we find British and

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 188.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 188.

French in 1860 join in a common cause, in spite of differences in temperament, in aims, in methods, to rescue their beleaguered friends. Again in 1900 we see American and Briton, Japanese, German and Austrian, Italian, Frenchman and Russ forget all animosities and work in the common cause of deliverance.

We must not forget, at the same time, the higher, nobler attitude which can forgive if it cannot forget, which can see in these actions the dark background and relief to a better ideal, which the same misguided race will sometime learn to follow. Thus a noted American could say, even during the bitter days in the siege in Peking in 1900: "Hereafter the honored names of those who have perished in this struggle—names absolutely few though they may be, yet relatively to our diminished forces all too numerous—will be cherished as those who died not merely to save the lives of their own countrymen and countrywomen, but not less for the liberties of Asia."

CHAPTER VII.

THE DAWN OF PEACE.

ON the afternoon of an October day in 1860¹, eight men could be observed tracing their way toward the foreign camp, outside the walls of Peking. Lines of care and anxiety were on their countenances, but they did not move like those borne down with weariness but rather like those who had been rescued from out of the jaws of death. Great was the joy and many the congratulations when these eight entered the camp, for now the long night of doubt and worry was beginning to break. The men thus restored to their friends at the eleventh hour, as it were, included Mr. Parkes, Mr. Loch, a trooper of Probyn's Horse, M. d'Escayrac de Lauture and four French soldiers².

Now let us take up the story of the sufferings of the prisoners and the death of some who were captured on that eventful day, Sept. 18th, 1860, when we lost sight

¹ Oct. 8, 1860.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 189. For the story of the capture and imprisonment of M. le Comte d'Escayrac de Lauture see his work, *Mémoires sur la Chine*, and also, *Le Moniteur Universel*, 31 Déc. 1860.

of them for so long. After the little party had left Ho-se-woo on the morning of Sept. 17th for the journey to Tungchow they noticed, while passing Chang-kia-wan, bodies of Tartar horsemen between that place and Tungchow. Their commander met the foreigners in a friendly and courteous fashion and said "that these were some of the troops which had lately held the country between Tung-chow and Ho-se-woo, and had just been called in by order of the Imperial Commissioners¹." This officer congratulated them on "the conclusion of peace" and said, "Let us forget that we have been enemies, and henceforward know each other as friends²." The party noticed that several small bridges had been taken away from the little creek which ran past Chang-kia-wan.

At Tungchow, Mr. Parkes had an interview with the Prince of I, Muh-yin and Hang-ki. He was received courteously but in a little time they began to dispute the arrangements. The escort for the Ambassador beyond Tungchow was objected to. The forces must begin to return the moment the convention was signed. The delivery of the Queen's letter, they said, was a new demand. Opposition to the first two points was gradually withdrawn but they said explicitly that the autograph letter of the Queen could not be presented to the Emperor in person³. When Mr. Parkes left the Commissioners after a long discussion, they seemed much gratified, however, at the near approach of peace.

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 226. Mr. Parkes' report to the Earl of Elgin of Oct. 20, 1860.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 227.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 227.

Up at daybreak the next morning¹, Mr. Parkes rode out with Colonel Walker and the Chinese officer, who had been appointed to act with them in marking out the camp, to Chang-kia-wan. At that place they were amazed to see the ground on both sides of the road filled with masses of Chinese troops. The long embankment which was, as Mr. Parkes understood, the leading mark of the five-*li* point was filled with match-lock-men. Cavalry were striking out far beyond it. Guns were being moved up. Mr. Parkes asked to be taken to some officer in command who could explain these strange movements to him. Everyone returned him indefinite answers. Their General was, perhaps, ten *li* off or perhaps twenty *li* off. They did not know where he was².

Mr. Parkes was now greatly alarmed. He thought best to hurry back to Tungchow and find out if the Chinese Commissioners could not draw away the troops and so stop a probable conflict. If they could not or would not, he would take away the twenty men of the party who were stopping in the town. The little company with Mr. Parkes divided. Mr. Loch was asked to ride on and tell General Grant how affairs were going. Colonel Walker stayed on the encamping ground to take observations. We have already seen how he was obliged to cut his way back to the allied lines³.

¹ Sept. 18, 1860.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 228.

³ Lord Elgin was disposed at the time to consider that the trouble was not due to deliberate treachery on the part of the Chinese Commissioners. He wrote: "I am, however, disposed at present to doubt there having been a deliberate intention of treachery on the part of Prince Tsai and his colleague; but I apprehend that the

Mr. Parkes on his return to Tungchow met Hangki, who was greatly surprised at the unexpected movements of troops which were taking place. At Tungchow he sent after the men of his own party who were in the town and then hurried to find the Commissioners. He met them, after some search, at a temple about three miles from the one in which the foreigners had been put up. When they came, he noticed that there was a decided difference in their manner. He asked them "whether they were aware that a large force of Chinese troops had occupied the very ground which they themselves had named as the situation of the allied camp." The Commissioners replied that they were "not military authorities," and had "no control over the troops." They brought up the audience question again. Mr. Parkes said he would have to return to Lord Elgin¹.

During this interview the Mandarins with the Commissioners tried to drown Mr. Parkes' voice by speaking in a loud tone. He made notes of the Commissioners' replies in his pocket-book, took leave and went to find his party. The little company had been waiting for him about twenty minutes. Mr. Loch, who, we remember, had gone to tell General Grant of the new turn of affairs, had bravely returned with a General-in-chief, Sang-ko-lin-sin, thought that they had compromised his military position by allowing our army to establish itself so near his lines at Chang-kia-wan. He sought to counteract the evil effect of this by making a great swagger of parade and preparation to resist when the allied armies approached the camping-ground allotted to them." Lord Elgin however upheld the action of the allies because the operations of the Chinese army and the assault on a French officer justified the charge of bad faith. Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 174.

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] pp. 228—9.

message from the General, telling them to hurry back to the allies' lines. This they hastened to do.

They got by Chang-kia-wan safely. In ten minutes more they hoped to be clear of the Chinese lines and in security. It was ten minutes too late. The Chinese artillery opened fire in the front. The battle had begun.

A body of Tartar horsemen saw the party and came down the road to stop them. Mr. Parkes told an officer who they were and asked to be allowed to pass. He said they could not go by, until he had had orders from a higher officer who was near. Mr. Parkes offered to go and speak to the officer himself. Permission was given, and Mr. Parkes, with Mr. Loch and a Sowar carrying a white flag, began the fateful journey. The rest of the party, Major Brabazon, Lieutenant Anderson, Mr. de Normann, Mr. Bowlby the "Times" correspondent, a dragoon and a number of Sowars stopped at the road. They too had a white flag¹.

Mr. Parkes and Mr. Loch and the Indian Sowar lost sight of the others on going beyond a field of cane. Suddenly they met a quantity of Chinese infantry. These almost fired on them but were stopped just in time.

There was a mounted red-buttoned Mandarin on the opposite side of the canal to which they had now come. The soldiers told the foreigners that they must dismount and take a boat across. Mr. Parkes did not wish to do this but he now saw that the Chinese soldiers were regarding them as prisoners. While

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 229.

waiting, they heard cries raised of "The Prince! The Prince!" and another Mandarin rode up to meet the first. Mr. Parkes asked an officer what Prince this might be. He replied Prince Sang, that is, the famous Tartar General Sang-ko-lin-sin. Mr. Parkes knew that the Prince had himself used flags of truce in the preceding conflict and he, therefore, hoped that he would respect their own white flag at this time.

The three foreigners, therefore, dismounted to cross the canal. Just as they did this the soldiers fell upon them, tore off some of the things they had on, dragged them over the canal and threw them prostrate at the feet of the Prince¹. Mr. Parkes told Sang-ko-lin-sin his name and that he had been stopped by the Chinese troops. The Prince interrupted his remonstrances and asked him why he had not agreed to settle the audience question. Mr. Parkes said he had not been empowered to do so. The Prince then charged him with being the instigator of all the evils which his people did to China². Mr. Parkes told him that he had come by an agreement with the Imperial Commissioners. It was in the interests of peace alone. He prayed him to respect an English flag of truce as the English did the Chinese flags of truce. They were then taken to a house near by where the Prince wished him to write to the foreign troops to stop the attack. Mr. Parkes said it would be of no effect.

Prince Sang-ko-lin-sin directed that Mr. Parkes, Mr. Loch and the Sikh horseman be taken to the Prince of I. The Prince rode away and the three foreigners

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 230.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 230.

were put into a rough, open cart. Two French soldiers, whom they had not seen before, were put in with them. A French officer had just been seen led up to the house. They were driven to Tungchow, found that the Commissioners had left and then went along the Peking road. Their sufferings on the ruined stone causeway while closely packed in the cart were great. At last they reached an encampment and were made to kneel before a Mandarin named Jui-lin, a Minister of State. Here Mr. Parkes pretended to be faint to avoid a painful examination. They were moved to a house where they were searched and everything they had with them taken away¹.

While undergoing another examination before another Mandarin, they thought their last hour had surely come. The Mandarin was called away of a sudden. They heard a great rush outside the house and a party of soldiers burst in, dragged them out and fastened their wrists tightly behind them. They cried out that the foreign soldiers had been killing their people and that death was the just due for the foreigner. After a little they were seized and run out "at a swift pace" just as Mr. Parkes had noticed "the Chinese conduct their prisoners to execution²."

But another lease of life was given them and once more they were hurried into a cart of torture and jolted along the Peking road. As they left the camp, all was uproar and they could see that an advance of the allies was compelling the Chinese to retreat. After a while, two of the party in the cart were

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 231.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 231.

transferred to another. The Prince of I, Muh-yin and Hang-ki passed them in sedan-chairs but their late fellow-negotiators would not notice them. The pain and thirst of the prisoners was great but a kind soldier gave them a little water¹.

As the sun was setting, they came to the eastern gate of Peking. Swarms of people were in the street and their captors tried to make it appear a species of triumphal procession. They were driven through many roads and, at last, with horror saw themselves engulfed by the gates of the dreaded Board of Punishments. Here Mr. Parkes and Mr. Loch were loaded with chains and separated from each other².

Mr. Parkes was taken to a common prison. Thoroughly exhausted from the lack of food for 24 hours and from the need of rest, he fell asleep. It was not for long. About midnight he was carried before the Board of Inquisitors again. After a cruel examination³ he was led back to his jail. For days after this Mr. Parkes and Mr. Loch were to endure the life of prisoners, at first in separation.

The officials came to see Mr. Parkes, at first to abuse and deride him. It was different with the

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 231.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 232.

³ "It appeared to be too probable we should never meet again, and my heart sank as I said, "God bless you, Parkes," and the sound of his chains as he passed through the further courts grew fainter and fainter; while together, we could support each other, and this had been an inexpressible comfort in the trying hours through which we had passed." *Personal Narrative of Occurrences during Lord Elgin's Second Embassy to China* in 1860, Lord Loch, 1900 Edition, p. 107.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] pp. 232 and 233.

common prisoners, his companions. He received sympathy and kindness from these and they were eager to hear his stories of foreign countries and customs.

A light now seemed to shine in the deep gloom of the situation. One day Mr. Parkes was happy to find himself removed from the common room to a separate ward¹. Hardly had the change been made when a Mandarin of small rank was introduced. He said his object was only a friendly visit, but intimated that Mr. Parkes might do something to bring about peace between the nations by writing a note of some sort.

Some little time after this Hang-ki appeared in the prison cell. He told Mr. Parkes of the recall of the Prince of I and of Muh-yin to Peking and the appointment of Prince Kung, the Emperor's brother, to negotiate in their place. Hang-ki wanted Mr. Parkes to write a letter which would bring about a settlement, but he evidently had a hidden object in view and Mr. Parkes declined².

Later³ he had another visit from Hang-ki who informed him that the Emperor had left Peking for Tartary. Mr. Parkes' account of Hang-ki's conversation on this day is of the most vital interest as furnishing testimony as to the inner workings of the hidden forces of the Empire at this crisis in China's history. He wrote: "Hang-ki followed with a long speech. Grand Councils had been held, he said, on the subject of foreign relations. It was considered that the hostilities of the allies are very different on this to all previous

¹ Sept. 22, 1860. Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 234.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 235.

³ Sept. 26, 1860.

occasions, as by advancing on Peking they are attacking the Emperor himself, and not, as heretofore, the Emperor's Viceroys. The Emperor is therefore on his defence, and must fight for his Throne and Dynasty. He has therefore determined to retire to the Hunting Palace at Jehol, in Tartary, and to call in the aid of the forty-eight Mongol Princes, each of whom can furnish, probably, 20,000 men¹. But supposing that all is lost—that is, Peking taken—and the Imperial forces retreat, fighting, beyond the frontier, the dismemberment of the Empire will follow, and all trade will be at an end. Is this the course that must be adopted or not? The majority of the Princes and Ministers are for it. The Prince of Ching, Prince of I, Sang-ko-lin-sin, and others, say that peace cannot be made with the allies, because they always make negotiations an opportunity for putting in fresh demands; also that commercial relations are far more costly than profitable to China, for, although some 4,000,000 taels are received from foreigners annually as duties, the claims for indemnities—first 21,000,000 dollars in 1842, then 6,000,000 taels in 1858, and now 10,000,000 taels more—almost equal the amount that has reached the Imperial Treasury from the same

¹ "Jehol:—hot river. A summer residence of the Emperors of China, lying about 100 miles north of Peking, beyond the Great Wall, and built in 1780 on the model of the residence of the Panshen Erdeni at Tashilumbo in Tibet, when that functionary proceeded to Peking to be present on the seventieth anniversary of the Emperor Ch'ien Lung's birthday. It was here that the Emperor Hsien Fêng died in 1861, subsequent to the capture of Peking by the British and French forces." *A Glossary of Reference on Subjects connected with the Far East*. (Third edition, 1900.) H. A. Giles, M.A., LL.D.

source during the above period. The personages just named, together with a large majority of their advisers, urge war. The Prince of Kung—the brother of the Emperor—who has now the direction of the foreign question, would be glad to see some other course, but, unless I point one out, no alternative presents itself. If I will not do this, and affairs continue to go wrong, I shall make myself a mark for the public fury, which cannot be restrained at a moment of extremity¹.”

Mr. Parkes replied ably to these arguments but again Hang-ki urged him to write a letter. The prisoner said it would be of no use and continued, “As to your menace, I know that I am in danger as long as I am in your hands, because it is no uncommon thing for the Chinese to deal cruelly with their prisoners, or even to take their lives. But while I should prepare for the worst, I know also that my fate will be determined, not by your will but by that of God. On the other hand it is for you to bear in mind that although you would do the allied force but little injury by killing the few prisoners who have fallen into your hands, you would, by such an act, bring down upon yourselves a terrible vengeance².” Again Mr. Parkes begged that he and Mr. Loch might be together.

Two days later Hang-ki came again with a Mandarin named Sung, an officer attached to Prince Kung. According to Hang-ki, the Prince did not like the way in which Mr. Parkes had been treated and said it was due to the policy of Sang-ko-lin-sin and the Prince of I. Prince Kung now had the direction of foreign affairs.

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 236.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 237.

He had bidden Hang-ki go to Mr. Parkes and tell him he should have better accommodation. Hang-ki hoped Mr. Parkes would appreciate the kindness of the Prince and persuade the foreign forces to follow the same peaceful line. Mr. Parkes replied that justice and courtesy would be, as ever, the conduct of his nation. If China followed the same line, peace would follow.

A dramatic scene ensued. " 'Listen!' said Hang-ki to the three mandarins who were with him, 'he declares that his nation will act according to justice. Take off his chains!'" The fetters were torn off and Hang-ki informed him that he would probably be let out of prison the next day. Mr. Parkes replied that he hoped Mr. Loch would also have this privilege, otherwise he (Mr. Parkes) would not leave the prison. Hang-ki said he must refer to Prince Kung.

He went away but returned in a quarter of an hour and said that before he could mention Mr. Loch's removal to the Prince, Mr. Parkes must write a note saying that Prince Kung had been very kind to him and was a very able and intelligent man. Mr. Parkes replied that he knew nothing about the character and ability of Prince Kung as he had never seen him. It was not favour but justice which he wanted. After further argument, Mr. Parkes, seeing that an advantage could be gained, said that if Mr. Loch and himself were taken out of prison and were treated properly, he would be willing to put down this fact in writing and also to say, if it were wished, that he had been told that the Prince was an able and intelligent man².

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 238.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 239.

The next day Mr. Loch and Mr. Parkes were taken from the prison and met each other with a deep joy after their separation¹. They were taken to the Kaou-meaou temple. Here they had good food, beds, soap, towels and writing materials, but many soldiers guarded the outer entrance into the court. Mr. Parkes kept his promise and wrote the following note.

"The Chinese authorities are now treating Mr. Loch and myself well, and we are informed that this is done by direction of the Prince of Kung. We are also told by them that his Highness is a man of decision and great intelligence, and I trust that, under these circumstances, hostilities may be temporarily suspended to give opportunity for negotiation²." Across this note Mr. Loch wrote in Hindostanee but in English characters: "This letter is written by order of the Chinese Government.—H. B. Loch³."

Mr. Parkes now thought from conversation with a servant of Hang-ki, that the foreign army was at Pali-kao, and Hang-ki's manner, when he assumed this as a fact, assured him of it. One more march, said Mr. Parkes to Hang-ki, would bring the foreign armies to the walls of Peking. It would be best for China not to lose the last chance to negotiate⁴. During another

¹ "When I rejoined him, Hang-ki, taking me again by the hand, led me through several courts and passages until we reached a small room, where I was shortly joined by Parkes. The Chinese closed the door, and left us alone; and I will also close the door on the first few moments of our meeting." *A Narrative of Events in China*, Lord Loch, 1900 Edition, p. 122.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 239.

³ *A Narrative of Events in China*, Lord Loch, Edition of 1900, p. 127.

⁴ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 239.

visit the Mandarins blamed Sang-ko-lin-sin and the Prince of I for fighting at Chang-kia-wan¹. They now wanted Mr. Parkes to write to Lord Elgin that the army should go back ten or twenty *li* and that deputies from the two sides should hold a conference on neutral ground. Mr. Parkes refused to make any proposal at all to have the foreign army retire. He, however, was willing to write about holding an interview on a neutral spot. Private notes were also written by Mr. Parkes and Mr. Loch to be sent to their friends if possible².

On Oct. 3rd they received another call and found that Prince Kung had kept back all their letters of the 1st just mentioned. After some talk the Mandarins then gave them a letter from Mr. Wade. It was a reply to the note Mr. Parkes had written, when they were taken out of the prison, and which had been sent to the English army. Mr. Wade's letter was as follows.

“MY DEAR PARKES,

“We were glad to hear from you at last. I have written you a note in Chinese, and take my chance with this in English. Ever since the Prince Kung has begun to write, Lord Elgin has been writing to say, that if they send an officer to get the Treaty ready for signature, and send out the prisoners at the same time, peace will be made. He adds no conditions to those he insisted on before, and if the Chinese had had any sense they would have made peace a week ago. As it is, they have delayed so long that we have been

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 240.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] pp. 240 and 244.

obliged to move on the force; and if they do not make peace now, we shall be obliged to attack Peking. Our shell will easily destroy the city; and if any harm befall you all, it will be burned from one end to the other. Everyone here wishes you well; if the other fellows want anything, try to get the mandarins to inform us¹."

The Chinese knew what was in the letter from a Chinese version which was sent open with it. Hang-ki's servant brought some clothes which had been sent them from the camp. Mr. Loch examined these closely, for he thought there might be some communication hidden in them. On a handkerchief he found, worked in the embroidery, some sentences in Hindostanee. These said that the guns were in place and the bombardment would begin on the third day. They were desired to inform Lord Elgin of their exact position in the city. There were some similar sentences worked on a shirt². Mr. Parkes now told the Mandarins what danger the city was running by their delay and wrote an answer to Mr. Wade in English and Chinese³.

Oct. 4th Lau, one of the Mandarins, told them that their letters had been sent to the English camp. The next day he called again with Hang-ki. After some insistence, they gave them a note from Mr. Wade, saying that hostilities would begin if the prisoners were not released⁴. Mr. Parkes read it over to Hang-ki twice and it seemed to make the Mandarins very nervous. He told them there was only one choice.

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 240.

² *A Narrative of Events in China*, Lord Loch, Edition of 1900, pp. 130—1.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 241.

⁴ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 244.

"You have to choose between the destruction of your capital or the unconditional surrender of your prisoners." He then wrote an answer to Mr. Wade's note, again in English and Chinese¹.

Oct. 6th there was more discussion and more notes were sent, but the next morning, Oct. 7th, at daybreak the crisis seemed to have come. They heard the sound of cannon for some moments at only a short distance. Then quiet followed. Hang-ki came in at 7.45 a.m. He admitted that the allies were before Peking. The Summer Palace, the Emperor's own, Yuan-ming-yuan, had been captured the day before. He (Hang-ki) had almost been taken as he was leaving there. He had come back to Peking. The gates were all closed. The walls were manned. He had been obliged to get into a basket and be hauled up over the ramparts². Mr. Parkes said the only escape for China was to give up the prisoners. Hang-ki left and said he would be back soon, but the long, weary hours of the day passed without his return.

The next morning, Oct. 8th, he appeared and told them the reason that he had not come before. He had had an interview with Mr. Wade outside the walls. The allies demanded the immediate surrender of the prisoners and one of the gates of Peking. It was impossible to comply. Mr. Parkes told him there was no choice but to submit to the demands and that the request for the gate was a necessary procedure.

Then everything seemed dark to the prisoners and the last card played. Hang-ki appeared determined to

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] pp. 241 and 242.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 242.

resist the demands¹. But the tide turned. The darkness of despair began to melt away and the dawn of hope to break. Hang-ki, after a long conversation with a Mandarin who came in², told them that he had promised Mr. Wade that they should have their freedom that afternoon. They were to be sent out at 4 o'clock. They doubted this assurance but Hang-ki seemed very anxious. He visited them occasionally during the morning. Once he told Mr. Parkes in a whisper, "I am particularly anxious to get you away for reasons that I will tell you of at a future time, and I will not wait for the hour named to send you off³."

Hang-ki said, long after the escape from Peking, "If your deliverance had been only delayed a quarter of an hour, even Prince Kung's influence could not have saved you, as the Emperor's order for the immediate execution of yourself and Loch, without any further delay, arrived within fifteen minutes of your having passed through the gates⁴." The two gentlemen

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 243. "This, Hang-ki said, was a demand which could not be complied with; then dismissing the subject, he changed the conversation, and began to discuss a dozen indifferent subjects, amongst others, whether the earth revolved round the sun or *vice versâ*. He had been joined by a good number of mandarins; all of them quietly drank their tea, and joined in the conversation,—Parkes maintaining his share in it with as much calmness as if our lives, and probably the future fate of China, were not hanging on each moment of valuable time thus slipping away." *A Narrative of Events in China*, Lord Loch, Edition of 1900, p. 142.

² *A Narrative of Events in China*, Lord Loch, Edition of 1900, p. 142.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 243.

⁴ *A Narrative of Events in China*, Lord Loch, Edition of 1900, p. 148.

also learned from Hang-ki on that eventful day that there were other prisoners in Peking. At two o'clock he announced that they had all come and that they could go.

The foreigners were put in separate carts and went under escort to the north-west gate of the city. When the great barriers were closed behind them they found with joy that liberty had come. Their escort were afraid to go outside of the protection of the gates. The task of finding, by themselves, their friends in the foreign camp was a happy one¹. We have already seen the congratulations with which the English and French refugees were greeted there.

As to the fate of Mr. de Normann, Mr. Bowlby, the correspondent of the "Times," and the nineteen troopers (18 Sikhs and 1 Dragoon) with them, under the command of Lieutenant Anderson on the English side²; and of the Abbé Deluc, M. Dubut, and Colonel Grandchamp on the French side the armies knew nothing³. It will be remembered that some of these had waited at the road near Chang-kia-wan, when Mr. Parkes and Mr. Loch went to meet Prince Sang. Colonel Walker had cut his way out.

On Oct. 12th nine more prisoners were returned, including eight troopers of Fane's Horse and one French soldier. But at the same time came evidence of the deaths during captivity of Lieutenant Anderson and of Mr. de Normann⁴. Later on, two more Sikh

¹ Oct. 8, 1860. Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 243.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 189.

³ *Négociations entre la France et la Chine en 1860*, Baron Gros, p. 130.

⁴ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 197.

troopers were returned alive but twelve corpses were given up, including those of Lieutenant Anderson and Mr. de Normann and also that of Mr. Bowlby. Captain Brabazon, together with the interpreter of General de Moutauban, it was feared, had been beheaded under orders from a Chinese General¹. Some more French subjects, it was found, had died.

After Peking had been entered, General Ignatieff, the Russian representative, offered to have the British and French victims buried in the Russian cemetery. This great kindness was joyfully accepted. On the day of the funeral the Russian Secretary said to Lord Elgin, "To-day we look on this cemetery, not as Russian or Greek, but Christian²."

On Oct. 13th the possession of the Anting Gate of Peking was requested. The Chinese tried to postpone the surrender but were informed that if the gate were not given up by noon, Peking would be bombarded. The gate was surrendered and the flags of England and France planted upon it³.

Then came a much-debated act of reprisal which took place while the English army was before Peking. The Yuan-ming-yuan Palace⁴ was the delight of the Emperor. We have seen how the dignitaries remained there even while the mighty hosts were advancing on

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 221. *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, Walrond, note on p. 365.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 210.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 196. *Négociations entre la France et la Chine en 1860*, Baron Gros, p. 132.

⁴ "Yüan-ming-yüan:—round bright garden. Formerly the summer residence of the Emperors of China, lying about 9 miles from Peking." *A Glossary of Reference on Subjects connected with the Far East*. (Third Edition, 1900.) H. A. Giles, M.A., LL.D.

Peking. We remember how Hang-ki escaped from it to find that the only way over the walls of the capital was by a ride in a basket. We recall how the French had taken it and how both allies had had their part in its loot. A terrible retribution was sought for by the foreigners for the death of their friends. Lord Elgin wrote to Lord J. Russell that the communications from Prince Kung, even while the evidence as to the victims was being brought in, were not satisfactory. The Prince referred to peace as if already existing. He complained of the army's advance toward Yuan-ming-yuan. Lord Elgin continued, "In the more secret councils of the Imperial Court it would have been argued that the arrest of the prisoners had been a successful measure, as it had in some degree at least paralyzed our movements, and gratified the resentment of the Emperor, without entailing any specific penalty. Low as is the standard of morals which now obtains in China on such points, we should in my opinion have still further lowered it if we had not treated the act in question as a high crime calling for severe retribution¹."

At the same time Sir Hope Grant informed Lord Elgin that the army would be obliged to retire toward Tientsin on or before Nov. 1st. Further, an attack on Peking or any public building in it was not allowable on account of the terms on which the Anting Gate had been surrendered². Lord Elgin concluded that a quick, sharp blow was necessary. The demand for the immediate payment of a certain sum of money as compensation and also the destruction of the Yuan-

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 213.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 219.

ming-yuan Palace seemed to be the best actions to fulfil the conditions required¹.

Another idea of Lord Elgin at this time is of interest when compared with the scheme of most recent history of a monument to Baron Von Ketteler's memory. Lord Elgin wrote, "I had also at one time resolved to require that a monument should be erected at the expense of the Chinese Government, stating the circumstances of the arrest and murder of the British subjects illegally captured, who had died from the effects of their ill-treatment in prison, and the penalty which had been inflicted for the deed; but this proposal I finally abandoned for reasons which I have explained elsewhere²."

In extenuation of the destruction of Yuan-ming-yuan, Lord Elgin said that if a money payment alone were required, apart from the taint of "blood money," the Chinese Government could not possibly pay great indemnities in its then disorganized condition³. If, secondly, he demanded that those guilty of the cruelties or of the violation of the flag of truce be surrendered some "miserable subordinates" would be given up. A demand for Sang-ko-lin-sin himself would have been one which "the Chinese Government would not have conceded," and his own "could not have enforced." By a process of elimination the destruction of the Yuan-ming-yuan seemed the only course, the punishment falling not on the people but on the Emperor himself⁴.

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 214.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 214.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 214.

⁴ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] pp. 214—5.

Accordingly Lord Elgin wrote a dispatch to Prince Kung. A sum of 300,000 taels must be paid immediately. This would be given, at the discretion of the British Government, to those who had suffered and to the families of those killed. The Yuan-ming-yuan would be destroyed at once and to this demand no assent was needed from the Prince¹. The French also demanded an indemnity of 200,000 taels for the victims of the affair of the 18th of September².

Baron Gros would not concur in the plan of the destruction of the Yuan-ming-yuan Palace. He thought it would be a useless vengeance³. Lord Elgin, however, carried it out on his own responsibility⁴. Prince Kung agreed to the demands of the allies for the compensation of 500,000 taels, 300,000 to the English⁵, and 200,000 to the French⁶.

On Oct. 18th the Yuan-ming-yuan and all the royal palaces which lay near were set on fire. For two

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 217.

² *Négociations entre la France et la Chine en 1860*, Baron Gros, p. 138.

³ "Quant à la destruction du palais d'Été, site de campagne sans défense, elle aurait, à mon avis du moins, un tel caractère de vengeance inutile, puisque malheureusement elle ne pourrait remédier à aucune des cruelles infortunes que nous déplorons, que nous devrions ne pas y songer.....

"Je suis convaincu que nous pouvons tout finir en peu de jours, si vous ne parlez pas, dans votre lettre à Kong, de la destruction de Youène-mine-youène, et des actes expiatoires que, selon vous, le gouvernement chinois devrait faire à Tiène-tsine." *Négociations entre la France et la Chine en 1860*, Baron Gros (le baron Gros à Lord Elgin), pp. 147—8.

⁴ *Annual Register*, 1860, [269].

⁵ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 218.

⁶ *Négociations entre la France et la Chine*, Baron Gros, p. 152.

whole days the smoke from the doomed pleasure-grounds lay like a pall above them and was even blown by the wind over the camp into Peking itself. The smoke so obscured the light of the sun that it seemed as if there were a prolonged eclipse¹.

And now at last, peace began to appear, after all the gruesome story of murder and fire and pillage. On Oct. 24th, 1860, Lord Elgin went in great state, accompanied by troops of horse and foot and with bands of music playing, to the Hall of Ceremonies. There the convention between China and England was signed. Two articles had been added to the Tientsin draft convention, one, legalizing emigration from China², and the other, granting the cession of Kowloon, the strip of territory opposite the island of Hongkong. Following the signing of the convention, the treaty of 1858, after so many vicissitudes, was at last ratified³.

¹ *Narrative of the War with China in 1860*, Wolseley, pp. 278—9.

“A man must be a poet, a painter, an historian, a virtuoso, a Chinese scholar, and I don't know how many other things besides, to give you even an idea of it, and I am not an approach to any one of them. But whenever I think of beauty and taste, of skill and antiquity, while I live, I shall see before my mind's eye some scene from those grounds, those palaces, and ever regret the stern but just necessity which laid them in ashes.” *How We got to Peking*, A Narrative of the Campaign in China of 1860, M'Ghee, p. 289. (The frontispiece of this volume is an engraving from a photograph of the Yuan-ming-yuan.)

² Vigorous efforts had been made by the allied Commissioners in Canton to break up the evil system of kidnapping coolies for export. See *A History of China*, S. W. and F. W. Williams, p. 311, also, Blue Book, 1860, LXIX. [2714]. Correspondence respecting Emigration from Canton.

³ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 219.

On Oct. 25th, 1860, the French convention was signed and the French treaty of Tientsin ratified. At the ceremony Prince Kung had a little word-play with Baron Gros. The Baron expressed himself to the Prince as sorry that he could not be present in his uniform, which had been destroyed by shipwreck at Ceylon. When he mentioned this to him, the Prince showed in turn his robes and said that he himself had not put on his best garments, for, if those of Baron Gros had perished by water, the fire had destroyed his ! The Baron adds in his account of the incident that the Prince knew that he had not wished to take part in the burning of Yuan-ming-yuan¹.

But there were other forces at work at the time. The representative of another Power was making history in large lumps during this critical period in the relations between China and the world. The following news-item appeared in the *Times* of Jan. 7, 1861. "The Russians in China. A correspondent of the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*, writing from Irkoutsk on the 30th of November, gives the following account of the part taken by the Russian Envoy, General Ignatieff, in the recent negotiations at Peking.

"After narrating the advance of the Allies and defeat of the Chinese, the Russian correspondent says :—

"Meantime, our Plenipotentiary, General Ignatieff,

¹ "Une légère rougeur a coloré son visage ; et me montrant sa robe : eh ! moi aussi, m'a-t-il dit, je n'ai pas mis le plus beau de mes costumes, car si les vôtres ont péri dans l'eau, c'est le feu qui a détruit les miens !.....Il savait déjà que je n'avais pas voulu prendre part à l'incendie du palais d'Été de l'empereur, son frère." *Négociations entre la France et la Chine en 1860*, Baron Gros, p. 169.

had left Tientsin and joined the army of the Allies. Close on Peking they were still undecided as to whether they ought to enter so populous a city or not; they had sent a summons to the Chinese before the 1st of October, threatening a bombardment in case of non-compliance. General Ignatieff pointed out to them on the map the residence of the Russian embassy, and received the assurance that it should be respected. At the same time he obtained a safe-conduct for Colonel Baluzek, sent to inquire into the condition of our mission inside the besieged city.

"The Colonel found all the members of the mission in excellent health, and informed General Ignatieff of the fact. At the same time the General received a letter from the brother of the Bogdy-Khan and from the high dignitaries entrusted with the Regency who, in the name of the friendship which for two centuries has existed between China and Russia, entreated our Plenipotentiary to save China from perdition, and to undertake the office of intermediary between them and the Allies.

"Finding that the Chinese were inclined to enter into negotiations, the Allies, acceding to the representations of our Plenipotentiary, consented not to enter Peking, not to burn the Palace that had been sacked, and to encamp their troops on the walls of the town, on which they placed their guns pointed towards the interior of the city. General Ignatieff entered Peking in the first week of October with a *suite* of 14 Cossacks and alighted at the Russian Embassy. All the high dignitaries immediately waited upon him. He explained

to them that they must at once accede to all the demands of the Allies, to which they consented.....

“General Ignatieff explained to them that the barbarous treatment of the European prisoners was an infraction of the law of nations, and would call down upon them the vengeance of all Europe, even of Russia, despite the friendship of two centuries; and that to save China they must at once consent to every demand of the Allies.

“Thanks to the good offices of the Russian Plenipotentiary, the English Ambassador made his entrance into Peking on the 12th of October, was received in the Palace of Foreign Affairs, and before leaving it ratified the treaty and concluded a supplementary convention. On the following day the French Ambassador did the same¹.”

Payment was due for the services of the intermediary. The Russian additional Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Limits was signed during the month of November of this same eventful 1860. As to these negotiations with the celebrated Ignatieff, destined to be of so great importance in the future history of China, Michie says, “The winter of 1860 left the statesmen of China some food for reflection. The thundering legions had passed like a tornado which leaves a great calm behind it. The ‘still small voice’ had also departed with a province in his *chemadán*, gained without a shot or even a shout. Two strongly contrasted foreign types had thus been simultaneously presented to the as-

¹ *Times*, Jan. 7, 1861, from the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*.

tonished Chinese. Can it be doubted which left the deeper impression¹?"

But again Lord Elgin must leave the shores of China after the final accomplishment of the mission which had taken so many weary months. Mr. Bruce, his brother, now came up from Shanghai. He was introduced to Prince Kung in a visit, during which Lord Elgin told the Prince that his task was now at an end and that Mr. Bruce resumed his functions as the representative of England in China².

Mr. Bruce returned to Tientsin with Lord Elgin, however, for a time, and Mr. Adkins, one of the student

¹ *The Englishman in China during the Victorian Era, as illustrated in the Career of Sir Rutherford Alcock*, by Alexander Michie, London, 1900, vol. i. p. 359.

Neumann says, "Der russische Gesandte, General Ignatiew, soll zu dieser glücklichen und schnellen Verständigung zwischen dem chinesischen Hofe und den Alliirten viel beigetragen haben. Für solche gute Dienste mussten die Chinesen die früher zurückgewiesenen Forderungen des Czars genehmigen, wie verzeichnet im Ergänzungsvertrag zu Peking." *Ostasiatische Geschichte*, K. F. Neumann, p. 436.

For the Treaty, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 53, p. 970. See also *New Englander and Yale Review*, New Haven, Ct., U.S.A., May 1891. A Sketch of Russo-Chinese Intercourse, by Frederick Wells Williams. Also, *Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian Railway*, by Vladimir.

² Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 254. *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, Walrond, p. 371. On the occasion of a friendly visit to Lord Elgin on Nov. 3rd, the following interesting anecdote is told of the Prince's conversation. "He remained over two hours, and during the conversation after lunch said 'that until our visit this year they did not know that India was merely a province of the British Empire; they formerly believed Great Britain to be a very small island, the population of which was so large [that] more than half were obliged to live in ships.'" *Times*, Jan. 14, 1861.

interpreters, volunteered to stay in Peking during the winter and arrange the putting in order of the house selected for the Ambassador's residence¹. The allied forces left Peking during November for Tientsin², and Lord Elgin and Baron Gros sailed away homeward.

The Emperor Hienfung never returned to Peking and never saw the ruin of his palaces. His death occurred in the next year³. A very interesting comparison with the events of our day is furnished by a Chinese historian. He narrates that the Governor of the province of Shansi begged the Emperor to go to the west, and the Viceroy of Hu Kwang entreated his Sovereign to reside "somewhere between Shen Si and Shan Si until all the foreign troops should have left Taku⁴."

Thus the actors in this conflict on the shores of those distant seas trooped off the stage one by one. Thus the resources of diplomacy and military skill, of brain and muscle, of Occident and Orient had battled against each other. Now the fresh green grass could grow once more in the fields which had been the stamping-ground of the nations, which had been soaked with blood of European and Asiatic. One more great clash of steel had resounded in the Far East summoning many problems to be settled through the long procession of the years.

We have followed the story of the Arrow War with

¹ Blue Book, 1861, LXVI. [2754] p. 254.

² *Annual Register*, 1860, [271].

³ *A History of China*, S. W. and F. W. Williams, p. 337.

⁴ *China's Intercourse with Europe*. Selections from the *Record of Chinese and Western Relations*, E. H. Parker, p. 101.

China. We have seen how an insult to the British flag in the dramatic opening scene of the encounter, on the deck of a lorch in the waters of Canton, in 1856, brought the British and Chinese authorities into collision. We have seen how the foreigners took the occasion of the beginning of strife to try for the settlement of the "City Question," the admission of foreigners into Canton itself and direct official intercourse with its rulers. We have seen the resistance of Yeh and his fall and that of Canton with him in 1858.

Then came a newer question growing out of the others, the demand of the foreigners to have direct communication with Peking itself. We have read of the coming of the Great Men from the West, the forcing of a way through to Tientsin and the signing of the treaties with England and France and with the United States and Russia in 1858. We have noticed how a powerful war-party arose at Peking. This disturbing influence defeated the ratification of the treaties in the stipulated time and thrust away the foreigners from the Peiho in 1859.

Then came the greater preparations of the West, the sending of the larger forces of sea and land and the humbling again of the proud forts in 1860. We have followed the strange events at Shanghai, foreigners helping their own enemies against the rebels. We have witnessed the march on Peking, the capture of the foreigners, their tortures and death, and the final ratification of the lasting treaties of peace in 1860.

The story is of the greatest importance and of the deepest interest because of its similarity to the events

of 1900. The deeper philosophic reason underlying this fact of likeness is, that the same causes were present in both series of events, in varying proportions but producing like results. A further interest attaches to the happenings of those days because they now have really become history. In future years the group of events from 1856 to 1860 will be seen as one great landmark towering over the plain of the passage of events for forty years and not to be equalled until the Boxer outbreak of 1900 with its fresh series of changes and its new boundary in history. The French war and the Japanese war break the monotony of the flight of time, and the effect, especially of the latter, upon the thought of the world in regard to the Far East is of the greatest importance. Those conflicts do not stand, however, for such an epoch-making series of treaties and change of relations to the outside world for China, as the period 1856—60.

In those far Oriental seas, there may exist a long period of comparative calm and peace on the surface of the waters. Suddenly a great typhoon whirls up the coast, lashing the waves into fury and dealing death to all in its train. There is noise and crash and sea and foam. Then the soft, hazy calm settles down again and all is at rest until the destined time of the next tempest. As in nature, so in politics. An upheaval and then a long comparative quiet, until the next great cataclysm, the next stirring in the sleep of ages.

There are seven salient points which are the seven springs of action in the tangled web of occurrences in the Arrow War. They are also entwined with all the

meshes of the Chinese problem. Let us characterize them briefly.

(a) The "Pushful" Policy of the Powers.

Owing to the pressure from their own nationals, the merchants on the spot, and also to the desire for the glories of adventure over-sea and the defence of the flag, England and France in 1857 and in 1860 united to uphold western civilization and its representatives in China. So long as human nature is what it is, the expansion of the influences of the West must go on. It is as hopeless to fight against it as to bail out the ocean with a tea-spoon or to try and stop a steam road-roller by throwing oneself in front of it. The thought of political domination may be absent, but the power of the ideals of the West, the spirit of that "progress" which constructs ocean greyhounds and sextuple printing-presses, spins the network of wire and rail and macadam road, develops the potentialities of school-house, mill and mine, keeps knocking, sometimes softer, sometimes louder, at the doorway of an Empire of undreamt-of latent resources and says, "Come with me."

There is a story told about an eccentric doctor. He asked his wife just before his death to have a notice put up on the door after his demise reading as follows: "Dr. Blank left for Paradise at 1 p.m. to-day." The good man died and his wife followed out her late husband's wishes. A little scamp, however, who was passing noticed the sign and scrawled underneath in the form of a telegram: "Paradise. 1.01 p.m. Dr. Blank has not yet arrived. Am anxious. Peter." In the same way, the Chinese may consider that the

western world is greatly mistaken, if it thinks that China will have reached the Paradise of "progress" and national blessedness, when it favours the introduction of western machinery and methods. They would probably point to the Chinese workers whose bread has been snatched from their mouths by the progressive device of river-steamers.

The great problem is so to regulate the rate of the introduction of all this new machinery and these modern methods into China that the sufferings due to the displacement of labour and the disturbance of vested interests shall be minimized. The Chinese have seen the economic danger and have blindly tried to keep out "progress" and its attendant changes altogether, forgetting the greatest good to the greatest number which would finally result.

(b) *The Nightmare of Anarchy.*

We have seen it present in Lord J. Russell's mind when he wrote his instructions to Lord Elgin in 1860. We observed it in the moderation of the Ambassadors on the field. We noticed it in the desire of the foreigners to defend Shanghai against rebels in 1860. Mark Twain once said, "Truth is the most valuable thing we have. Let us economize it!" But there is no necessity to be economical with the truth about the motives of the Cabinets of the world. Their statesmen dare not drive the hunted quarry too far and push China into the frenzy of all lack of law and order. It serves as an antidote to the first powerful motive of action, the "pushfulness" of the Powers. They would push but it is dangerous to carry the process too far, and then again they might crush against each other.

(c) Europe aroused, flies to the Rescue.

In 1860, when the foreigners were captured, when their fate was unknown; in 1900, when the legations were besieged, when their inmates were despaired of;—in such crises motive (a) has overcome the dread of motive (b) and the hosts of the nations of the world have been fused in the melting-pot of a burning anxiety to rescue their friends.

When the crisis has passed, when the relief has been effected, then the common purpose of all the Powers, directed before toward releasing their citizens and subjects, splits up into varying policies shaped by diverse national interests. In a crisis, whether it be in 1860 or forty years later, action swift, sharp, sure, is demanded. After the necessity of rapid, unhesitating deliverance has passed and as the memory of the days of terror grows fainter and fainter and fades away, the “native hue of resolution is sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought.” The quick drum-beat no longer calls to liberate imprisoned captives and the selfish interests of the Powers again come into play.

Then we usually see two well-defined attitudes. One policy seeks vengeance and breathes forth threats and violence. The other policy is to pursue gentle measures and not to punish the culprit beyond the limit of all possible endurance. In ancient times a man who, delirious with a fever, tried to bite and beat his nurses may have been very roughly handled in response. His blood, at any rate, was drained away by the lancet of the surgeon. But modern scientific methods are gentle and aim at recuperation.

It is the same case with a larger patient. China may

be bled and bullied and made to suffer cruelly, for the wrongs which are due to the fever of ignorance, but the result, if pushed to its logical conclusions, would be to kill the sufferer. On the other hand, the policy of gentleness will win in the long run for the benefit, not only of China, but also for all nations. It is only another case of the old, old fable of the man whom the sun persuaded to take off his great-coat after all the unavailing boisterousness of the north wind.

(d) Chinese Merchants desire Peace.

We have read of Howqua and Kingqua in the old days when Canton was threatened. The representatives of the great mercantile firms wanted nothing but the political rest which is the reliance of trade. We have seen that, while there might be war at the north or the south with the foreigner, at the great open ports commerce was peacefully proceeding. As in 1857 or 1860 so again in 1900. The great Chinese merchant class are not "Boxers" any more than all the inhabitants of London are "Hooligans."

(e) The Ambitions of Allies.

We remember that clever cartoon, representing the allies in China in 1900 as men, who were all trying to ring one bell by pulling hard at the same time and in opposite directions at ropes attached to its tongue, with the result that there was no ringing. In 1857 and 1860 there were only two allies and those two pulled very well together. In 1900—I we have eight, and the resulting sounds, if there are any, are mostly jangling.

A pessimist has been said to be a man who of two evils chooses both, and at every crisis of history there

is abundance of opportunity to see nothing but the dark cloud and not a particle of silvery lining. But if we are optimistic as to China's future, this very fact of clashing interests among the allies, as the years have advanced from those palmy days of a generation and more ago, may be a solace. Otherwise, there might be no ringing of the bell because in truth it is broken.

(f) The Taps at the Door of the Empire were a Necessity.

If we lay down the proposition that progress is the law of life and prosperity and success in nations as in men, then the argument must follow that China needed to be vigorously shaken out of the drowsy influence of the narcotic of isolation. England was the nation to take the lead in 1856 to 60 with her long, proud record of equal justice to all, with her experience of Asia, and her Anglo-Saxon happy proportion of kindness and firmness which has so well fitted her to deal with Oriental peoples.

The story is told of a certain Ambassador in China who was acquainted with the Chinese language. In some of his long, fruitless, irritating discussions with the Board of Foreign Affairs at Peking, his temper utterly forsook him and he broke into a torrent of reproach in fluent Chinese. But his muse was apt to forsake him, and his memory of sufficient terms of opprobrium would fail him. While thus at a loss, the meek members of the Chinese Foreign Office would, with true Oriental politeness, supply him with words of execration in their own language and assist his jaded memory to lecture them in the choicest Chinese taunts.

There may be a world of philosophy behind this story, a mute, pathetic acknowledgment that the foreigner, with all his roughness, had, shining through the selfishness of the demands of State, the light of a real desire for the highest good of China. In the same way, the future Chinese historian may date the planting of the seed of the new spirit of progress, of "gettin' clear o' dirtiness, gettin' done with mess, gettin' shut o' doin' things rather-more-or-less," in those same days of 1856 to '60. The nations came thundering at the Empire's doors with demands for their own selfish interests, it is true, but at the same time there was a service to China's best hopes in those same rough knocks.

There is a story told about a man who was obliged to ride on a certain over-worked line of tram-cars a great deal. He was once talking with a friend and said to him, "I have ridden on that line for five years and have never offered a lady a seat." His friend replied, "I think you have never had any manners." The answer was, "That is not the point. I have never yet had any seat."

In the same way the steady forcing of the men and wares of foreign nations upon China, through the many changes of the fleeting years, may at first glance seem very rude and impolite. It was, however, a necessity arising from world-conditions, a part of the great burden of the reviving of the Orient, of the helping of a great nation to know itself, of the good which must be wrought, sooner or later, for those patient, toiling, living millions.

(g) A new Element in the Situation.

We have seen how it was a question of the influence of the war-party at Peking which precipitated the strife with the allies at the Peiho in 1859 and all the woe which followed. It was simply a question of the balance of parties, the anti-foreign, reactionary cluster among the ruling class of China winning the day over the liberal, progressive, broad-minded group.

To-day that fact has grown into a condition of the greatest importance. If the party which tends for the worse is overcome by the section which strives for the better, that element which was in its rudiments in 1859 may soon grow into the great charter of the freedom of the Chinese race.

As to the capacity of the Chinese people, when once the better forces come to the front, to live up to the high hopes so often expressed for them and to justify the efforts of so many on behalf of the integrity of their Empire and the refusal to partition it, we have Lord Lansdowne's words in the House of Lords on March 28th, 1901. "We sometimes hear that we should require the wholesale dismissal of Chinese officials, and the wholesale reorganization of the internal government of China. My lords, the regeneration of an empire numbering, I believe, 300,000,000 of people and covering about one-twelfth of the land-surface of the globe, is not a task to be undertaken light-heartedly. At any rate, I should be very sorry to contemplate the idea of insisting upon such a reform and retaining British troops in China until such time as it has been carried out. At the same time, I should be sorry to have it understood that we despair of seeing reforms in China.

I feel, personally, very confident that China is capable of better things.....Those who know Chinamen really, and have lived in China, will tell you that the Chinaman as a soldier, if he is properly led, is one of the most fearless soldiers in the world. They will tell you that as a merchant he keeps faith scrupulously, and as a workman he is laborious and frugal beyond anything to which our ideas can attain."

In the "North-China Herald" of Apr. 3rd, 1901, we read the following testimony: "...It will not be long before these two meetings at Chang Su-ho's garden in Shanghai will be recognised as marking a new epoch in the history of China. It has been the constant lament of those who know China and like the Chinese as a people that there was no public opinion in the country. But this public opinion has now been created and is spreading fast.....It is no small thing that six of the eight Viceroy's in China and a large number of the Governors of the most important provinces should have recognised the importance of these meetings and eagerly co-operated with the committee in their effort to make the Throne realise the gravity of the situation. The movement is a grave one, fraught with good for the Empire and no interested opposition or detraction can now permanently stay its progress."

There may be a great shifting of the balance of political power in China, through the means and by the methods of old-established, well-fitted, long-accustomed modes of government, a process which will be bloodless, a constitutional rather than a social upheaval. It will be a change which will bring the nobler characteristics of this great people into prominence.

The last chance for China may have already come but it has not passed. There does not yet exist the justification for the nations of the world to cast lots and part among them the fragments of a race.

We have noted the similarity of those great problems of the last generation to the events of to-day—events similar because with parallel causes. It remains for the history written in the great land of the future, to give the answer of accomplished fact to the question, whether the Arrow War was one shock in the downfall of a nation or one effort in the building of a great Empire, to be finished long after the tramp of the foreign armies had died away.

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